







THE  
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.









THE  
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.

ITS ANTECEDENTS AND ITS INCIDENTS.

BY

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[BASED UPON LETTERS REPRINTED BY PERMISSION FROM "THE TIMES."]

"Unaque hora, quadringentorum annorum opus quibus  
Alba stoterat excidio ac ruinis dedit."—LIVY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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TO  
COLONEL EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY,  
ROYAL ARTILLERY,  
LATELY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND  
TACTICS AT THE STAFF COLLEGE,  
THIS FAINT ATTEMPT TO CHRONICLE THE EVENTS  
OF THE GERMAN WAR OF 1866 IS

**Dedicated**

BY  
A FORMER PUPIL



## PREFACE.

THE only claim to consideration that the following pages can present is that for the most part they are the product of a personal eye-witness of some of the most interesting incidents of a war which, for rapidity and decisive results, may claim an almost unrivalled position in history.

The Author has attempted to ascertain and to advance facts. His object has been impartiality, his aim truth. Criticism from one so feebly competent to criticise would have been entitled to no respect, and has therefore been avoided. A few observations occasionally introduced are the results not of original thought so much as of communication with some whose positive abilities and experience entitle their opinions to be attentively weighed.





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# SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.

## BOOK I.

### CHAPTER I.

*"Who cares with foemen when we deal,  
If craft or courage guide the steel?"*  
CONINGTON.

ALTHOUGH the animosity between Prussia and Austria which led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1866 had been the gradual growth of many years, the immediate causes of collision were the consequences of the war waged by Germany against Denmark in 1864. The results of this contest were embodied in the Treaty of Vienna of that year, by which King Christian of Denmark surrendered all his rights to the Elbe duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and the duchy of Lauenberg, in favour of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of Prussia.<sup>1</sup>

The Danish war had been undertaken in the first instance by the Germanic Confederation, in consequence of a decree of Federal execution against the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, and, in virtue of that

<sup>1</sup> For translation of Treaty of Vienna of 30th October, 1864, see Appendix I.

duchy, a prince and member of the Confederation. The Diet which passed this decree had intended that the execution should be carried out by amalgamated detachments of such troops of all the States included in the Confederation as might be determined by the Diet. Some of these troops actually marched into Holstein. But the occupation of the Elbe duchies by troops of the Confederation, and the consequent establishment of these districts as an independent State, would not have suited the political purposes of Prussia. The object of this Power was not so much to free Holstein from the dominion of the Dane as to secure the harbour of Kiel for the new fleet which was to be formed in order to carry the black eagle of Brandenburg into a forward place among the naval ensigns of the world: but the Diet was determined to carry out the execution; and, if the troops of the Federal powers were once allowed to declare Schleswig-Holstein independent, the subjection of the duchies to the domination of Prussia would require a display of force and a violation of public opinion for which Count Bismark did not at that time consider himself strong enough. To annex an independent community, established under the auspices of the Diet, with a popular and chosen prince, would have roused all Germany. The policy of the Cabinet of Berlin demanded that Schleswig-Holstein should not become independent yet.

Prussia was not, however, sufficiently confident in her strength to set aside at this time, with her own hand alone, the decrees of the Diet. To have done so would have raised a storm against which she had no reason to

suppose that she could successfully bear up. England was excited, and the warlike people of that country eager to rush to arms in the cause of the father of the young Princess of Wales. France was discontented with the insolence of the English Cabinet, but might have accepted a balm for her wounded pride in a free permission to push her frontier up to the Rhine. Austria would have opposed the aggrandizement of Prussia, and all Germany would have at that time supported the great Power of the South in the battle for the liberation of Holstein from the supremacy of the Hohenzollerns as eagerly as from that of the House of Denmark. The independence of Holstein, which could not be opposed by open force, had to be thwarted by stratagem. Prussia sought the alliance of Austria with a proposal that those two great Powers should constitute themselves the executors of the Federal decree, and put aside the troops of the minor States. Austria agreed, and rues at this hour the signature of that convention. Yet she had much cause of excuse. To allow Prussia to step forward alone as the champion of German national feeling would have been for Austria to resign for ever the supremacy of Germany into the hands of her rival. Old traditions, chivalrous feeling, and inherited memories, caused Austrians to look upon their Emperor as the head of Germany, the modern representative of the elected tenant of the Holy Roman Empire's crown and sceptre. Prussia was rapidly approaching to that supremacy with gigantic strides. Austria was already reduced to the position of being the advocate of German division and of small States, purely because amalgamation and union



would have drawn the scattered particles not towards herself, but within the boundaries of her northern neighbour. To permit Prussia to act alone in the matter of the Elbe duchies would have been to see her certainly obtain an important territorial aggrandizement, and also to lose the opportunity of creating another independent minor German State, which, if not a source of strength to Austria, might be a slight obstacle in the path of Prussia.

The war against Denmark was undertaken. The Danes, terribly inferior in numbers, organization, equipment, armament, and wealth, after a most gallant resistance lost their last strongholds; while a Western Power, which had certainly by insinuations, if not by facts or words, encouraged the Cabinet of Copenhagen into the delusion that other soldiers than Danes would be opposed to the German invaders of Schleswig, calmly looked on, and sacrificed in a few weeks the reputation which, fortuitously won on the plains of Belgium, had lived through half a century. The Danish war terminated in the treaty signed at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, and the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were handed over to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia.

At this time the troops of Hanover and Saxony, which had been ordered by the Diet to carry out the decree of Federal execution against the King of Denmark, were in Holstein. The next step in the policy of the great German Powers was to rid the Duchies of their presence. On the 29th November, 1864, Austria and Prussia laid the treaty of peace with Denmark

before the *Germanic Diet*, and proposed that, since the decree of Federal execution had been carried out, the presence of the Hanoverians and Saxons was no longer necessary in the duchies, and that both the troops and Civil Commissioners of these States should be required to vacate their position. This motion was opposed by the representative of Bavaria, and was negatived by a majority of one vote. On the 30th November, however, the representative of Prussia announced in the Diet the claims of the Prince of Augustenburg to the Duchies would be settled by treaties between Austria and Prussia, and that these two Powers would enter into negotiations with the pretender on the subject, but that, in the meantime, the Saxons and Hanoverians must retire from the disputed ground, and that notes had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to Dresden and Hanover, to demand the withdrawal of the contingents of those States. The representative of Hanover declared that his government was ready to withdraw its troops: the deputy of Saxony appealed to the decision of the Diet. On the 5th December, 1864, the Diet passed the motion proposed by Austria and Prussia, in opposition to a protest from the Bavarian representative. In consequence the troops and Civil Commissioners of Hanover and Saxony were recalled from the duchies by their respective Courts, and Austria and Prussia took upon themselves the military and civil administration of Schleswig-Holstein.

Prussia stationed in the duchies six regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. Austria left there only the brigade Kalik, which was

composed of two regiments of infantry, one battalion of rifles, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of artillery.<sup>1</sup>

The Austrian Government appointed Herr Von Lederer as Civil Commissioner, who was shortly afterwards recalled to Vienna, and replaced by Herr Von Hahlhuber. The Prussian Civil Commissioner was Herr Von Zedlitz. The Hanoverian and Saxon Commissioners gave over the government of the duchies to the Commissioners of the great Powers on the 5th of December, who immediately entered upon their duties, and established the seat of government at Schleswig. The expulsion of the Civil Commissioners of the minor States from the Elbe duchies was the last act of the Schleswig-Holstein drama in which Austria co-operated with Prussia. From this time she drew near again to the smaller States, which were now embittered against Prussia.

The administration of the duchies by the great Powers was openly announced as only a temporary measure, and was regarded in this light by the whole world. Austria wished to give up what she considered only a temporary trusteeship as soon as possible, and proposed to place the Duke of Augustenburg provisionally at the head of the duchies, while the rival claims of the Houses of Augustenburg and Oldenburg to permanent occupation should be investigated. In Prussia, however, meanwhile the lust for increase of territory had been developed. It was discovered that the House of Brandenburg had itself claims to succession. In a despatch of the 13th Decem-

<sup>1</sup> The strength of the forces left would thus amount to about 12,000 Prussians and 5,200 Austrians, as troops

left here were maintained on a peace establishment.

ber, Count Bismark informed the Austrian Cabinet that Prussia could not accept the proposal to place the Prince of Augustenburg at the head of the duchies ; and that such an act would forestall the claims of other pretendants, and would be viewed with disfavour by the Courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia ; that an annexation of the duchies to Prussia could not indeed be carried out without the concurrence of Austria, but that such a step would be very advantageous to the interests of Germany in general, and would not be antagonistic to those of Austria in particular ; while Prussia's geographical position made it her special duty to insure the duchies against the recurrence of revolutionary disturbances. In this despatch the Cabinet of Berlin also proposed that in furtherance of this scheme the military organization of the duchies should be assimilated to that of Prussia, and that their maritime population should be made available for recruiting the Prussian marines and navy.

By a despatch of the 21st December Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered the above despatch from Berlin, and said that Austria had undertaken the solution of the question in the interests of Germany ; that the Austrian Cabinet was upon as friendly a footing with the Courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia, as was that of Prussia ; that Hanover made no definite claims, but only expressed ideas of doing so ; that the Austrian Cabinet would also investigate the claims of Oldenburg ; but that Russia had lately declared that she would accept as authoritative only the decision of the Germanic Confederation on the question of succession ; that if Prussia had wished to advance

claims to the inheritance of the duchies, she ought to have done so before she made the declaration of the 28th May, in common with Austria, at the Conference in London in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg. As had already been remarked in Berlin through Count Karolyi,<sup>1</sup> Austria could agree to an incorporation of the duchies in Prussia only as an equivalent for an increase of her own German territory; that if Count Bismark spoke of the obligations of his own country, the Austrian Cabinet might say the same of itself; that Austrian blood had not been spilt to destroy the balance of power of the two great German States by a one-sided aggrandizement of Prussia. The despatch, in conclusion, let the Prussian Government understand that it ought to place no difficulties in the way of the rapid solution of this important question.

The Austrian Government was now in error. This despatch demonstrated that the avowed champion of the smaller States was about to betray their cause for the sake of individual advantage, and threw a trump card into the hand of Count Bismark. By some means this despatch was communicated to an Austrian newspaper, the *Presse*, and appeared openly in public print. The Vienna police failed to discover from what sources the editor of the *Presse* had been supplied with a copy of the official document, but strong suspicions have ever since prevailed that the publication was due to Prussian agency, which had acted with the object of shaking the confidence of the minor States in the leading Power. In effect, several of the representatives of the smaller States

<sup>1</sup> Austrian Ambassador at Berlin.

sought from Count Mensdorf a declaration of what portion of territory the Austrian Government had in view in making the demand for an equivalent.<sup>1</sup> During the winter several addresses were got up by Prussian partisans in the duchies, with the object of soliciting the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to agree to the incorporation of the duchies with the kingdom of Prussia. These were strongly negatived by protests directed to the Prussian House of Commons, and were generally considered to be due more to the electioneering tactics of Prussian agents than to any popular desire for annexation. Such of the late parliamentary representatives of the duchies as could meet together energetically protested against the addresses as exponents of the national will, but no means were taken for gauging the true desires of the population. No parliamentary estates were assembled to act as the mouth-piece of the influential and educated classes; no popular vote was allowed to declare the wishes of the people. Either step might have shown that the standard of Prussia was waving over a nation which aspired to hoisting the flag of independence.

Prussia, unable without a public violation of decency to monopolise the Elbe duchies, appeared in the early spring of 1865 desirous to lay aside the idea of annexation, and, instead, to pave the way for the accession of a prince to the government of the country, who might be a feudatory at least of the Court of Berlin. On the 21st of February, 1865, a despatch was sent by the Prussian Ministry to the Cabinet of Vienna, which pro-

<sup>1</sup> It is now supposed that the equivalent Austria wished to obtain was the county of Glatz, in Prussian Silesia.

ferred to propose the measures which the Prussian Cabinet desired to see carried out in the duchies for the security of the interests of Prussia and of Germany, as well as what restraints should be placed upon the future sovereign of Schleswig-Holstein, both in his own and the general interest. The substance of this despatch was,<sup>1</sup> that Prussia desired the following guarantees from the new State of Schleswig-Holstein which was about to be established.

1. That this State should conclude a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, by which Prussia would guarantee the protection and defence of the duchies against every hostile attack, while the whole naval and military power of the duchies should form an integral portion of the Prussian fleet and army.

2. The Prussian fleet—reinforced in the manner mentioned in Article 1—is to be entitled to the right of freely circulating and being stationed in all Schleswig-Holstein waters; and the Prussian Government is to have the control on the Schleswig-Holstein coasts of pilot dues, tonnage-dues, and lighthouse-dues.

3. Schleswig-Holstein is to pay Prussia a tribute, which is to be settled on an equitable basis, for the support of its army and navy, of which Prussia will undertake the whole administration. The Prussian Government will contract for the transport of war material, &c. with the Schleswig-Holstein railways, on the same terms as it does at present with the private<sup>2</sup> railway companies of Prussia.

<sup>1</sup> For literal translation of this despatch see Appendix II. B.

<sup>2</sup> Railways not in the hands of the Government.

4. The fortresses of the duchies are to be regulated according to agreement between the Prussian and ducal Governments, and, according to the requirements of the former, for general military purposes.

5. The duties of the new sovereign of Schleswig-Holstein with regard to the German Confederation remain the same as those of the former for Holstein. Prussia will find the Holstein Federal contingent out of parts of her army which do not form her own contingent.

6. Rendsburg, in accordance with the wishes of all concerned, is to be declared a Federal fortress. Until that is done, it is to be occupied by Prussia.

7. Inasmuch as Prussia takes upon herself the duties of the military and maritime protection of the duchies, she requires that certain territories should be given up to her for the cost of fortifications, with full rights of sovereignty over them. The territories required would be at least—

a. Sonderburg, with as much territory on both banks of the Sound of Alsen as may be necessary for a naval harbour at Hjörupshaff, and the security of the same.

b. The territory necessary for the security of the harbour of Kiel, near the fort of Friedericsort.

c. Territories at both mouths of the proposed North Sea and Baltic Canal, and, besides, the right of free navigation along this canal.

d. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter into the Zollverein.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Zollverein, or General Customs Union, was entered into by most of the German States under the guidance of Prussia. The object of this union was to free the trade of Germany from the restrictions under which it lay from the

conflicting interests and custom-house regulations of so many independent States. By the Zollverein Treaty, which was re-established on the 1st January, 1854, tolls or customs were collected once for all at the common frontier of



and the administration of the railways and telegraphs of the duchies is to be amalgamated with that of Prussia.

These propositions showed that the Government of Prussia was determined to attempt to establish Prussian supremacy in the Elbe duchies. The aims of the Cabinet of Berlin were clear to the Austrian Government ; and Count Mensdorf, in the name of the latter, by a despatch of the 5th March, 1865, informed Count Bismark that a Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, under such restrictions as would be entailed by an acceptance of the Prussian proposals, could not enter the Confederation of German princes on terms of equality, and with the power of a free vote in the Diet ; that the Prussian propositions were calculated to forward the special interests of Prussia alone, but that Austria and the whole Germanic Confederation had a claim to the disposition of Schleswig-Holstein. Austria in the same despatch, however, declared herself willing to concede to Prussia the right of occupation of Kiel harbour, and would agree to Rendsburg being declared a Federal fortress, to the commencement of a North Sea and Baltic Canal, and to the entrance of Schleswig-Holstein into the Zollverein. Further, Austria would not go ; and she declared that treaties to settle the details of the above concessions could be entered into with profit only after the question

the united States, and the produce divided among them in equitable proportions. The Zollverein included Prussia, and all the minor German States except Holstein, Lauenburg, and the principality of Lichtenstein. Austria was not included in the Zollverein, but became connected with it in 1853 by a commercial treaty with Prussia, by

which both sides contracted to do nothing to prevent the free circulation of articles of trade in their respective territories, or the transit of any article of merchandise, except tobacco, salt, gunpowder, playing-cards, and almanacs ; the principal of these exceptions, tobacco, being a Government monopoly in Austria, and not in the other States.

of the sovereignty of the duchies was decided. Austria also expressed a wish to terminate negotiations from which there could be little hope that an agreement would result.

Prussia and Austria had both spoken out their designs. That of Prussia was now manifestly the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, that of Austria to thwart, hinder, and prevent the execution of Prussia's intention. Austria wished to carry out the project of establishing the duchies as a separate German State, under an independent prince, and thus to fulfil the object with which the German war against Denmark had been undertaken, and to satisfy the unanimous sympathy of Germany evoked for that war. This was doubly Austria's interest, in order to both impede the aggrandizement of her rival, and to raise up another small State, a fresh unit of German nationality, a fresh obstacle to the German unity which she had found could not be effected under her own supremacy. But the question of the Elbe duchies could not have been laid to rest in this condition, even if Austria and Prussia had both earnestly desired such a consummation. The whole Germanic people was nervously interested in its solution. In April, 1865, a motion brought forward in the Diet at Frankfort by the representatives of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse Darmstadt, which proposed that Holstein should be given over to the Prince of Augustenburg, was accepted by the majority.<sup>1</sup> This vote could, under the circumstances, have no practical result, but it showed

<sup>1</sup> This motion was brought forward on the 27th March, by Barons Von der Pfordten, Beust, and Dalwigk, the re-

presentatives of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse Darmstadt.

that the current of feeling of the small States was setting strongly against the threatened preponderance of Prussia, and made Prussia feel that henceforth her policy must be antagonistic to, and subversive of, the dynasties of the minor Germanic States.

Another element of discord had been in existence ever since Austria and Prussia had undertaken the joint government of the duchies, but it was not till the summer of 1865 that the quarrels between the Commissioners of the two Powers became so frequent and so stormy that they threatened to lead to a German war, through which the results of the conflict of 1866 might have been anticipated by a year. The Austrian Hahlhuber and the Prussian Zedlitz, engaged in a joint government, and primed by their own Cabinets to support diametrically opposite lines of policy, could not fail often and seriously to disagree. The Austrian wished to encourage the expression of popular feeling in the duchies, and to support the manifestation of popular sympathy for the Prince of Augustenburg: the Prussian desired to repress all expressions of political feeling, except such as emanated from the partisans of incorporation with Prussia. These difficulties in the administration of the German provinces at the mouth of the Elbe were reflected in the society of Vienna and Berlin. Feelings rose high, and an appeal to arms seemed more than probable, when Prussia deemed it prudent to reopen negotiations with Austria. The celebrated personal meeting of the sovereigns of the two countries was arranged. The Emperor Francis Joseph and King William met at the little town of Gastein, on the banks

of the Achen, about forty miles south of Salzburg, and from their interview originated the Convention of Gastein, which was concluded on the 14th, ratified on the 20th August, 1865.

This convention consisted of the following heads :

1. Both Powers, Prussia and Austria, reserved to themselves the common sovereignty over the duchies Schleswig and Holstein, but Austria takes upon herself the provisional administration of Holstein, Prussia takes upon herself that of Schleswig.

2. Prussia and Austria will propose that a German fleet should be established, and Kiel declared a Federal harbour. Until the resolutions of the Germanic Confederation are carried out the navies of Prussia and Austria are to use the harbour of Kiel ; but Prussia is to have the command in that harbour, to regulate the police there, and to acquire all territorial rights necessary for the security of this harbour.

3. Austria and Prussia will propose at Frankfort<sup>1</sup> that Rendsburg be declared a Federal fortress ; until Rendsburg is recognised as a Federal fortress, it will be occupied by Austria and Prussia in common.

4. As long as the division of the administration of Schleswig and Holstein between Austria and Prussia endures, Prussia is to retain two high roads through Holstein, one from Lübeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg.

5. Prussia, on her side, takes upon herself the care of a telegraphic communication and postal line to Kiel and to Rendsburg, and also the construction of a direct

<sup>1</sup> The Parliament of the Germanic Confederation assembled at Frankfort.

ailway from Lübeck by Kiel through Holstein, without raising claims to sovereign rights over the line.

6. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter the Zollverein.

7. The construction of the North Sea and Baltic Canal, with the results naturally accruing therefrom, is given over to Prussia.

8. With reference to the financial arrangements established by the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th October, 1864, all remains as of old. Only the duchy of Lauenburg is to pay no share in the expenses of the war, and the tributes of Schleswig and Holstein are to be divided in proportion to the amount of their populations.

9. The Emperor of Austria gives up the duchy of Lauenburg, with all rights as gained by the Treaty of Vienna, to the King of Prussia, who will pay for this 2,500,000 Danish dollars in the Prussian silver currency, four weeks after the ratification of this Convention.

Thus by the Convention of Gastein the administration of the duchies was territorially divided between Prussia and Austria: Prussia obtained certain proprietary and administrative rights of great importance in Holstein; and, what is most notable, Austria sold her rights to the duchy of Lauenburg, which she had acquired by conquest in common with Prussia, and thus tacitly recognised the validity of the Austro-Prussian conquest of the Danish duchies, and of the right of either Power to dispose of the conquest as it might desire, were the concurrence of the other obtained.

The Convention of Gastein was opposed on many sides. The princes of the small Thuringian states of Weimar, Meiningen, and Coburg protested against the

clause by which Lauenburg was ceded to Prussia. The national party in Germany expressed loud disapprobation of the severance of Schleswig from Holstein. The French and English Ministers for Foreign Affairs in confidential notes expressed unfavourable opinions of the Convention. The Prussian House of Commons was loud in its censure of the Convention, and of the Government which by concluding it menaced a heavy demand from the Prussian finances for the purchase of Lauenburg. The King of Prussia, however, paid for the ceded rights of Austria over the duchy out of his own private purse; the protestations of foreigners were disregarded; and, on the 15th September, Lauenburg was occupied by the Prussians.

In the few succeeding days the Prussian troops, except those whose retention in that duchy had been specially agree to, withdrew from Holstein into Schleswig and Lauenburg. The Austrian force which had been in the two duchies concentrated itself in Holstein, under the command of General Gablenz, who was made Governor of Holstein by the Emperor Francis Joseph. General Gablenz retained Herr Von Hahlhuber as Civil Commissioner, but after a short time the latter was replaced by Herr Von Hofman.

The King of Prussia nominated General Von Mantuffel as Governor of Schleswig, to whom Herr Von Zedlitz was attached as Civil Commissioner.

## CHAPTER II.

### FRUITLESSNESS OF THE GASTEIN CONVENTION.

THE Convention of Gastein silenced that portion of the German press which had, during the summer of 1865, openly anticipated a rupture between Prussia and Austria, and had indulged in calculations as to which side Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, and Hanover would be forced to espouse. It seemed that civil war between divisions of the Germanic people would be avoided ; and for a time the two great Powers of Central Europe, by acting cordially in common, led many men to believe that community of interests and unity of policy was secured between them. Thus, when the Diet assembled at Frankfort declared against the Convention of Gastein, the Governments of Austria and Prussia alike sent warning notes to the Frankfort Senate. Again, when in November, 1865, the representatives of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse brought a motion before the Diet which proposed that Austria and Prussia should now call an assembly of the estates of Schleswig and Holstein, which might participate in the solution of the question of the duchies, Austria and Prussia alike protested against this motion. Still, those who looked forward into the future

foresaw that there were latent circumstances which foretold an approaching dissolution of the cordiality of the great Powers. One of these circumstances was the rising amity between Prussia and Italy; but more important was the jealousy for supremacy in Germany which the present position of affairs in the duchies was only too well calculated to rouse to action.

Prussia published, in the beginning of October, 1865, the opinion of the law officers of the Crown with respect to the question of the duchies. This opinion was practically that all rights over the duchies originated in the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th October, 1864, and that all rightful claims of the House of Augustenburg to the crown of these provinces would have been annulled by this treaty, even if such claim had ever existed; but that, in fact, no rightful claim ever had existed.

The Austrian administration in Holstein, notwithstanding this publication, allowed the rights of the Prince of Augustenburg to be continually treated of by the press, and at public assemblies, as a matter on which no doubt could be entertained, and suffered considerable agitation to take place in favour of his rights. The Prussian administration in Schleswig, on the other hand, allowed it to be understood that all such agitation would be regarded as treasonable, since it was calculated to thwart the aims of the temporary sovereign.

Nor was the Prussian Government disposed to look on calmly while the duchy of Holstein was permitted the right of free opinion and free discussion, the tide of which invariably seemed to set against the idea of incorporation with Prussia. On the 30th January, 1866,



Count Bismark despatched a note to Vienna, in which he pointed out to the Austrian Cabinet how the conduct of its administration in Holstein must infallibly complicate the general relations between the two Governments. This note was hardly despatched when a monster meeting of the Schleswig-Holstein Unions<sup>1</sup> at Altona gave the Prussian Minister occasion to despatch a second, which is of peculiar interest.

In this note Count Bismark recalled to mind the happy days of Gastein and Salzburg, and expressed his belief, that Austria would be united with Prussia, not only in a conviction of the necessity of withstanding revolutionary ideas, but also in the plan of the campaign against such ideas; that affairs were now assuming a very serious aspect; that the bearing of the Government of Holstein must be regarded as directly aggressive; and that the Austrian Government ought not to carry on against Prussia in the provinces the same agitation which it had united with the Prussian to quell at Frankfort. The note went on to say that the Convention of Gastein had treated of the administration of the two duchies as only a provisional measure; but that Prussia had the right to advance that Austria, during the epoch of the provisional government, should maintain in Holstein the *status quo* in which she had received the province, in the same manner as Prussia felt herself bound to preserve this *status* in Schleswig. The Prussian Government requested the Austrian to ponder upon the matter, and then to negotiate. Were a negative or evasive answer returned, Prussia would be forced to adopt the

<sup>1</sup> Vereins.

conviction that Austria, prompted by a traditional antagonism, no longer wished to act harmoniously in union with her. This conviction would be painful, but Prussia must finally see her way clearly. If it were made impossible for her to act in concert with Austria, she must obtain full freedom for her own policy in order to contract closer alliances in other directions for the advancement of her own immediate interests.

The negative and evasive answer was returned in a note from Count Mensdorf, on the 9th of February, in which this Minister, in the name of Austria, declined the responsibility for the national assemblies, because the duchies were only under a provisional government. The Count added, that Austria was well aware she did not occupy Holstein as an acquisition, but that so long as the provisional government might last, she considered herself perfectly free in the administration of the duchy, and could admit no control from any quarter.

This despatch from Vienna was the first step towards the development in a crisis of the political circumstances which now followed rapidly, one after the other. Austria saw in the Prussian declaration a hidden threat of war, and an open reference to an intended alliance with her mortal foe, Italy, and believed that she was threatened with an imminent and simultaneous attack on both her northern and southern frontiers. This belief was strengthened by the apparent fact, that a council was held at Berlin, on the 23th of February, under the presidency of the King, to which the chief of the staff of the army, General Von Moltke, and the military Governor of Schleswig, General Von Manteuffel, were

summoned. Austria accorded no faith to the most pacific assurances on the part of Prussia that these fears were groundless. Nor was her confidence in the peaceful intentions of her rival established by the denial of a rumour which had gained public credence, and which asserted that the question discussed at this council had been whether, under the aspect of political circumstances, Prussia ought to prepare herself for the war which might be the result of their development ; nor by the assertion that no preparations for war of any kind had been made in Prussia. Austria, anxious at the same time for her position in Germany and Italy, full of mistrust and anger against Prussia, badly directed and counselled, perhaps also instigated by the embittered enemies of Prussia in Germany, began early in the month of March her preparations not only for a war, but also for a struggle of which the intended object was to support the Germanic Confederation against Prussia.

## CHAPTER III.

### COMMENCEMENT OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

OPEN antagonism between Prussia and Austria was declared by the exchange of notes which was mentioned towards the end of the last chapter.

Prussia had acquired full freedom for her own policy by the Austrian answer to her declaration of the 26th of January, and men in Germany looked around anxiously to see what use Count Bismark would make of this liberty. For a time the wary Minister gave no signal of what he was about to do. Many expected that, face to face with the strong military power of Austria, and with the sentiment of all Germany hostile to him, he would be obliged to treat with Vienna.

The solution of a conflict between different States depends ultimately always upon strength. Prussia, therefore, naturally desired to reinforce her strength, and to replace the alliance which had been broken by some new alliance.

But where to turn for the new alliance? In Germany there was no hope of finding friends among the Governments, for these were all interested in the maintenance of small States, and naturally antagonistic to national community. Nor were the people of Germany at this

time at all disposed to regard Count Bismark as their champion, or accept him as the leader of a national party. The late quarrels between the Prussian Minister and the Prussian Commons, the press prosecutions in Prussian territory instigated by the Government over which he presided, the conservative tendencies of his views on taxation, marked him out more as the enemy than the harbinger of a free national unity. The people of Germany were at this time no allies of the counsellor of the head of the House of Hohenzollern.

As no alliance could be found in Germany, the Prussian Minister looked abroad, and there saw, in the south-western frontier of the territories of the Kaiser, a natural ally to join hand-in-hand with Prussia against Austria. This was the newly formed, hardly consolidated kingdom of Italy. This ally could boast no long list of victories borne on the banners of its soldiery, its traditions did not reach seven years back, its army was composed of raw levies; but its people were feverish, eager, and covetous to gain Venetia, and to inflict a blow upon the detested Austrian.

Before the conclusion of the Convention of Gastein, in the middle of the year 1865, when at that time a rupture of the alliance between Austria and Prussia appeared possible, the latter Power had drawn near to the young kingdom of Italy, and had entered into negotiations for the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the Zollverein and that kingdom. The larger number of the minor States which belong to the Zollverein<sup>1</sup> had not yet recognised the kingdom of Italy,

<sup>1</sup> See page 12.

and their rulers had no desire now to do so, for the recognition of a sole sovereign of the united peninsula would be tantamount to a recognition of the advantage of the concentration of the small States which had, previously to 1859, been independent portions of Italy, and of the superfluous character of their reigning dynasties. On the other side, Italy would not enter into negotiations with a Confederation of which most of the component States still denied her title-deeds of kingdom. Prussia stepped in as mediator. Italy was happy to be recognised. The small States of the Zollverein were forced into agreement with the proposals of Prussia. Count Bismark threatened to dissolve the Zollverein. The mere threat drove a probe into the mercantile classes of all Germany; the interest of the monied aristocracy was brought to bear on the Governments; and on the 31st December, 1865, a commercial treaty between the newly recognised kingdom of Italy and the Zollverein was signed.

When the prospect of a war between Prussia and Austria arose in the spring of 1866, came Italy's opportunity to complete the work which had been commenced at Magenta, to secure and unite to herself the only province which, still under the rule of the foreigner, prevented her from being free from the Alps to the Adriatic. Italy naturally drew as close to Prussia as she possibly could. Austria requires a long time to mobilise her army, and had begun her preparations for war in the middle of February. Public attention was directed to them by a council of war held at Vienna on the 10th March, to which Feldzeugmeister Benedek was summoned from Verona. At this council the party in

favour of war was strongly predominant ; and decided that Austria was strong enough to take the field against Prussia and Italy at the same time, provided that measures were taken to isolate Prussia in Germany, and to draw the States of the Confederation to the Austrian side. At this council too high an estimate appears to have been formed of the strength of Austria, and far too low a calculation made of the powers of Prussia ; for the opinion of the council seems to have been that Austria could only emerge from such a war as a decisive victor. Italy was so detested, that all Austrians wished for an Italian war ; and, with justice, among the Austrian soldiery a proud contempt was entertained for the Italian army. It was considered that Prussia, weakened by an internal political conflict, could not unite her contending parties in a common foreign policy. Nor was a high opinion entertained of her military resources and organization. The professional papers and periodicals of Austria ingeniously demonstrated that Prussia, however hardly pressed, could not place her normal army on a complete war-footing, because trained men would be wanting. The writers of these articles calculated that the battalions of infantry could only be brought into the field with a muster-roll of eight hundred men ; no consideration was paid to the Landwehr,—in fact, doubts were in some cases thrown upon the existence of Landwehr soldiers at all, and those who believed in their existence entertained no doubts of their certain disloyalty. It was also calculated that the Prussian army would have to make such strong detachments for the garrisons of fortresses that a very small force would be

left for operations in the field. These false calculations, the first step and perhaps the most certain to the bitter defeat which ensued, were due to defective information, and to the absence from the War Office of Vienna of those detailed accounts of foreign military statistics, deprived of which any country that undertakes a military measure of any kind necessarily gropes in the dark. To isolate Prussia from Germany, and to entangle her in a strife against overwhelming numbers, the plan of Austria was to draw the Germanic Confederation into a decisive action against Prussia,\* in order that the Confederation might be implicated in the question in dispute between Austria and Prussia concerning Schleswig-Holstein. Austria was certain of gaining, by the vote of the minor States, a majority in the Germanic Diet against the aims and objects of Prussia. If Prussia bowed to the decision of this majority, her position of power in the Confederation would for a long time be shaken, but if she refused to accept this decision, then would arise a favourable opportunity to declare Federal execution against Prussia, and to crush her with the whole forces of the Confederation.

After this council of war, the Austrian preparations were secretly pushed forward. The fortresses, especially Cracow, were strengthened and prepared for defence, and the troops in Bohemia were reinforced. These armaments and military movements excited the attention of Prussia. Questions were asked: Austria answered that the population of Bohemia had broken out in riots against the Jews, and that the Imperial Government was necessarily obliged to send troops into the disturbed



districts for the protection of its Jewish subjects. The Prussians averred that, by a singular coincidence, the care and protection of the Jewish subjects drew the troops suspiciously close to the frontier, while the Jews chiefly resided in Prague, the capital and almost the central point of the province of Bohemia.

The Austrian army in a mobilisation, before the war of 1866,<sup>1</sup> had to be increased from the 269,000 men, whom it mustered on a peace footing, to 620,000. It therefore required the recall of over 350,000 men on furlough, or soldiers of reserve, to complete its strength. This increase of force could only conveniently be made in the recruiting districts of each regiment, because the men who are called in for each regiment must be clothed and armed by the fourth battalion, which is always stationed in time of peace as a weak depôt in the recruiting district. In March, 1866, the quarters of many regiments of the Austrian army were changed, so as to bring the battalions into the vicinity of their recruiting depôts; and several regiments from Italy, Galicia, and Hungary, which could conveniently receive their full complement of men only in Bohemia, Moravia, or Austrian Silesia, were moved into those provinces. By these means the Austrian forces in Bohemia were, by the end of March, reinforced by about twenty battalions of infantry and several regiments of cavalry, which were, however, to avoid suspicion, still retained upon a peace footing; while the purchase of horses, and the

<sup>1</sup> The Austrian army, in consequence of the disastrous results of the late campaign, is now being reorganized.

The text alludes to the former organization of the army.

completion of fourth battalions to full strength, commenced in various parts of the Imperial dominions.

At the same time the Austrian Government took steps to strengthen the fortresses in Italy, and to protect, in case of war, the coasts of Istria and Dalmatia. In the same month an extraordinary but very secret military activity commenced in Wurtemberg and Saxony. All ideas of armament were officially denied by Austria, but the Prussian agents did not fail to observe their existence. The King of Prussia had already taken action, and issued a decree by which the authors of any attempts to subvert his own authority or that of the Emperor of Austria in the Elbe duchies, were threatened with imprisonment. This decree was published by General Von Manteuffel in the duchy of Schleswig on the 13th March, and gave occasion for the Austrian Ambassador at the Court of Berlin to ask Count Bismark, on the 16th March, whether Prussia seriously intended to break the Convention of Gastein. Count Bismark answered No, and added that he could make no further answer by word of mouth, as oral conversations were easily liable to be misunderstood, and that, if the Austrian Ambassador desired any further information on the subject, it would be better that he should put his interrogations in writing. This was not, however, done.

Directly after the council of war at Vienna, on the 10th March, Austria had taken steps to array the minor States against Prussia, and to secure their co-operation. In a circular despatch of the 16th March, the States of the Germanic Confederation which were inclined towards Austria were warned of the warlike attitude of Prussia,

and were cautioned to take heed to the armament of their contingents and to their completion to war strength, since Austria had an intention to soon bring before the Germanic Diet a motion for the mobilisation of the Federal army.

The movement of troops in Bohemia daily excited the apprehensions of Prussia. There still rankled in that country, the memory of 1850, when she, unprepared, suddenly found herself opposed to Austria fully armed, and was forced to submit to the terms dictated to her at Olmütz. Count Bismark had, however, provided that no such fate should befall her in 1866.

Although he knew well the position in which he stood with regard to the minor States, he considered it advisable to force from them a declaration of their policy. In a despatch of the 24th March he declared that, on account of the armaments of Austria, Prussia was also at last obliged to take measures for the protection of Silesia; for, although Austria at present spoke in peaceful terms, it was to be feared that these would alter as soon as her preparations for war were completed. Prussia, he added, could not, however, remain content with measures calculated for her momentary safety alone; she must look into the future, and seek there guarantees for that security which she had in vain anticipated from her alliance with Austria. Prussia, of course, under these circumstances, looked in the first place towards the other German States; but her perception ever became clearer that the Germanic Confederation in its present form did not fulfil its aim, not even did it do so when Austria and Prussia were united,

much less would it when these two Powers were dis-united. If Prussia now were attacked by Austria, she could not expect the support of the Germanic Confederation: she could only rely upon the goodwill of the single States which had promised her their help without reference to the bonds of the Confederation. In this despatch, therefore, Prussia wished to ask with what feelings she was regarded by individual States; and, that she might prove their sincerity towards her, she would in any case desire a reform of the political and military constitution of the Confederation.

This despatch of Count Bismark, which was really only a question to the minor States of how they would act in case of a war between Prussia and Austria, was answered by their respective Governments in almost identical terms. With one accord they pointed to the Eleventh Article of the Charter of Constitution of the Germanic Confederation, by which all States members of the Confederation bound themselves never to make war against each other, but to bring their differences before the Germanic Diet, which was to be the mediator and arbiter between the disputants. How worthless any such article can be to restrain physical by moral force was never more clearly demonstrated than in the late struggle, when the Germanic Confederation was shivered to pieces in the shock of battle of its contending members.

Prussia now saw it was time to make her preparations for war. Austria had earlier begun to arm, but the more elastic military organization of Prussia, the constant attention—sprung from the knowledge of her statesmen that, sooner or later, a German war would take place—

which had for many years been devoted to her army, more than compensated for the start of a few weeks which Austria had gained.

By decrees of the 27th and 29th of March the first armaments were ordered in the provinces most exposed to attack from Austria. The battalions of the five divisions which garrisoned the provinces contingent with the Austrian and Saxon frontiers were placed on the highest peace footing, but not yet increased to war strength. Five brigades of field artillery were, however, fully completed; and the armament of the fortresses of Glatz, Cosel, Neisse, Torgau, Wittemberg, Spandau, and Magdeburg commenced. Prussia, confident in the rapidity with which her whole army could be mobilised, was able to limit herself to these purely defensive augmentations, which entailed an increase of only about 20,000 men to the army always maintained in time of peace. She deferred till the last necessary moment the raising of the army to war strength, in order as long as possible to leave the men, who must be called into the ranks, to their trades, professions, and labours. Of this increase of the army no secret was made; the decree which ordered it was openly published and commented upon in the daily press.

On the 31st March, Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced to the Cabinet of Berlin that all movements of troops in Bohemia had really taken place only in consequence of the riots against the Jews, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph had never contemplated an attack on Prussia:

On the 6th April Prussia announced in answer that

she had not been the first to arm, and that now she only had taken defensive measures. The Austrian Government replied on the following day that no overwhelming concentration of troops had taken place in Bohemia, in fact nothing to approach what the Austrian organization could place in the field if a great war were in prospect ; that no extraordinary purchase of horses had been made, and that the number of men who had been on furlough recalled to the ranks was not worthy of mention ; that any discussion as to priority of armament was rendered superfluous by the declaration of the Emperor, that he had never contemplated an attack on Prussia ; that the Cabinet of Vienna desired only a similar declaration on the part of King William ; and that, since no preparation for war had been made in Austria, it was only necessary that Prussia should repeal the armaments which had been decreed at the end of March.

On the 15th April, Count Bismark sent a note to Vienna, in which, without argument, he assumed that Austria had armed, and had commenced to arm before Prussia, and expressed his opinion that Austria should be the first to commence to disarm.

On the 18th Count Mensdorf replied, and promised that Austria would move the troops quartered in Bohemia from those positions in which Prussia had considered that they were intended for an attack upon Silesia.

Count Bismark, on the 21st April, remarked in reply that, on authentic news being received of the disarming of Austria, Prussia would follow step by step in the same course. Scarcely, however, had Austria named the 25th of April as the termination of all military proceedings

which might be supposed to be intended against Prussia, than the promise of disarmament was stultified by the announcement that, although Austria would disarm in Bohemia, she was compelled to take decisive measures for the defence of Venetia against Italy.

Prussian partisans argue that the armament of Venetia was an equal threat against Prussia as the armament of Bohemia, but this was not necessarily the case. Six hundred thousand Austrian soldiers south of the Danube would require as long a time to be moved to Saxony as would suffice to mobilize the whole Prussian army. But Prussia was allied with Italy, and although she chose to fancy that Austrian troops in the Tyrol might be intended to act upon the Elbe, in reality she saw in them the means given to Austria to crush an army allied to Prussia, after the defeat of which Austria might turn her undistracted forces against her German enemies.

There is no doubt that Italy had already armed, and was fully prepared to take advantage of the opportunity of a war between Prussia and Austria to attack Venetia. The open threat that Venetia would be assailed at the first favourable moment would alone have been ground sufficient for Austria to declare war against Italy, and to sweep away an army which was avowedly maintained only to strike her in the hour of trouble. On the 22d April the soldiers of reserve and men on furlough were called up for the regiments in Venetia, and measures were taken to prepare for the field an army to act against the Italians.

These steps called forth a despatch from Count

Bismark, in which Prussia took her new ally under her protectorate, and demanded that Austria should not only disarm in Bohemia and Moravia, but also in Venetia. To this Austria did not consent, and Prussia made an advance in her armaments. This was accelerated by the discovery that some of the minor States were secretly treating at Bamberg, which aroused the suspicion that a coalition was being formed against Prussia. On the 24th April, the infantry of five Prussian corps d'armée, as well as the whole of the cavalry and artillery, were increased to war strength, but as yet were not mobilized.<sup>1</sup>

On the 26th April, Austria again reverted to the Schleswig-Holstein question, and proposed to submit the definitive decision of this question to the Germanic Confederation, and to hand over the duchies to the Prince of Augustenburg. Both these propositions were declined by Prussia on the 7th May, when Count Bismark remarked that the competency of the Confederation to decide in these international questions could not be recognised, and that the whole question could be most simply and easily settled by coming to an understanding with Austria, for the reform of the Constitution of the Confederation by the speedy assembly of a German Parliament, as had already been proposed by Prussia on the 9th April.<sup>2</sup>

Matters were daily approaching a crisis, and Prussia was determined to be ready for the conflict which would probably soon break out. The King of Prussia, on the

<sup>1</sup> The term Mobilization is applied to the administrative acts which supply a collection of soldiers with the transport, commissariat, &c. which render

them fit to be moved into and act in the field.

See page 40.



4th May, had already ordered the five corps d'armée, which had been augmented to war strength, to be mobilized; and ordered the soldiers of reserve of the other<sup>1</sup> four corps d'armée to be called in, so as to place these also upon a war strength. On the 7th May, these four corps also received orders to be mobilized; so that now the whole of the war army, as provided for by the regulations of the Prussian service, were called under arms. The mobilization was effected with wonderful rapidity and precision. At the end of fourteen days, the 490,000 men who form the strength of this army stood on parade, armed, clothed, equipped with all necessities for a campaign, and fully provided with the necessary transport trains, provision and ammunition columns, as well as field hospitals. The rapidity with which these trains were provided might almost be accepted as proof that, for several years, Prussia had foreseen that her policy would not, for any great length of time, conduct her along the paths of peace.

On the 19th May, the concentration of the Prussian army might have commenced, and actually by the end of May the troops had taken up their positions in the frontier provinces, a triumph for the Prussian machinery of mobilization. The rapidity with which this army was called together, equipped, and transported to its positions on the frontier cannot be too highly admired, especially when it is considered that more than 250,000 of the soldiers had been suddenly called in from the reserve and Landwehr. Prussian authors, with complacency, point to the army collected upon the frontier

<sup>1</sup> See *Military Organization*, p. 89.

at the very beginning of June, and indignantly demand how Europe can suppose that Prussia incited the war, when, if she wished to make an attack upon Austria, she could have done so at this moment with such a great advantage. For, although the Austrian armaments had been commenced ten weeks earlier than the Prussians, they were still in a very backward state, and the Austrian army was still far from ready to open the campaign. But was Prussia really so moderate as her advocates would have the world believe? Was it desire of peace or fear of failure which stayed her hand, and held her marshalled corps on the north of the mountain frontier of Bohemia? It may have been both, but the results of the war show that the latter entered into the calculations of those who planned the Prussian strategy. The army was ready, and might have attacked Austria, but it would in its advance have exposed its communications to the assault of the minor States, and, until forces were prepared to quell these, the main army could not assume the offensive. This appears to have been the probable cause why the troops were not at once concentrated, and pushed immediately into Bohemia.

As it was, at the very beginning the Prussian army confined itself to taking up defensive positions to cover the provinces most exposed to attack, especially towards Bohemia. The Austrian Army of the North had commenced its concentration in Bohemia on the 13th May, and Feldzeugmeister<sup>1</sup> Benedek had there taken over the command-in-chief of it on the 18th. The 1st, 5th, and 6th Prussian corps d'armée<sup>2</sup> were posted

<sup>1</sup> General of Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> See page 70.

in Silesia, the 2d and 3d corps in Lusatia, and the 4th corps round Erfurt. The Guards corps was still left at Berlin, and the 7th and 8th corps were retained in Westphalia and the Rhine provinces respectively.

Several of the minor States—such as Bavaria, Hesse Darmstadt, and Nassau—had also ordered their armies, and their contingents of Federal troops, to be mobilized during the month of May ; others—as Saxony, Electoral Hesse, Wurtemberg, and Hanover—had commenced the augmentation of the military peace establishments by the recall of men on furlough, or soldiers of the reserve.

Italy had early in the year commenced preparations for an attack against Venetia as soon as war might break out between Austria and Prussia. At the beginning of May the Italian armaments assumed a more definite form ; and, in order to enlist more closely national feeling in the probable struggle, on the 8th of that month a decree was published at Florence for the formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under the immediate command of \*General Garibaldi. All party contests, all political animosities, in Italy were silenced. The whole nation drew together for a common assault upon its traditional enemy when he should be encumbered by the heavy pressure of Prussia upon his northern frontier. The crowds of volunteers that flocked to Garibaldi's standard were so great that, at the end of May, the number of battalions had to be doubled. On this, Austria raised a compulsory loan in Venetia of twelve million gulden, which so embittered and excited Italian feeling that it seemed doubtful whether King Victor Emanuel would be able to keep his people in hand, or

prevent excitable individuals from precipitating a contest for which the moment had not yet arrived.

Thus the nations were making ready for war, each, with its hand on its sword, moving heavy masses of troops to convenient positions near the frontiers of its probable antagonist. Before detailing the positions these masses assumed, or attempting to show how they were guided into the shock of battle, it is necessary to cast a glance over the diplomatic sparring which preceded the military conflict.

## CHAPTER IV.

### PRUSSIA'S MOTION FOR REFORM OF GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.

As was referred to in a previous chapter, Prussia brought forward, on the 9th April, in the Germanic Diet a motion for the reform of the Confederation. The essence of this motion consisted in a desire that a German Parliament should be assembled by means of universal and direct suffrage, in order to introduce that unity into the central power which naturally must be wanting to the Diet, — an assembly of delegates of the various States, who acted in accordance with the instructions of their Cabinets. Prussia desired that the day for the assembly of this Parliament should be at once fixed; and declared that when this point was settled she would bring forward special motions. She wished also to employ the time which must intervene before the assembly of this Parliament in taking measures to secure the accord of the other Governments to the measures which she would bring forward.

The Prussian motion was not very agreeable to the other Governments; but it would not have been prudent to reject it altogether. The constitution of the Adminis-

trative Assembly of the Germanic Confederation was notoriously and avowedly imperfect, and few men in Germany, either among sovereigns or subjects, would not have rejoiced in its reform and re-organization. But very few Germans desired that the ideas of this reform, and the projects for its completion, should emanate from Prussia, and still less from Count Bismark.

The Diet, on the 21st April, decided that the motion should be referred to a specially-chosen Committee. And on the 26th this Committee was elected.

The object of many of the German Governments was now to put off indefinitely the calling together of the Parliament. Count Bismark, in a despatch of the 27th, recognised that this was the aim of many, and expressed his opinion that the step the Diet had already taken in referring the motion to a Committee could hardly have any other result than to postpone a solution of the question until the Greek Kalends. He said that at this time growing animosities required the completion of the work of reform; and that on this work depended the maintenance of peace, and the dissolution of the uneasiness which at present penetrated all minds.

On the 11th May the President of the Prussian Cabinet communicated confidentially to the Committee of the Diet the ground-plan of the changes which he considered ought to be made in the constitution of the Confederation. These were: the completion of the central power by means of a German Parliament, extension of the legislative competency of the new central power, removal of all restrictions on trade and commerce of every sort which then separated the Germanic States

from one another, the organization of a common system for the guardianship of German trade abroad, the foundation of a German navy, an improved establishment of the German land-forces, so that their general efficiency might be improved, while the expenses of individual States might be diminished. These proposals were, doubtless, good and worthy of regard ; but there were too many interests which would be affected by their adoption to allow such measures to be immediately accepted by the Diet. Long time would have been required to pass a motion entailing such great alterations through the Diet ; and the demand of Count Bismark for a speedy reform of the constitution of the Confederation, far from removing, aggravated the chances of war. While the steps for the reform of the Federal Constitution dragged slowly along, the preparations for war were rapidly developed, and, a few days after the despatch of Count Bismark's confidential communication to the Committee of the Diet, the decree was issued for the mobilization of the whole Prussian army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rüstow, *Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland*.

## CHAPTER V.

### BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN.

"Oh what a tangled web we weave,  
When first we venture to deceive."

It was after Prussia proposed a reform of the Federal Constitution that Austria re-opened the Schleswig-Holstein question, after a long silence had been maintained on that subject between the two great Powers.<sup>1</sup>

On the 26th April, Count Mensdorf sent a despatch to Count Caryoli, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, the contents of which were to be communicated to Count Bismark, which earnestly pressed Prussia again to turn her attention to the matter of the Elbe duchies. This despatch was naturally not agreeable to the Prussian Government, for in it Austria assumed that Schleswig-Holstein should be given over to the Prince of Augustenburg, which solution of the question would have been the most unfavourable of all to the interests and intentions of Prussia. In a letter of the 1st May, Count Bismark expressed anew his views on the question to Baron Werther, the Prussian Ambassador at Vienna, and endorsed the contents of this letter by a note of the 7th May, in which he expressed the strong desire of Prussia

<sup>1</sup> See page 20.



to hold fast to the Treaty of Vienna and the Convention of Gastein, by which the introduction of any third party, as for instance of the Germanic Confederation, into the government of Schleswig-Holstein was prohibited. Count Bismark further declared that Prussia had no intention to renounce the rights she had acquired over Schleswig-Holstein to a third party without consideration for her own interests, or for those of Germany in general: but that she was always ready to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would renounce the question of the rights to the duchies of the Elbe which she had acquired by the Treaty of Vienna. In conclusion, the Prussian Minister added the wish that Austria might act in harmony with Prussia in the question of the reform of the Federal Constitution.

For the first time in the diplomatic proceedings Prussia had now openly repudiated the idea that her hold upon Schleswig was temporary or provisional. She now insisted upon the right of conquest to that duchy, as sealed by the Peace of Vienna of October, 1864.

To this despatch Austria returned no answer. The din of armaments on all sides rose every day more loudly. All Germany, Austria, and Italy were hurrying on their harness, and rapidly becoming great camps; and men foresaw that almost any attempt to secure peace would probably only precipitate a conflict.

Austria had, on the 4th May, entirely broken off negotiations with Prussia on the subject of disarmament.<sup>1</sup> Count Mensdorf had declared that it was superfluous to argue the question of priority of argument; that it was

<sup>1</sup> See page 36.

impossible for Austria to disarm in Venetia, on account of the agitation in Italy ; and that Austria, by preparing to resist an attack on her south-eastern frontier, was protecting not only her own individual interests, but those of all Germany, and that no German State should look askance at preparations made in such a cause.

The Government of Saxony was much disturbed by the Prussian interrogation as to why that country was arming, and the concomitant demand that these armaments should cease. Fearful of an attack, Saxony, on the 5th May, proposed a motion in the Frankfort Diet, the object of which was that the Diet should promptly decree, with reference to the proceedings of the Prussian Government, that the internal peace of the Confederation was to be preserved.

On the introduction of this motion, the Prussian representative declared that Prussia had no intention to attack Saxony, and that all the armament which had taken place in his country had only been prompted by purely defensive considerations.

Nevertheless, on the 9th May, the Diet passed the Saxon motion by a majority of ten over five votes.

The middle States, at the head of which stood Bavaria, under this threatening aspect of affairs, earnestly desired to effect a compromise. They felt that, since Prussia had not been the only State to arm, it would be unfair if she only were required to declare the object of her armament. They therefore proposed a motion in the Diet to the effect that all Governments which had armed should be required to state their reasons for having done so. This motion was passed on the 24th

May, and on the 1st June the statements were to have been received.

The 1st June was an important landmark in the development of the diplomatic crisis; but, before reviewing its incidents, it is necessary to glance at external influences which were exerted in the vain, and perhaps only apparent, endeavour to preserve peace in Germany. While in Italy the whole population were clamorous for war; while Prussia, the author and originator of the whole disturbance, by her disregard of the rights of the Prince in whose nominal cause she had taken up arms in 1864, was pointing out her increased battalions as purely a defensive police for the security of her territory; and while the war party in Austria, eager to wipe out on the Mincio the memory of Solferino, and proudly confident of the power of the military empire to sweep away with one hand the feverish soldiery of Victor Emanuel, while with the other it shattered the legions of Prussia, urged the Cabinet of Vienna not to yield an item: Russia and England, led and accompanied by France, entered upon the diplomatic theatre. These three great Powers made a common attempt to avert the war by despatching, on the 28th May, almost identical notes to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the Germanic Confederation. In these notes it was proposed that the five great Powers should join in a Conference, at which the Germanic Confederation should also be represented, in order to settle by treaty the three main questions which menaced the peace of Europe. These questions were that of the Elbe duchies, of the tranquillity of Italy, and of the reform of the Federal Constitution of Germany.

The possibility of peace being maintained by these means was from the beginning extremely doubtful: even in the event of all the parties interested consenting to submit their causes to this European jury. Almost the utmost that could be expected from a Conference would be that the points of dispute might be defined, and in this manner that the theatre of war might be limited.

On the 29th May, Prussia accepted the proposal for the Conference. Italy followed this example; also the Germanic Confederation. Of what validity these acceptances were, may however be calculated from the fact that at the time of the acceptance the Confederation informed its representative, Herr Von der Pfordten, that the project had already practically fallen to the ground.<sup>1</sup>

Austria was only willing to join the Conference on condition that no territorial alterations should be there discussed. This proviso was absolutely necessary for Austria. If territorial changes were to be discussed, few could doubt but that a proposal would be made for the cession of Venetia to Italy, and of the Elbe duchies to Prussia. If these cessions took place, Austria would lose as much without a blow, in her own diminution and the aggrandizement of her German rival, as could at that time have been anticipated from the most disastrous issue of the imminent war. It does not appear that it was any desire of war on the part of Austria which made her couple her expressions of readiness to join the Conference with this condition, which appears on the contrary to have been advanced from a perhaps too honest desire to meet the wishes of the great Powers.

<sup>1</sup> Rustow, *Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland und Italien.*

To this communication of Austria the mediating Powers replied that, in their opinion, the disputant Governments should be allowed full freedom for the discussion, and if possible for the solution, of every relevant question at the Conference.

Thus matters stood on the 1st June, the day appointed by the Federal Decree of the 24th May as that on which the German Powers were to make their declarations concerning their armaments.

The Diet was assembled at Frankfort. The Austrian representative rose, and declared that Austria could look back with a calm conscience on her steady endeavours to preserve an unity with Prussia in the question of the Elbe duchies. The Emperor Francis Joseph had conceded the uttermost tittle that the dignity of Austria and the rights of the Germanic Confederation would allow. Prussia had made unjust proposals, and had expressed the intention of prosecuting and carrying out these proposals by force. As Prussia had threatened, after the Peace of Vienna, to compel the Federal troops to evacuate Holstein, so she had also threatened Austria concerning the question of the duchies with force, and had relied on the support of foreign opponents of the Imperial State. At the time of the Convention of Gastein Prussia had renewed this attempt, because Austria would not consent to administer Schleswig-Holstein according to the policy of annexation. Threatened on two sides, Austria had been compelled to place herself in an attitude of defence. The preparations against Italy might rest unchallenged at Frankfort. Austria would recall her troops that had been raised against Prussia, pro-

vided that the latter did not intend to make an attack on Austrian territory, or on any State allied to Austria, and would give security against the recurrence of the danger of war. This security would depend for Germany, as for Austria, on the fact that in Germany not force, but treaties and right ruled, and that Prussia also, although an European Power, should respect the peace and the decrees of the Confederation, and further that the Schleswig-Holstein question should be settled, not for the interest of an individual claimant, but according to the rights of those provinces and Federal rule. On the 24th August, 1865, Austria and Prussia had promised to communicate to the Confederation the result of their negotiations in reference to Schleswig-Holstein. Austria now was fulfilling this promise. That she must now declare that all her endeavours to obtain a solution of the question of the duchies which would be agreeable to the Confederation had been of no avail, and that now, in the first place, Austria yielded up everything further on this point to the decree of the Confederation, and in the second place had already ordered her Commissioner in Holstein to assemble the Estates of that duchy in order to obtain an expression of the wishes of the people as to their future fate.

Austria thus attempted to undo what she had assisted in doing by the Treaty of Vienna and the Convention of Gastein. But, in order to make restitution for her disregard of right in these two agreements, she was now obliged to break the Convention of Gastein, in handing over to the Confederation, which she had declared incompetent in this international question, the

decision of the future fate of the duchies. Her second step, by which she ordered her Commissioner, Field Marshal Gablenz, to convene the Holstein Estates, was also, if not an actual breach of the Convention, a virtual one, because by the Convention, although the administration of the duchies was divided, the rights of the two sovereigns to the common supremacy were still as much extant as ever.<sup>1</sup>

After the Austrian declaration, the representative of Prussia at the Diet rose, and said that the mobilization of the Prussian army had only taken place in consequence of the Austrian armaments; only if these armaments were annulled, and if at the same time the other Germanic States which were allied with Austria restored amicable relations between themselves and Prussia, could Prussia herself disarm. On these conditions she would disarm immediately. Prussia had only taken defensive measures. If the Germanic Confederation was not in a position to give Prussia guarantees for the maintenance of peace, if the members of the Confederation resisted those reforms of the Federal Constitution which were universally recognised as necessary, the Prussian Government must accept the conclusion that the Confederation did not attain its object, and could not fulfil the most important of its aims, and that with regard to further Federal revolutions, Prussia would act on this conviction.

The Prussian representative further defended his Government against the Austrian conception of the circumstances connected with the Schleswig-Holstein

<sup>1</sup> See page 15.

question, and advanced in support of his assertion the many declarations which Prussia had made with reference to this question.

The speeches of the two representatives of the great German Powers were the main events of the assembly of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation at Frankfort on the 1st June, 1866. The reports of these speeches were immediately telegraphed to every town in Germany, and caused great excitement. Men foresaw that a war would result by the shock of which the political circumstances and peculiar constitution of the Fatherland would be shaken to their very foundations; but no one almost supposed the outbreak of war to be so near. It was believed that Austria was much superior as a military Power, certainly at the outbreak of a war, to Prussia, but she was not yet ready, and it could not be supposed that she would urge matters on till her preparations were complete. Nor did sage men, who, wondering by what fatuous madness Count Bismark was driving his Government into a one-sided struggle, looked impartially upon the course of events, ever imagine that Prussian temerity would be wild enough to anticipate the necessity of defence through bearding a more than respected adversary by commencing the attack.

Count Bismark saw, however, in the steps that Austria had lately taken, in her summons to the Holstein Estates, and in the publication of her intentions with regard to the Elbe duchies, the final severance of the Cabinet of Vienna from his policy. No longer could Austria be persuaded to stand beside him in a common slight against, or oppression of, the body of the Germanic Confederation. Austria



had resumed her position as the champion of the individuality of small States. The spoilers had ultimately quarrelled over the allotment of their prey. The Convention of Gastein was broken through and trampled upon.

Against the breach of this Convention, Count Bismark sent a protest to Vienna; but, in anticipation of the answer he would receive to this protest, signed on the 4th June a despatch to the Prussian plenipotentiaries at foreign Courts. This despatch accused Austria of giving provocation to war; and attributed to the Austrian Government the intention of recruiting its finances by forced contributions from Prussia, or by an honourable bankruptcy.

Count Bismark at the same time took a step more likely to be productive of important results than either protests or protocols. The concentration of the Prussian army was resumed. The corps d'armée of the Guard was sent to Silesia, the eighth corps d'armée and one division of the seventh corps were forwarded by railway from the banks of the Rhine to the neighbourhood of Halle.<sup>1</sup> In Berlin a reserve corps d'armée was formed

<sup>1</sup> How it came that Prussia was able to leave the frontier of the Rhine totally undefended during the campaign, when it was evident from the subsequent demand made by France that the Government of the Tuileries had a jealous eye upon Rheinland, has remained one of the mysteries of the war. The explanation as far as yet can be discovered appears to be as follows:—In 1865 Count Bismark paid a visit to the Emperor of the French at Biarritz, and there hinted broadly that in case France

would stand aloof, and allow Prussia to work her way in Germany, compensation might be given for France's tranquillity by the cession of the Rhine provinces. The Emperor, who expected, like every one else, that the contest would be, if not favourable to Austria, certainly long and doubtful, anticipated that at a certain stage he would be able to step upon the theatre of war, and demand, from whichever side he espoused, the possession of the Rhine provinces of Prussia. He gave

of the four regiments of the Landwehr of the Guard, and of four other Landwehr regiments, while all available artillery and cavalry was drawn together, organized, and mobilized as quickly as possible.

no distinct assurance to Count Bismark of neutrality, but the Count left Biarritz with a tolerable certainty that France would not interfere, at least at the commencement of a war, and without giving any distinct promise to the Emperor of territorial compensation. When the campaign terminated as abruptly as

it did, the Emperor of the French wished to claim the price of his neutrality, but Prussia was then in a condition to enter on a campaign with France, whose armies were not armed with breach-loaders, and refused to entertain any ideas of territorial cession.

## BOOK II.

### CHAPTER I.

#### FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN.

“ The good old rule sufficeth me,  
The stern and simple plan—  
Let those take who have the power,  
And let those keep who can.”

OLD SONG.

NOTWITHSTANDING the protests of Count Bismark, the Austrian Civil Commissioner of Holstein, General Von Gablenz, issued a decree on the 5th June, 1866, by which the Estates of Holstein were summoned to meet on the 11th of that month at Itzehoe. It was, however, known at Berlin (on the same day as that on which the despatch to the plenipotentiaries of Prussia at foreign Courts was signed) that Austria was about to bring forward a motion in the Diet for Federal execution against Prussia. Accordingly, on the 6th June, Prussia published a more special protest against the assembly of the Holstein Estates, as well as a declaration that Prussia would consider such an encroachment on the Convention of Gastein as a direct breach of that agreement, and that in consequence not only was the Convention a dead letter, but that the common occupation and administration of the duchies must be

resumed as before that Convention. Orders were accordingly despatched from Berlin to General Manteuffel, the Prussian Commissioner in Schleswig, that as soon as General Gablenz summoned the Holstein Estates to meet, he should enter Holstein with his Prussian troops in order to again resume the common administration of the two duchies. Orders were given to General Manteuffel to avoid any conflict with the Austrian troops; and to assure General Gablenz that the intrusion of Prussian troops into the duchy over which he was appointed to represent the Austrian Emperor, was undertaken quite in a friendly spirit. General Manteuffel accordingly informed General Gablenz beforehand of his intention of invading Holstein, and issued this proclamation to the people of the duchy of Schleswig:—

“GOTTORP, June 7.

“INHABITANTS OF THE DUCHY OF SCHLESWIG,—

“Since my assumption of office here I have always acted towards you with frankness. Never have I had any reason to repent of that course, and I now address myself to you again with the same frankness. The rights of sovereignty which His Majesty my King and master has over the duchy of Holstein have been endangered by proceedings with which you are all acquainted. The most sacred interests of your country are placed in jeopardy, for never have the Estates of either of the duchies been called together except in view of an assembly of the general representation of an undivided Schleswig-Holstein. I am charged by His Majesty the King with the protection of those menaced rights, and for that reason I have to-day ordered the entry of troops into Holstein, as I have announced to the Imperial Governor of the duchy of Holstein that this military measure has only a purely defensive character.

“Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig,—I have learnt to know and to esteem the spirit of order and legality with which you are animated, and I now give you a proof of this esteem. At this

Schleswig is being almost denuded of troops. You will prove that the attitude which you have hitherto maintained has not been induced by fear, but by the loyalty of your character. But you, too, in your turn have learnt to know me, and you know that I am faithfully and heartily devoted to the interests of this country. You will with confidence accept my word. No doubt of the power or of the will of Prussia could find root in your minds. Let us have faith in each other.

"The Governor of the duchy of Schleswig,

"E. MANTEUFFEL,

*Lieutenant-General,*

*Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King of Prussia."*

General Gablenz did not wait for the intrusion at Kiel, where his head-quarters had hitherto been, but suddenly left that town, and concentrated the whole of his forces, which consisted of the infantry brigade of Kalik and one regiment of dragoons, at Altona. The Government of Holstein and the Prince of Augustenburg followed him quickly.

On the morning of the 8th June the Prussian troops crossed the Eider, without paying any attention to a protest launched against their proceedings by General Gablenz, and moved slowly southwards. General Manteuffel had under his command in Schleswig two brigades of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, and he crossed the frontier of Holstein with all his disposable force. Austria was naturally unwilling to resume the common administration of the two duchies as it had existed previous to the Convention of Gastein, and accordingly, by order of his Government, General Gablenz concentrated his troops in the south-western corner of the duchy. General Manteuffel, who had marched into Holstein on

the 8th June, on the 11th prevented the assembly of the Holstein Estates at Rendsburg by taking military possession of that town, closing the House of Assembly, and placing a guard over the door with fixed bayonets. General Gablenz, assailed by far superior numbers, and unable to be of any more use in Holstein, on the night between the 11th and the 12th June withdrew his troops to Hamburg, and thence despatched them by railway through Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort to the Austrian army of the north in Bohemia. From this bloodless conflict in Holstein arose the first Prussian victory, gained by the knowledge of the great rule of war, which teaches that to reap success great numbers must be hurled upon the decisive point, and that in order that these superior numbers may be forthcoming, rapidity of concentration, organization, and locomotion of troops are vitally required. This bloodless victory and the consequent evacuation of Holstein by the Austrians, had an important effect on the subsequent incidents of the war. The abandonment of Holstein added only five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry and one battery of artillery to the Austrian army in the field; while the same event left the whole of the Prussian division of General Manteuffel—which consisted of twelve battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery—free and at the disposition of the Prussians for the further prosecution of operations.

The assembly of the Holstein Estates, and the delivery of the opinion of the southern Elbe duchy with regard to its future fate, was prevented by the inroad of the Prussians. The Prince of Augustenburg departed from

the province. The Prussian Government appointed Herr Von Scheel-Plessen as Supreme President of Schleswig-Holstein. Supreme President is the title of the highest civil administrator of a Prussian province. Scheel-Plessen entered upon the duties of his new office on the 11th June ; while the non-consulted duchies looked on sulkily upon the Prussian assertions of right. The duchies came under Prussian rule when Scheel-Plessen assumed his office. This was all very arbitrary, forcible, and dependent upon main strength, but the Prussian virtual annexation of Schleswig-Holstein had one good effect. It settled the question of the Elbe duchies ; and, as far as the Seven Weeks' War is concerned, neither reader nor author will be again troubled with the intricate problem of the true rights of succession to "Schleswig-Holstein sea-surrounded."

## CHAPTER II.

### FINAL RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

ON the 11th June, 1866, an Extraordinary Assembly of the Diet was summoned.

The representative of Austria advanced the proposition at this sitting, that Prussia had broken the Convention of Gastein, and threatened the peace of the Germanic Confederation, by marching her troops into Holstein. He proposed in consequence for the restoration of peace, that the whole of the army of the Confederation, with the exception of the three corps d'armée<sup>1</sup> which, by the Federal Constitution, Prussia was bound to put into the field, should be mobilized in such form of principal, contingents, and reserves within fourteen days, that the troops should be able then to march within fourteen hours.<sup>2</sup> That care was to be taken for dépôt contingents, and that the appointment of a commander-in-chief was to take place as soon as the decree was passed; and that the supervision of all these matters was to be given over to the Diet, which was to act in concert with the military commissioner of the Germanic Confederation.

<sup>1</sup> The 4th, 5th, and 6th corps d'armée of the Federal army.

<sup>2</sup> Could a British army be mobilized and be placed in such a state within

fourteen days as to be able to march in twenty-four hours! Yet this matter of mobilization was not sufficient to oppose the Prussian armament.



The representative of Prussia at the Diet declared that he was not authorized to make any statement upon the motion which had been brought forward, the purport of which was entirely new to him.

The Austrian representative, who filled the post of President of the Diet, urged an immediate decree in favour of the motion ; and the Assembly, although the representative of Mecklenburg brought to notice, that even on the most unimportant questions, when for instance only the disbursement of one hundred gulden<sup>1</sup> was under consideration, three sittings were required, one for the introduction of the motion, one for the discussion, and one for the final vote, the majority of the Diet decreed that the final vote on the Austrian motion should be taken on the 14th June. Whoever recalls to mind the many years which the Diet consumed ere it passed the vote of Federal execution against Denmark, can hardly doubt that the deeds of Prussia had been replete with some peculiar enormity in the eyes of the princes of the small states to arouse so enthusiastic a zeal in such an usually torpid body as the Germanic Diet.

<sup>1</sup> Equal to about 10*l*.

## CHAPTER III.

### BREAK-UP OF THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.

"Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall,  
And nodding Ilion waits th' impending fall."

POPE.

"The history of mankind informs us that a single power is very seldom broken by a confederacy."—JOHNSON.

BEFORE the 14th June arrived, Count Bismark sent a definite and final project to the Governments of the various States which were members of the Germanic Confederation. The first article of this project of reform expressed "That the territory of the Confederation was to consist of those States which had hitherto been included in the Confederation, with the exception of the dominions of the Emperor of Austria, and of the King of the Netherlands." While, then, Austria wished to enlist the Governments of the Germanic Confederation in war against Prussia, Prussia desired to exclude Austria from the Confederation. As for the Government of the Netherlands, it had wished for nothing more for a long time than to be allowed to withdraw from the Confederation its two duchies which were included within that political league.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The duchies of Luxembourg and Limburg.

The next article treated of the Parliament, the common concerns of Germany, and of the privileges of the new Confederation. The German war navy, with a common German budget, with the Federal harbour of Kiel and of the Bay of the Jahde, were proposed to be placed under the supreme command of Prussia, while the land forces of the new Confederation were to be divided into two Federal armies, an army of the north, and an army of the south. The King of Prussia was to be commander-in-chief of the northern army, the King of Bavaria that of the southern, both in peace and war. In peace the commander-in-chief of either army was to superintend the efficient organization and administration of his own army; and, in urgent cases, he was to be able to call out his army within the boundaries of his own part of the Federal territory, conditionally with the subsequent approval of the Confederation. For each of the two Federal armies there was to be a common budget. The administration of either army was to be conducted under the superintendence of the commander-in-chief, and to either army the States included in its portion of the Federal territory were each to contribute their proportionate quota of soldiers. Each Government was to pay the expenses of its own contingent of the Federal army. All expenses of the military budget were to fall on the military chest of that army to which the budget was specially applied. The relations of the new Confederation with the empire of Austria were to be settled by special treaties.

These were the principal points of the project of reform proposed by Count Bismark on the 10th June.

This project surprised the majority of the German States in a very unpleasant manner. The 14th June arrived, the day for the final vote in the Diet upon the Austrian motion.

The representative of Prussia in the Diet protested against the motion being entertained, and declared that both in form and substance the motion was subversive of the ideas of the Confederation.

The votes were, however, taken, and the Austrian representative carried his motion by a majority of nine over six votes.

The details of the voting were as follows:—

For the Austrian motion there voted,—

The first Curia, Austria.

The third, Bavaria.

The fourth, Saxony.

The fifth, Hanover.

The sixth, Wurtemberg.

The eighth, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel).

The ninth, Hesse-Darmstadt.

The sixteenth (Lichtenstein, Waldeck, the two Reusze, Lippe, Lippe-Schaunburg, Hesse-Homburg).

Of the thirteenth Curia (Brunswick and Nassau), Nassau.

Of the twelfth Curia (Saxe Weimar, Saxe Altenburg, Saxe Coburg, and Saxe Meiningen), Saxe Meiningen.

Of the seventeenth Curia (the four free towns, Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Frankfort), Frankfort.

Against the Austrian motion there voted,

The seventh Curia, Baden.

The eleventh Curia, Luxembourg and Limburg (belonging to the Netherlands).

The twelfth Curia, with the exception of Saxe-Meiningen.

Of the thirteenth Curia, Brunswick.

The fourteenth Curia, the two Mecklenburghs.

The fifteenth Curia, Oldenburg, Anhalt, and the two Schwurzburgs.

The seventeenth Curia, with the exception of Frankfort.

In this voting, Prussia did not give a voice, as her representative had protested against any entertainment of the motion, and did not vote : and the tenth Curia, Holstein Lauenburg, had no representative. The vote of the thirteenth Curia was cancelled, because Brunswick voted against Nassau, and thus there was no majority in this Curia.

Thus the results were that the 7th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th Curiae, therefore six Curiae, voted against Austria ; the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th, besides the representative of Austria himself, for the Austrian motion. The vote of the 16th Curia was recorded in favour of the motion, but, as appeared afterwards, accidentally. Each of the seven small States which composed this Curia had an equal voice within the Curia, and the vote of the Curia was that of the majority of the component members. On the 14th June, the representative of this Curia who voted in the Diet, and who was the delegate of Schaunburg-Lippe, declared that Lippe-Detwold, Waldeck, and Reusz of the younger line, therefore three-sevenths of the total, wished to vote against

the Austrian motion, and, in accordance with instructions from his own Government, and more consequently, give the vote of the Curia for the Austrian motion. As soon as this was known, however, the Government of Schaunburg-Lippe notified to the Prussian Government that it had also intended to vote against the Austrian motion, and thus disowned the act of its own delegate. It was then too late, for the vote had been given, and the motion passed. But had the Government of Schaunburg-Lippe been a little more careful in sending definite instructions to its representative, and had Prussia voted, the Austrian motion would have been thrown out by a majority of eight over seven votes, and the event which plunged Central Europe into immediate war might have been certainly postponed, possibly evaded. On such tiny circumstances do the destinies of nations hang.

As the votes were actually recorded, the Austrian motion was carried by a majority of nine over six voices.

After the Austrian representative, the president of the Diet, had declared the result of the voting, nine votes for Austria against six, the Prussian representative stated that it was now his duty to publish to the Diet the resolutions of Prussia. The Austrian motion was in itself a negation of the Federal Constitution, and must necessarily be regarded by Prussia as a breach of the community of the Confederation. The Federal Constitution recognised Federal execution against members of the Confederation only in particular cases, which were clearly defined. These cases were entirely neglected in

the Austrian motion. The position which Austria had assumed with regard to Holstein came in no manner under the protection of Federal treaties. On this account Prussia had refused in any way to take action on the Austrian motion, and not taken any precautions to oppose the Austrian intention. According to the ideas of Prussia, the Diet would not have for a moment listened to the Austrian proposals, but would have cast out the motion without any second thought upon the matter. Since the Diet had, however, acted in a manner so contrary to all expectation ; since Austria had been actually arming for three months, and had called the other members of the Confederation to her aid, and since hereby the Act of Confederation, the chief object of which was to secure the internal tranquillity of Germany, was entirely invalidated, Prussia must consider the rupture of the Germanic Confederation as completed, and must view that Confederation as dissolved and abrogated. Prussia did not, however, despise the national necessities for which that Confederation was instituted, nor did she wish to unsettle the unity of the Germanic nationality ; therefore she wished to declare herself ready and desirous to form a new Confederation with those States which might be willing to unite with her in a Federal union on the basis of the reform proposed for the Confederation on the 10th June. In conclusion, the Prussian delegate asserted the claims of his Government to a share of all rights which sprang from the former Constitution, and, having protested against the disbursement of any Federal moneys without the consent of Prussia, quitted the assembly.

The Germanic Confederation, established in 1815, was broken up at this moment. The declaration of internal war had virtually been proclaimed among its members.

The first action of Prussia in consequence of the decree of the Diet of the 14th June, was to send a summons to the three States the territories of which lay within or close to the Prussian provinces, and which had voted against Prussia on the 14th June. These States were Hanover, Saxony, and the Electorate of Hesse. This summons required that the Governments of these States should immediately reduce their troops to the peace establishment, which had existed on the 1st March, and should agree to join the new Prussian Federation on the basis of the reform proposed on the 10th June. If these Governments declared, within twelve hours, their agreement to these demands, Prussia undertook to guarantee their sovereign rights within the boundaries of the proposed Federation; otherwise, Prussia announced her intention to declare war.

The three Governments hesitated, and made no reply. On the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war against these three countries. No formal declaration of war was made against Austria, but at a later date the intention to commence hostilities was communicated to the Austrian outposts.

On the 17th June, the Austrian war manifesto was published; on the 18th, the Prussian; on the 20th, Italy, who had entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, declared war against Austria and Bavaria. Diplomacy had now done its work, and the



conflict was removed from the field of politics to the theatre of war.

Subjoined, for facility of reference, is a tabular list of the principal features of the political prologue.

*October 20th, 1864.* Treaty of Vienna.

*August 14th, 1865.* Convention of Gastein.

*March 12th, 1866.* First preparations of Austria for war in Bohemia and Moravia.

*March 30th, 1866.* First preparations of Prussia.

*April, 1866.* Negotiations concerning these armaments.

*April 23rd, 1866.* Great armament of Austria in Venetia.

*April 26th, 1866.* Proposal of Austria to submit the questions in dispute to the Diet.

*May 7th, 1866.* Declaration of Prussia of the Diet to decide in international questions, and suggestion of the desirability of the reform of the Confederation.

Until *May 28th, 1866.* Armaments in all Germany and Italy.

*May 28th, 1866.* Proposal of a Conference by the three great non-Germanic European Powers.

*May 29th, 1866.* Prussian acceptance of this proposal.

*June 1st, 1866.* Austrian acceptance under conditions which render the Conference impossible.

*June 1st, 1866.* Submission of Schleswig-Holstein question to the Diet.

*June 5th, 1866.* Summons by General Gablenz for assembly of Holstein Estates.

*June 10th, 1866.* Prussian proposal for the reform of the Federal Constitution.

*June 11th, 1866.* Austrian motion for the decree of Federal execution against Prussia.

*June 14th, 1866.* Acceptance of the Austrian motion by the Diet.

*June 15th, 1866.* Declaration of war by Prussia against Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Saxony.

*June 20th, 1866.* Declaration of war by Italy against Austria and Bavaria.

## BOOK III.<sup>1</sup>

### CHAPTER I.

#### THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA.

BEFORE it is possible to enter upon a review of the military operations of the war, it is necessary to glance at the organization, administration, and numbers of the forces which were at the disposal of the belligerent Powers. The question of the numerical strength of an army in the field is always an extremely difficult one. Before a campaign, sometimes the demands of strategy require that the strength of troops should be exaggerated, sometimes the contrary. The casualties of every skirmish, the sickness incident to every day's march and every night's exposure, reduces the number of soldiers under arms. Hazy distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, different modes of reckoning, the exclusion or inclusion of artillery and administrative services in returns, the non-completion of battalions up to their normal strength, all throw great difficulties in the way of gaining an accurate appreciation of the number

<sup>1</sup> It may be a relief to the general and not professional reader to be made aware that an omission to read this

Book, which is almost entirely technical, will not interrupt the continuity of the narrative.

of men engaged on either side in particular actions. It appears, therefore, advisable to sketch here the organization and regulated normal strength of the armies engaged in the war, and to attempt, at necessary points in the narrative, to calculate and compute from the most trustworthy authorities the actual numbers present on particular occasions.

The kingdom of Prussia before the late war had, with an area of about 127,350 square miles, a population of over nineteen million souls. The yearly revenues, according to the latest budgets, amounted to about 21,600,000*l.*, and the expenditure of the Government was always confined within its income. The National Debt in 1864 amounted to about 42,000,000*l.* The State chest in 1862 contained, from the surplus of estimated over actual annual expenditure, and from some other minor sources, a sum of about 2,500,000*l.* The financial economy of Prussia is superior to that of any nation in Europe. The army has lately cost in time of peace about 6,300,000*l.* annually, the navy about 6,450,000*l.*

The Prussian army which took the field in time of war consisted, of eight corps d'armée of troops of the Line, and of the corps d'armée of the Guard. Each corps d'armée is organized with the intention of being a perfectly complete little army of itself, so that without inconvenience it can be detached from the main army at any time. Each corps d'armée of the Line in time of war consists of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a military train. Each division of infantry is composed of two brigades,

each of which has two regiments, and, as each regiment contains three battalions, in a division of infantry there are twelve battalions ; to every infantry division is also attached one regiment of cavalry, of four squadrons, and one division of artillery, of four batteries, making the total strength of the force under the command of every infantry divisional General twelve battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries.

A cavalry division consists of two brigades, each containing two regiments, and, as every regiment has four squadrons, the division contains sixteen squadrons ; it has also two batteries of horse artillery attached to it.

The reserve of artillery consists of one division of field artillery, which forms four batteries, and of two batteries of horse artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of ammunition.

This gives the strength of a corps d'armée as twenty-four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, and sixteen batteries of artillery. Besides this, however, each corps has one battalion of rifles and one battalion of engineers, besides an engineer train for the transport of materials for making bridges, and a large military train, which carries food, hospitals, medicines, fuel for cooking, bakeries, and all the other necessities of not only life, but of the life of an army, the members of which require not only the same feeding, clothing, and warming as other members of the human race, but who will not be denied bullets, powder, shot and shells, saddlery for their horses, and who from the nature of their life are more liable to require medicines, bandages, splints, and all hospital accessories than other men.

If we do not consider the train when we are calculating the number of combatants who actually fall in, in the line of battle, every battalion may be considered to consist of 1,002 men. Thus the force of infantry and engineers in a corps d'armée numbers over 26,000, and on account of men absent through sickness may in round numbers be calculated at this figure. Each squadron of cavalry may be calculated at 140 mounted men, which makes the whole cavalry force about 3,300 men. Each division of four batteries of horse artillery brings into the field 590 actual combatants, and each of field artillery the same, so that the whole artillery force of a corps d'armée is about 2,350 men. The actual number of combatants with a corps d'armée is in this way seen to be 31,650 men, which may be stated in broad numbers at 31,000. The Guard corps d'armée differs chiefly from the Line corps in having one additional rifle battalion, one additional Fusilier regiment, and two additional cavalry regiments, which increase its strength by about 5,150 actual combatants; the total number of combatants in this corps may be safely assumed as 36,000 men, in round numbers.

If we turn, however, to the list furnished by the military authorities, we find that the army is said to consist of 335,000 men, with 106,500 horses, of which only about 70,000 belong to the cavalry and artillery, and that it is accompanied by a waggon train of 8,950 carriages, of which only 3,500 belonging to the artillery perform any service on the field of battle.

What has then become of these 55,000 men, 36,500 horses, and 5,450 carriages which form the difference

between the returns we find of an army on paper and the actual number of men engaged on the field of battle? This difference represents the moving power of the combatant branches; it is this difference that feeds the warriors when they are well, that tends them when wounded, and nurses them when struck down with disease. Nor are these the only duties of the non-combatant branches. An army on a campaign is a little world of itself, and has all the requirements of ordinary men moving about the world, besides having an enemy in its neighbourhood, who attempts to oppose its progress in every way possible. When the line of march leads to a river, over which there is either no bridge or where the bridge has been destroyed, a bridge must be immediately laid down, and, accordingly, a bridge train is necessarily always present with the army. When a camp is pitched, field bakeries have to be immediately established to feed the troops; field telegraphs and field post-offices must be established for the rapid transmission of intelligence. A large staff must be provided for, which is the mainspring which sets all the works going. And these are only ordinary wants, such as any large picnic party on the same scale would require. When we consider that 200 rounds of ammunition can easily be fired away by each gun in a general action, that every infantry soldier can on the same occasion dispose of 120 rounds of ball cartridge, and that this must be all replaced immediately; that all this requires an enormous number of carriages, with horses and drivers; that outside of the line of battle there must be medical men, their assistants, and nurses; that within it and under

fire there must be ambulance waggons, and men with stretchers to bear the wounded to them ; and that forty per cent. of the infantry alone in every year's campaign are carried to the rear, we may understand how the large difference between the number of actual fighting men and of men borne upon paper is accounted for.

We have seen that each corps d'armée may be safely estimated at 30,000 combatants, and that of the Guard at 36,000, without taking into consideration those large artillery and engineer trains which would be requisite were the army to undertake the siege of any considerable fortress. It only remains now to consider whether this strength may always be reckoned upon as constant ; and it appears that this may be done in consequence of the admirable system of Prussian organization. By this system, as soon as a corps d'armée is put on a war footing, there is a *depôt* battalion formed for each regiment, a *depôt* company for each battalion of rifles, a *depôt* squadron for each cavalry regiment, a *depôt* division for the artillery of each corps d'armée, a *depôt* company for each engineer battalion, and a *depôt* for the military train. These *depôts* remain in their barracks, and supply all vacancies made in the ranks of the corps to which they belong. Nor is it at all difficult for them to do so, because in consequence of the system of recruiting pursued in this country these *depôts* do not consist entirely of raw recruits, but partly of men who have served for some time in the army, and who have, after leaving the regular ranks, been annually put through a course of training.

In Prussia, with the exception of clergymen and a few



every man in the year in which he becomes twenty years old is liable to military service for five years, three of which he spends in the regular army and two in the reserve. On completion of this service he is placed in the first levy of the Landwehr for seven years, and afterwards in the second levy of the Landwehr for seven years more. When it is necessary to raise the regular army to a war footing, the reserve is first draughted into the ranks, then the first levy of the Landwehr, and afterwards, if necessary, the second levy. If the Landwehr is exhausted the Landsturm is called out, and in this case every man between sixteen and fifty is liable for service.

Each corps d'armée of the Line in time of peace is quartered in one of the eight provinces of the kingdom ; its recruits are obtained from that province, and its Landwehr are the men in the province who have served five years and who have been dismissed from actual service, but are subjected to an annual course of training. The provinces to which the different corps d'armée belong are :—1, Prussia Proper ; 2, Pomerania ; 3, Brandenburg ; 4, Prussian Saxony ; 5, Posen ; 6, Silesia ; 7, Westphalia ; 8, Rhine Provinces. The Guards are recruited from men of a certain stature from all the provinces, and the Landwehr of the Guard consists of the men who have formerly served in it.

Prussia, after the successes of Frederick the Great, was content to suppose that the military organization which had served her so well in the Seven Years' War was perfect, and required little or no modification to enable it to continue superior to that of other European Powers ;

but while she reposed complacently on the laurels of Rossbach and Leuthen, military science had rushed forwards, and she was rudely roused from her repose by the crushing defeat of Jena. Under enormous difficulties, and with the greatest secrecy, a new organization was then introduced into the Prussian army. The terms of peace dictated by Napoleon after the Jena campaign allowed the Prussian army to consist of only 42,000 men, but no stipulation was made as to how long these men should serve. In order to secure the means of striking for independence on the first favourable opportunity, General Scharnhorst introduced the *Krümpersystem*, by which a certain number of soldiers were always allowed to go home on furlough after a few months' service, and recruits were brought into the ranks in their place. Those drilled were in their turn sent away on furlough and other recruits brought in for training. By means of this system at the beginning of 1813 not only could the existing regiments be filled up to proper war strength, but fifty-one new battalions were raised from prepared soldiers. This force, however, was totally insufficient for the great struggle against Napoleon; so in February, 1813, volunteer Jäger detachments were formed which mustered together about 10,000 men, and in March the raising of a Landwehr was decreed, which in five months after the signature of the decree was able to take part in the war with a strength of 120,000 men. Thus in August, 1813, Prussia possessed an army of 250,000 men, of whom 170,000 men were ready to take the field, while the remaining 80,000 formed reserve and depôt troops and

supplied garrisons. This army fought in the war of independence, and formed the first nucleus of the existing military organization of the kingdom,—an organization which, dating from a terrible misfortune, the bitter experience of which has never been forgotten, has since been constantly tended, improved, and reformed, and with careful progress been brought to such a high pitch of excellence that last year it enabled the Prussian troops to march and conquer with an almost miraculous rapidity, to eclipse in a few days the glories of the Seven Years' War, to efface the memory of Jena by thundering on the attention of the startled world the suddenly decisive victory of Sadowa, and to spring over the ashes of Chlum into very possibly the foremost place among the armies of the world.

After Prussia had regained her position as a great Power it was necessary that she should have an army of a strength similar to that of the armies of other great Powers, and therefore with a muster-roll of about half a million of men. At this time the other great Powers kept the greater part of their soldiery in peace, as in war, in the ranks, and only allowed a few trained veterans, who together amounted to about one-fourth of the total strength of the army, to be absent on furlough. But Prussia was then the smallest of the great Powers, and had neither such a large population nor revenue as the others. Thus, she had, in the first place, not sufficient men; in the second place, not enough money to maintain an army on a similar system, and could in peace keep together only a much smaller portion of her soldiery than her possible enemies could. This

portion of her army was organized on the following system :—The country was required every year to grant 40,000 recruits, each of whom served for three years under the standards and for two years in the reserve ; so the standing army amounted to 120,000 men, and by calling in the reserves could be raised immediately to 200,000 men. But, to complete the requisite number of 500,000 soldiers, 300,000 more were necessary, and in time of peace the kingdom could afford to maintain only very small depôts for these additional troops. The war of independence had shown that the Landwehr system, by which men were allowed to retire from service, but still remained liable to be called up for duty, was capable of effecting good service, and in case of need of supplying the men who could not be kept in time of peace in the regular army. Therefore this system was retained, and by the decree of the 3d of September, 1814, the Prussian army was organized definitively on the Landwehr system. By this system every Prussian capable of bearing arms was without exception liable to military duty, and to serve from his 20th to his 23d year in the standing army, from his 23d to 25th in the reserve, from his 25th to 32d in the first levy of the Landwehr, and from his 32d to 39th in the second levy. The Landsturm was to consist of all men capable of bearing arms between seventeen and forty-nine years of age who did not belong either to the standing army or to the Landwehr. From the Landwehr battalions and squadrons were raised which formed Landwehr regiments, and these were united for annual exercise or service in brigades and divisions with

regiments of the Line. Landwehr men who had belonged to Jäger battalions, to the artillery, or to the engineer service, were not formed into separate corps; but in case of being called up were to return into the ranks of the regiments in which they had formerly served.

By this system, with an annual supply of 40,000 recruits, Prussia was enabled to hold in readiness for war an army which consisted of three distinct parts.

1. The standing army of 120,000 men, raised in war by the recall of the reserves to 200,000 men, and with Landwehr-Jägers, artillerymen, and pioneers, to 220,000 men.

2. The first levy of the Landwehr, including only infantry and cavalry, of which, in peace, only small depôts, numbering together about 3,000 men, were maintained, but which, on the mobilization of the army for war, supplied considerably over 150,000 men, even allowing liberally for deaths, sickness, emigration, and other causes of reduction.

The standing army and the first levy, after detaching 30,000 men to strengthen the garrisons of fortresses, formed together the field army of 340,000 men, and besides, from their surplus men and recruits, could leave at home a force of depôt troops amounting to about 50,000 men.

3. The second levy of the Landwehr, from which no exercise or training was required in time of peace, but which in war was called upon to furnish 110,000 soldiers, who, with the 30,000 above mentioned from the standing army and first levy, garrisoned the for-

tresses of the country, and could, in case of urgent necessity, be supported by the Landsturm.

From these three sources—1, the field army ; 2, dépôt troops, formed by the standing army and first levy of the Landwehr ; 3, garrison troops, formed by the surplus of the first levy, the second levy of Landwehr, and in case of need from the Landsturm—Prussia could for war raise 530,000 men, of whom in time of peace hardly one-fourth were present with the standards. The standing army during the time that this organization remained intact consisted of forty-five infantry regiments, ten light infantry battalions, thirty-eight cavalry regiments, nine artillery regiments, and nine divisions of engineers.

The great advantage of this system was that in peace it necessitated but a small expense, and required but few men to keep up an army which on the outbreak of war could be raised quickly to a large force. As it was arranged after the War of Independence it endured without alteration during the reigns of Frederick William III. and Frederick William IV.

But in the campaigns which the Prussian army undertook in 1848 and 1849, and again when the army was mobilized in 1850 and 1859, the disadvantages of an organization so entirely based upon the Landwehr system became apparent in a high degree.

The energetic spirit with which the Prussian people rushed to arms against Napoleon can only, under very peculiar circumstances, agitate a whole nation, and make every individual willing and anxious to sacrifice his personal comfort and convenience in order to respond to the

call of his Government, and serve with alacrity in the ranks of the army. Such circumstances seldom occur, and are due either to the insupportable weight of a foreign domination—as was the case in Prussia from 1807–12—or to some strong patriotic stimulus such as has knitted the people of the same country together during the late campaign; but this spirit is seldom found at the outbreak of an ordinary war, engaged in for ordinary political reasons.

It was found on the mobilization in 1848 that a great portion of the Landwehr soldiers obeyed only unwillingly the call to arms, because it interfered with their private occupations; that they sometimes, weaned by long ease from military ideas, showed a want of discipline, and that, thinking more for their wives and families than for their duty to the State, they did not always acquit themselves properly in action. Besides, there was this disadvantage that the Landwehr—therefore, about half of the field army, newly embodied—prevented the divisions from being immediately prepared to take the field, a delay which is terribly prejudicial to an army in these times, when troops are forwarded to the theatre of war by the rapid means of railway transport. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Landwehr were also little used to their duties, and at the very moment of mobilization a great number of them were necessarily transferred to the Line, and others brought from the regular army to supply their places. These numerous alterations of their leaders at such an important time were alone sufficient to impair materially the efficiency of the troops.

Besides these disadvantages, the existing system had brought about a great injustice in the distribution of military service, as in 1815 only 40,000 recruits were yearly called for to support the standing army of 140,000 men, while in the meantime the population had increased from 10,000,000 to 18,000,000 ; so that about one-third of the lads who should proportionately have entered the service were entirely free of duty, and those who did enter were liable to be recalled to the ranks for a longer period of their life than was really necessary ; for if, instead of 40,000 recruits, 63,000 were, as easily could be, called up every year, men, instead of being liable to be put into the standing army on the outbreak of war for twelve years (from twenty to thirty-two), need only be liable for seven years (from twenty to twenty-seven). In direct ratio with the increase of population the national revenues had also increased from 50,000,000 to 93,000,000 thalers, and so admitted of an increase of the standing army and of the military expenses.

There were thus three grounds for a reform in the Landwehr system, and therefore King William I., while still Regent, introduced in 1859 and 1860 a re-organization of the army, which up to last year formed a bone of contention between the Prussian Ministry and the Radical party in the Lower House, but the success of which in the late war has completely silenced, if not thoroughly convinced, even its tax-paying opponents of its wonderful excellence and elasticity. By this re-organization of 1859, as it is usually called, the first levy of the Landwehr was no longer, as a rule, to be sent into



the field; and to attain this object the standing army, including the reserves, was to be increased by as many men as the first levy of the Landwehr formerly provided—in fact, to be nearly doubled. The time of service in the Landwehr was diminished by two years, and that in the reserve in return to be lengthened by two years. The Landwehr still remaining in two levies, but composed only of men from twenty-seven to thirty-eight years old, was, as a rule, with its first levy alone to perform the duty which had hitherto been performed by the second levy,—namely, to garrison the fortresses. In case of necessity the Government still, however, retains the power of calling up the second levy to aid in this duty.

By this organization a recruit who joins the Prussian service serves for three years (from nineteen to twenty-two) in the regular army; for five years (from twenty-two to twenty-seven) in the reserve; and for eleven years (from twenty-seven to thirty-eight) is liable to be called up for duty as a Landwehr man.

By this re-organization the total war strength of the field army was slightly increased, and its efficiency most materially improved; the war strength of the dépôt troops was, on account of the necessity of great rapidity in modern warfare, more than doubled; that of the garrison troops was improved, and can now, by calling up the second levy, be made twice as great as it was formerly. These reforms also allowed the standing army to be increased by thirty-six regiments of infantry, nine battalions for the fusilier regiments, ten cavalry regiments, and five divisions of garrison artillery. Sufficient

time has not yet elapsed for this re-organization to be thoroughly carried out, and still eight of the ten cavalry regiments have not been formed, and their place has been supplied during this campaign by twelve Landwehr cavalry regiments, and as yet only one of the divisions of garrison artillery has been formed.

When the re-organization has been thoroughly carried out, the forces raised from the territory which belonged to Prussia previous to the late war will be—the field army of 342,000 men of the standing army, of whom in peace 217,000 are present with the standards; the *depôt* troops, mustering 130,000 men, for the most part soldiers of the reserve and recruits; garrison troops, mustering 195,000 men, for the most part Landwehr of the first levy, with an additional 108,000 men from the second levy,—altogether, without the Landsturm, 775,000 men, of which number in peace two-sevenths are present in the ranks.

The military organization of the provinces which are to be annexed as the result of the war has not yet been decided upon, but it will be upon the same system, and will add about 75,000 combatants to the standing army.

During the late campaign the elasticity of this organization was clearly manifested. In a wonderfully short time the large armies which fought at Königgrätz were placed on a war footing, and brought about 260,000 combatants into the very field of battle, besides the necessary detachments which must be made by a large army to cover communications, mask fortresses, and so on; but the detachments made from the Prussian army

were very small compared to those which would have had to be separated from an army organized on a different system; for as the field army advanced the *depôt* troops moved up in rear, and formed both *depôts* and reserves for the first line, while some of the garrison troops of *Landwehr* came up from Prussia, and formed the garrisons of Saxony, Prague, Pardubitz, and all the other points on the lines of communication. At the same time General Mülbe's corps, formed for the most part of reserve and *depôt* soldiers, pushed up to Brünn, and was hastening to take its place in the first line, when its march was stopped by the conclusion of the long armistice.

While the armies of Prince Frederick Charles, the Crown Prince, and General Herwarth were being supported in Bohemia, Moravia, and Saxony, General Falkenstein, with a number of Line regiments and a force of *Landwehr*, was driving the war forwards to the Main; and the Prince of Mecklenburg, with the second reserve corps, was pushing on against Bavaria. Nor was Prussian territory left without its garrisons: *Landwehr* battalions were in Kosel, Neisse, Berlin, Torgau, Magdeburg, Königsberg, and all the other garrison towns of the country, while under their shelter recruits were being drilled, and more *Landwehr* embodied to march forward into the conquered countries. The armies which were on the Marchfeld in front of Lundenburg and in Bavaria did not form a thin front line, which, once broken or turned, would have been driven back even to the Elbe; their rear was guarded and supported by large forces of strong and firm batta-

lions, lately embodied, but from their nature quickly trained, and composed of well-grown old soldiers who were thirsting to be sent against the enemy, and on whose well-knit frames disease or the hardships of war could make little impression.

Though the part of the Prussian organization which refers to the recruiting of the army and to the filling up of the ranks in case of war has had a great deal to do with the success of the late campaign, on account of the facility and rapidity with which by its means the army could be mobilized and brought upon a war footing, the portion of the Prussian organization which relates to the combination of the recruits so obtained in pliable bodies, which can be easily handled, easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different arms as to be capable of independent action, has not failed to be appreciated most fully by those who, with its assistance, have gained such tremendous results. This portion of the military organization of the Prussian army is so simple that almost every man in the ranks can understand it. Jealous of expense in time of peace, it allows for a wide expansion, without hurry and without confusion, on the outbreak of war. It provides for, at the same time, the broadest questions and the most minute details, and is so clearly laid down and so precisely defined, yet at the same time admits of so much elasticity, that the Prussian officers can find no words strong enough to express their praise of it.

England, in fact, has hardly wakened up to realize that the Prussian army now is very different from that which at the beginning of this century was destroyed on

the fatal day of Jena, or that to-day it only resembles the army which marched so well to our aid at Waterloo, in patriotic feeling and in the rudiments of its organization. Prussia seems now about to spring into the position she held one hundred years ago, when Frederick had made her the first military Power in the world, and England was introducing her military system into the germs of the army which marched through the Peninsula, and at Waterloo shattered the legions which Blücher annihilated. Would that England now would take some hints for the organization of her army from the victors of Königgrätz, and would adopt the experience which has been won on the plains of Bohemia, before military progress is forced upon her by a disaster more fatal, perhaps, than that of Klostersevern!

In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobilization of the army, every officer and every official knows during peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the moment the decree for the mobilization is issued, and the moment that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most distant stations every one sets about his necessary duty without requiring any further orders or any explanations.

When a war is imminent the Government decrees the mobilization of the whole army, or of such a portion as may be deemed necessary. In preparing for the late campaign, the whole field army and the first levy of Landwehr were mobilized before the invasion of Saxony. A part of the second Landwehr levy was also mobilized immediately the troops of Prince Frederick Charles stepped across the Saxon frontier; and on the day of

the great battle near Königgrätz, without any exertion, Prussia had over 600,000 men under arms. Every commanding general mobilizes his own corps d'armée; the "Intendantur" the whole of the branches of the administrative services; the commandants of those fortresses which are ordered to be placed in a state of defence take their ~~own~~ measures for strengthening the fortifications and for obtaining from the artillery dépôts the guns necessary for the armament of their parapets. All orders are sent by telegraph, or, where telegraphic communication does not exist, by mounted orderlies. The mobilization of the whole army is soon complete in every branch; the infantry is ready in a fortnight from the time the decree is signed.

The process of the mobilization may be classed under the following five heads:—1, The filling in of the field troops to their war strength; 2, the formation of dépôt troops; 3, the formation of garrison troops and the arming of the fortresses; 4, the mobilization of the field administration; 5, the formation of the head-quarter staffs, &c. who are to remain in the different districts to supply the places of those who march to the seat of war.

The completion of the rank and file of the field troops to war strength is effected by drawing in some of the reserve soldiers, who supply half the total war strength of the infantry, one-third of that of the artillery, and one twenty-fifth of that of the cavalry. The cavalry has, of course, on account of being maintained in such force during peace, a superabundance of reserve soldiers available on a mobilization; these, after the men required for the cavalry itself have been drawn from them, are

handed over to the artillery and military train, so that these services thus obtain many valuable soldiers, well accustomed to mounted duties. The reserve soldiers who are to be enrolled have orders sent to them through the commanding officer of the Landwehr of the district in which they live, who can avail himself of the services of the provincial and parochial civil authorities to facilitate the delivery of these orders. The men are, immediately on the receipt of their orders, required to proceed to the head-quarters of the Landwehr of the district, where they are received, medically inspected, and forwarded to their regiment, by an officer and some non-commissioned officers of the regiment which draws its recruits from the district. Officers who are required to fill up vacancies in the regular army in a mobilization are obtained by promoting some of the senior non-commissioned officers. Landwehr officers obtain their commissions much in the same way as do military officers in England, but no Landwehr officer can be promoted to the rank of captain unless he has been attached to a regular regiment for two months' duty; and no Landwehr officer can be a field officer unless he has before served for some considerable time in the regular army. Many of the officers of the Landwehr are officers still on the strength of the regular army, who are detached to the Landwehr on its mobilization.

On a mobilization, the whole army requires about 88,000 horses more than it has in time of peace; in order to obtain these quickly the Government has the power, if it cannot buy them readily from regular dealers, to take a certain number from every district,

paying for them a price which is fixed by a mixed commission of military officers and of persons appointed by the civil authorities of the district.

Each regiment of field artillery forms nine ammunition columns, in each of which are waggons to carry reserve ammunition for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the proportions in which experience has shown that ammunition is usually required. In the field these ammunition waggons follow directly in rear of the field army, but are kept entirely separate from the field batteries, the officers of which are justly supposed to have enough to do in action in superintending their own guns, without being hampered with the supply of cartridges to the cavalry and infantry.

Every battalion of engineers forms a column of waggons which carries tools for intrenching purposes, and also a heavy pontoon train and a light field bridge train for which all is kept ready during peace. If a portion of the army is mobilized merely for practice, or goes into camp for great manoeuvres, as is done nearly every summer during peace, one, or perhaps two or three, engineer battalions make their trains mobile, in order to practise the men and to accustom them to the use of the *matériel*. Arms and ammunition which are required to complete the war strength of regiments are supplied from the artillery depôts. Officers are allowed soldier servants on a more liberal scale than in the English army, but no officers' servants are mustered in the company; they form, with all the non-combatant men of each battalion of infantry, the train which is attached to every battalion: this consists of the officers' servants



and the drivers of the regimental waggons ; every one else borne on the muster-roll draws a trigger in action, so that the muster-rolls actually show the number of rank and file who are present, and do not include any of the followers, who often never come up into the line of battle at all. On service the captain of every company is mounted, and is required to have two horses, to aid in the purchase of which he is allowed a certain sum of money by the State.

The strength of an ordinary battalion on active service is one field-officer, four captains, four first lieutenants, nine second lieutenants, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one paymaster, one quarter-master, 1002 non-commissioned officers and privates. The train attached to this battalion is, besides officers' servants, the drivers of the ammunition waggon, which has six horses ; of the *Montirung Wagon*, which carries the paymaster's books, money chest, and a certain amount of material for the repair of arms and clothing, and is drawn by four horses ; a hospital cart with two horses, an officers' baggage waggon with four horses, and men to lead four packhorses, each of which carries on a pack-saddle the books of one company.

The baggage of a cavalry regiment on service consists of one medicine cart with two horses, one field forge with two horses, four squadron waggons, each with two horses, one officers' baggage waggon, with four horses ; the total strength of a cavalry regiment being 23 officers 659 men, of whom 600 fall in in the ranks, 713 horses, and seven carriages.

The nine ammunition columns which are formed by

each artillery regiment for the supply of ammunition to the artillery and infantry of the corps d'armée to which the regiment belongs are divided into two divisions, one of which consists of five columns, and has a strength of two officers, 175 men, 174 horses, and 25 waggons; the second, consisting of four columns, has two officers, 173 men, 170 horses, and 24 waggons. This division is made to facilitate the despatch of the two divisions separately to the ammunition depôt to have the waggons refilled after their first supply of cartridges has been exhausted, or to allow one division to be detached with each infantry division, in case of the corps d'armée being divided, as was the case in this war with the third and fourth corps, in which case four columns can conveniently be attached to each infantry division, and one column to the cavalry division of the corps.

The reserve ammunition park from which these ammunition columns are replenished, is also divided into two divisions, each of which has a strength of nine officers, 195 men, 264 carriages, and is further subdivided into eight columns of 33 waggons each. It is brought into the theatre of war either by railway or water carriage, or by means of horses hired in the country where the war is being conducted. It generally is one or two days' march in rear of the army. In the late campaign on the day of the great battle, the ammunition reserve park of the army of Prince Frederick Charles was at Turnau, to which place it had been brought by railway.

A siege train for attacking fortresses is not generally organized at the beginning of a war, unless the general plan of the campaign should be likely to lead the army

into a country where fortresses exist, which could not be either neglected or masked, and which must be reduced. If a siege train is organized, it is formed with especial reference to the fortresses against which it is to act, and follows the army in the same manner as the reserve ammunition park. At the beginning of the late campaign the Prussians had no siege train with the army, but directly the battle of Sadowa had been won a siege train was organized, perhaps to be employed against the fortresses on the Elbe, though such small places scarcely merited such an attention from so large an army, perhaps for an attack on Olmütz. When the fortifications of Floridsdorf were found looming in front of the advance on Vienna, the siege train was ordered up to be ready for the attack of the Austrian works covering the Danube, but it was halted as soon as the four weeks' armistice was agreed upon. The want of siege trains was, however, felt. The garrison of Theresienstadt, a fortress which had been totally neglected, sallied out and broke the railway bridge on the line of communication between Prague and Turnau. Had their communication been thus broken during the active campaign, and not during the armistice, it must have seriously inconvenienced the Prussians. Had Theresienstadt been masked, the sally of the garrison would have been probably prevented; but had it been properly besieged, the garrison would have been kept within their works, and the direct line of railway between Prague and Dresden would have been at the service of the Prussian army for almost its entire length.

It is thus that the Prussian army is formed in peace,

that its field forces can be made ready to march in a few days in case of war, and that the troops in the field are supplied with the powder and shot which give them the means of fighting. But, *l'art de vaincre est perdu sans l'art de subsister*. An organization of even more importance lies still behind—the organization of the means of supplying the warriors with food when in health, with medicine and hospitals when diseased or wounded, and for filling up the gaps which are opened in the ranks by battle or pestilence; an organization which has always been found to be more difficult and to require more delicate handling than even strategical combinations, or the arraying of troops for battle.

The Prussian army can enter the field with 342,000 men in its ranks; but, as is well known, no army, nor any collection of men, can maintain its normal strength for a single day; in such a host, even of young healthy men, ordinary illness would immediately cause a few absentees from duty, much more so do the marches, the hardships, and the fatigues to which a soldier is exposed on active service before the first shot is fired. Then as soon as an action takes place, a single day adds a long list to the hospital roll, and the evening sees in the ranks many gaps which in the morning were filled by strong soldiers, who are now lying torn and mangled or dead on the field of battle. The dead are gone for ever; they are so much power lost out of the hand of the general; nor can an army wait till the wounded are cured and are again able to draw a trigger or to wield a sabre. Means must be taken to supply the deficiencies as quickly as possible, and to restore to the commander of

the army the missing force which has been expended in moving his own army through the first steps of the campaign, or in resisting the motion of his adversary. What is the amount of such deficiencies may be estimated from Prussian statistics, which have been compiled with great care, and from the experience of many campaigns; these state officially that at the end of a year's war forty per cent. of the infantry of the field army, twenty per cent. of the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and twelve per cent. of the military train would have been lost to the service, and have had to be supplied anew.

It is for the formation of these supplies of men, and for forwarding them to the active army, that depôts are intended. The depôts of the Prussian army are formed as soon as the mobilization takes place, and it is ordered that one half of the men of each depôt should be soldiers of the reserve, who, already acquainted with their drill, can be sent up to the front on the first call; the other half of each depôt consists of recruits who are raised in the ordinary way, and of all the men of the regiments belonging to the field army which have not been perfectly drilled by the time their regiment marches to the seat of war. The officers of the depôts are either officers who are detached from the regular army for this duty, or are officers who have been previously wounded, and who cannot bear active service, but can perform the easier duties of the depôt, besides young officers, who are being trained to their duty before joining their regiments.

Since the re-organization of 1859, the number of depôt troops kept up during a war has been quite doubled;

formerly every two infantry regiments had one depôt battalion, and every two cavalry regiments one depôt squadron. When the army was re-organized, it was foreseen that this amount of depôt troops would never be sufficient in case of a war of any duration or severity, so by the new regulations each infantry regiment has one depôt battalion of 18 officers and 1,002 men; each rifle battalion, a depôt company of 4 officers and 201 men; each cavalry regiment, a depôt squadron of 5 officers, 200 men, and 212 horses; each field artillery regiment (96 guns), a depôt division of one horse artillery battery, and three field batteries, each of four guns, with 14 officers, 556 men, and 189 horses; every engineer battalion, one depôt company of 4 officers and 202 men; every train battalion, a depôt division of two companies, which muster together 12 officers, 502 men, and 213 horses. All this is required to feed the army in the field with supplies of men to take the places of those who pass from the regimental muster roll into the lists of killed, died in hospital, or disabled; for those who are only slightly wounded return to their duty either in the depôt or at once to their battalions, as is most convenient from the situation of the hospital in which they have been.

As a rule, four weeks after the field army has marched, the first supply of men is forwarded from the depôts to the battalions in the field. This first supply consists of one-eighth of the calculated yearly loss which has been given above. On the first day of every succeeding month a fresh supply is forwarded. Each of these later supplies is one-twelfth of the total calculated yearly loss. If a

very bloody battle is fought, special supplies are sent at once to make up the losses of the troops that have been engaged.

The troops in *dépôt* are provided with all articles of equipment with which they should take the field. When a detachment is to be sent to the front, all who belong to one corps d'armée are assembled together; the infantry soldiers are formed into companies of 200 men each for the march, the cavalry into squadrons of about 100 horsemen, and are taken under the charge of officers to the field army, thus bringing to the front with them the necessary reserves of horses. The places in the *dépôts* of those who have marched away are filled up by recruiting.

An army, though of great strength and well provided with supplies of men, cannot always be sure of taking the initiative, and by an offensive campaign driving the war into an enemy's country. There is no doubt that an offensive campaign is much better for a country and much more likely to achieve success than a defensive one: it was much better for the Prussians to cover Berlin in Bohemia than in Brandenburg; General Benedek would have preferred to cover Vienna indirectly by an attack on Prussian Silesia rather than in a defensive position at Königgrätz; Napoleon justly saw that the proper point to defend Paris in 1815 was not on the Marne, but in Belgium. But political reasons or want of preparation often force an army to be unable to assume the offensive, and with the loss of the initiative make a present to the enemy of the first great advantage in the war. In this case the theatre of war

is carried into its own territory, when an army requires fortresses to protect its arsenals, dockyards, and its capital, to cover important strategical points, or to afford a place where, in case of defeat or disaster, it may be re-organized under the shelter of fortifications and heavy artillery. It has been well seen in this war that small fortresses do not delay the progress in the field of a large invading army, which can afford to spare detachments to prevent their garrisons from making sallies. Josephstadt and Königgrätz did not delay the Prussian armies for a day, though they are both strong places, and would possibly have stood a long siege; but they were both masked by detachments, the loss of which from the line of battle was hardly felt by the main body, and, though no trenches were opened and no guns mounted against them, the great line of the Prussian communications passed in safety within a few miles of their paralysed garrisons. It has also been demonstrated by this war that fortifications which inclose a town of any size are useless, unless the defensive works are so far in front of the houses as to preclude the possibility of the bombardment of the city. Towns are now so rich, both in population and wealth, that few Governments would dare to expose their subjects to the loss of property and risk to life which a bombardment must entail. Prague, though surrounded by ramparts, struck the Austrian colours without firing a shot, because the Prussian guns would at the same time have played upon the defenders of the parapets, the unprotected citizens, and the rich storehouses of its merchants. The Spielberg at



Brünn, if it stood alone, might make a strong resistance to the passage of an invader, but the white flag of truce waving from its flagstaff, instead of the war standard of Austria, greeted the Prussian vanguard, because the Emperor could not have borne to hear that its spires, its palaces, and large manufactories had crumbled to the ground under Mecklenburg's artillery. But it would be rash to jump to the conclusion that fortresses, and even fortified towns, are no longer of use in war. Fortresses are useful as supports to the flanks of an army : if Benedek had lain along the river from Josephstadt to Königgrätz, the junction of the two Prussian Princes would have been long delayed, perhaps prevented. The guns of Königgrätz materially checked the pursuit of the Austrian legions defeated at Sadowa. What Olmütz did to save the army of the north from a total disorganization, and to allow General Benedek, under its cover, to make his preparations for the masterly move by which he carried it to Vienna, is well known. Whenever a capital is distinctly the objective point of an invader, as would be the case if an enemy's army were ever to be allowed to land on the shores of our own England, strong works round the city, but so far in advance of the houses as would prevent their being reached by the besieger's shells, become a necessity, between and behind which the defender's army, if worsted in a battle, might be restored, and wait until the attacking troops had shattered themselves against the intrenchments. And though the earthworks at Floridsdorf had little to do with the sudden cessation of hostilities, there can be no doubt that if Vienna had

been properly fortified on every side Austria might, with a very fair chance, have struck another blow before she suffered herself to be excluded from the Confederation of the German people.

As long as fortresses exist they require garrisons, but the troops which are formed in Prussia on the breaking out of a war are not intended, in case of an offensive campaign, only to hang listlessly over the parapets of fortified places. When an army pushes forward into a foreign country, it leaves behind it long lines of road or railway over which pass the supplies of food, clothing, medicines, and stores, which are vitally important to the existence of an army. With an unfriendly population, and an enemy's cavalry ready always to seize an opportunity of breaking in upon these lines of communication, of charging down upon convoys, and destroying or burning their contents, and of thus deranging seriously what might be called the household economy of the army, it is necessary, especially on lines of railway, that strong garrisons should be maintained at particular points, and that patrols should be furnished for nearly the whole line. Towns have to be occupied in rear of the front line, depôts of stores have to be guarded and protected, convoys have to be escorted, telegraph lines watched, the fortifications which may fall garrisoned. To detach troops for the performance of all these duties dribbles away the strength of an army : if the Prussian armies which crossed the frontier into Bohemia and Moravia had been obliged to make all these detachments, how many fighting men would have mustered on the Marchfeld? Very few. If these armies had

waited till troops were formed at home after the course of the campaign had been seen, how long would it have required to march to the Rossbach? Probably the advanced guard would have still been upon the Elbe when it was actually on the Danube. To provide for these duties, and to allow the main armies to push forward in almost unimpaired strength, Prussia forms on the mobilization of the field army her so-called garrison troops.

In the formation of these garrison troops, there is a drawback from the general excellence of the Prussian military organization, which arises from the Landwehr system. The men of the first levy of the Landwehr form, when alone called out, as many battalions as do the united levies when nearly the whole of the second levy is also called out. In both cases there are 116 battalions, which consist each of 402 men of the first levy, and are only filled up to their full strength of 1,000 men by men of the second levy. On account of this arrangement, if only the men of the first levy are required, a large number of weak battalions are formed, which are more expensive and more difficult to handle than would be a smaller number of full battalions. It would appear much simpler to have a certain number of battalions composed entirely of men of the first levy, and the rest entirely of men of the second levy; but in Prussia this simplicity cannot be obtained because it is considered advisable to have a Landwehr battalion for every recruiting district, and only to enrol the men of the district in their own battalion. If, however, treble the population which inhabits one of the present re-

cruiting districts were included in one district, it would be quite easy to have three battalions of Landwehr for each district, one completely composed of men of the first levy, the second of the first men of the second, and the third of the later men of the second levy, who now complete the battalions up to their full strength.

In some respects, which are easily seen, the Prussian Landwehr resembles the British Militia, but there are two vital differences between our organization and that of Prussia. The first is, that in England when a militia regiment is formed it is made up of men who are not old soldiers, and consequently, if the regiment is for some years disembodied, all its late recruits know nothing of their work except what they can pick up in the short period of annual training; so that in course of time, if a regiment remains for many years without being embodied, the mass of the ranks contain men who from want of training are unqualified to step on the very outbreak of a war into the line of battle. In the second place, the Landwehr of the first levy is as much an attendant and concomitant of an army in the field as the park of reserve artillery, and it is this which makes the Landwehr so valuable, because it thus takes up the duties which otherwise would have to be performed by detachments from the active army. If the Prussian armies in the late campaign had been obliged to leave detachments in Leipsic, Dresden, Prague, Pardubitz, and along the railway from Görlitz to Brünn, besides troops in Hanover, Hesse, and on the lines of communications of the armies which were fighting against the Bavarians, how many troops would have formed the first lines of

battle either on the Danube or in the theatre of war near the Main ? It is at the present moment impossible to obtain authentic returns of the number of troops of the Landwehr who were under arms, much more so to know how many that were embodied remained within the Prussian territory ; but it is probable that the number of Landwehr men employed on foreign soil, in Saxony, and in guarding and garrisoning the rear of the armies which were concentrated between the Thaya and the Danube, would be under-estimated at 103,000, exclusive of the corps of the regular army which was watching Olmütz. If this estimate be at all correct, the armies which were collecting, together 225,000 regular troops, for the attack upon Vienna, would, unless they had had these Landwehr behind them, have been reduced to under 125,000 men. In fact, an English army under the same circumstances would have been shorn of almost half its strength.

When a Prussian army with its unimpaired strength is preparing to fight a battle in an enemy's country, when supplies of men are already coming up in anticipation of the losses which the action will cause, and when its lines of communication are guarded and secured by the garrison troops in its rear, it musters an enormous number of soldiers, who must every day be provided with food, without which a man can neither fight, march, nor live ; and not only must it provide for itself alone, but also for the prisoners of the enemy who may fall into its hands,—not only food, but hospitals, medicines, and attendants for the sick, surgeries, assistants, and appliances for the wounded, and the means of conveying both sick and wounded from the places where they fall

helpless to convenient spots where they may be tended and healed at a safe distance from the danger of battle, or of being taken in case of a sudden advance of the enemy. It is extremely difficult from mere figures to realize what a gigantic undertaking it has been to supply even food alone to the armies which have fought in the late campaign. The difficulties of such a task may be conceived if we remember that the front line of the Prussian armies in front of Vienna mustered nine times the number of British troops with which Lord Raglan invaded the Crimea; that close behind this line lay General Mülbe's reserve corps, and a corps of the Army of Silesia, which was watching Olmütz, and that these two corps alone were stronger by 4,000 men than all the British, German, and Spanish troops that fought at Talavera; that behind them again was a large mass of Landwehr; that during the siege of Sebastopol the British army was stationary, and had the great advantage of sea transport to within a few miles of its camps, while in the late campaign the Prussian army has been moving forward at an enormously rapid rate, and that the men to be fed in the front line alone numbered about 250,000—a population as large as that of the twelfth part of London. It would be a bold man who would undertake to supply the twelfth part of the whole population of London with to-morrow's food—a bolder still who would undertake the task if this portion of the population were about to move bodily to-morrow morning down to Richmond, and would require to have the meat for their dinner delivered to them the moment they arrived there, and who, without railway transport, agreed

to keep the same crowd daily provided with food until moving at the same rate they arrived at Plymouth ; and yet a general has to do much more than this in giving food to his men,—he has, besides the ordinary difficulties of such a task, to calculate upon bad roads, weary horses, breaking waggons, the attacks of an enemy's cavalry ; he has not only to get the food to the troops, but in many cases he has to provide it in the first place ; he has to keep his magazines constantly stocked, to increase the amount of transport in exact proportion as his troops advance ; to feed not only the fighting men, but all the men who are employed in carrying provisions to the combatants, to find hay and corn for all the horses of the cavalry and for the horses of the transport waggons, and to arrange beforehand so that every man and horse shall halt for the night in close proximity to a large supply of good water. This is not the lightest nor the least of a general's duties. It was the proud boast of England's great soldier that "many could lead troops, he could feed them." When the enemy is in front, and any moment may bring on an action, a general has little time to turn his mind to the organization of a system of supply. Then he must sift intelligence, weigh information, divine his adversary's intentions almost before they are formed, prepare a parry for every blow, and speed a thrust into any opening joint of his antagonist's harness. The means of supplying troops ought to be given ready into the hands of a general ; they should be all arranged and organized beforehand, so that he has but to see that they are properly administered and made use of.

The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field, exclusive of the waggons of each battalion, the artillery and engineer trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided under two heads. The first and larger portion is under the direction of the Commissariat department, and is maintained solely for the supply of food to men and horses. The second portion belongs to the medical department, and carries the medicines and hospital necessities for the sick and wounded, together with the means of carrying disabled men.

The first portion in charge of the Commissariat department consists in the first place of a certain amount of waggons, which are in time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and immediately on the mobilization of the army are provided with horses and drivers from the military train, who are entirely under the control of the principal Commissariat officer. Each army has a principal Commissariat officer; each corps has with its headquarters a Commissariat officer of high rank, and one of the next inferior grade is attached to each division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants, form the first links of the chain by which a General draws food to his troops. The Commissariat columns of each corps d'armée, which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilized, consist of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers, 98 men, 161 horses, and 32 waggons. If the corps d'armée is broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and the reserve artillery. The 160 waggons which form these columns carry three days' provisions for every man in



the corps d'armée ; as soon as the waggons which carry the first day's supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to supply the fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the other waggons will have been emptied. As it is easier to carry flour than bread in these waggons, each corps d'armée is accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of 1 officer and 118 men, 27 horses, and 5 waggons, which are distributed among the troops as may be most convenient ; and as the horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have very hard work, a dépôt of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers, accompanies each corps d'armée. These provision columns thus carry three days' provisions, but in a country where supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way of collecting food ; their duty is simply to bring provisions from the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army advances these magazines must advance also, and that means must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collection of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of transport ; this transport is obtained by hiring waggons and carts in the country where the war is being carried on, or in the countries near it. Waggons hired in the country are also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision columns only carry food for the men.

When the army of Prince Frederick Charles advanced from Saxony, it made its first marches as if in a totally

desert country as far as the supply of provisions was concerned, because the Prussian Generals knew it was quite possible that the Austrians might, in order to retard their progress, lay waste the country. Immense magazines were accordingly collected at Görlitz and in Saxony, which, as the army advanced, were brought forward by railway and by long trains of country waggons to places where they could be conveniently reached by the provision waggons and forage carts. These magazines were constantly replenished both by food and forage brought by railway from the interior of Prussia, or by requisitions levied on Saxony and Bohemia of food and forage, for which the Commissariat paid by cheques which the fortune of war now allows to be defrayed from the war contributions that are to be paid by the Austrian and Saxon Governments. Had the fate of arms been different, of course Saxony and Austria would have provided that these cheques should be honoured by the Berlin Exchequer. When it was found that the country was not laid waste, the provision waggons in some cases were filled in the neighbourhood of the troops by requisitions, but this was found not to be so good a plan as to send them back to magazines where the provisions were collected ready for them, because the time taken up in gathering together dribblets of food and forage from each village, and the great distances over which waggons had to move, imposed an enormous amount of work on both the men and horses.\* Although the requisition system was very useful, it was only regarded as an auxiliary means of supply, for the armies moved prepared every day to find that the country in front of them might be

devastated, and Prussia and Saxony were always looked upon as the real sources of supplies ; and this was absolutely necessary, because it would have been impossible to feed such a large force as the Prussian armies presented by requisitions alone, for requisitions cannot conveniently be made at great distances from the direct line of communications, and in a very short time the quarter of a million of men who were in the front line alone would have eaten up everything in the country around them if they had been dependent on that tract of country only for supplies. Then, even if the troops could have got food from more distant places, the villagers and country people would have starved ; but it is the interest of a general to make his requisitions so that they do not drive the inhabitants to destitution, for terrible sickness always follows in the train of want, and, if pestilence breaks out among the people of the country, it is certain immediately to appear in the ranks of the invading army.

The trains which accompany the medical department of a corps d'armée into the field consist of three heavy hospital trains, each of which has 14 surgeons, 114 men, 69 horses, and 11 waggons, and three light divisional hospital trains, each with 13 surgeons, 74 men, 56 horses, and 10 waggons. Each train carries medicines, materials, instruments, and ambulances for 200 sick, so that an allowance is made for more than 20 per cent. of the men of each corps being *hors de combat*. Each corps d'armée has, besides, a company of sick-bearers, who, on the day of battle, are divided among the troops ; each battalion has also ten men appointed as assistant sick-

bearers, who, with the regular sick-bearers, carry the wounded to the rear; no other man is ever allowed to quit the ranks under fire. When a man is struck, he is taken immediately a short distance out of fire to where the battalion surgeons are waiting; they hastily bind up his wound, he is then placed in an ambulance waggon and carried to the light divisional field hospital, which is kept out of fire about a couple of miles in the rear. The surgeons here perform any necessary operation that is absolutely required, but men are only kept here until a sufficient number arrive to fill a large ambulance waggon, which, as soon as filled, is sent off to the heavy hospital trains which are established in the villages in the rear. At the beginning of the battle of Sadowa the regimental surgeons were occupied in every sheltered nook of ground on the hill of Dub, the divisional hospitals were behind that hill and in Milowitz, the heavy hospitals were in and about Horitz. When the Austrians retreated and the Prussian troops advanced, the divisional hospitals followed; and, before the Austrian guns had ceased firing, were established in Sadowa, Chlum, and Lipa, and all the other villages in the field whither the indefatigable sick-bearers were rapidly bringing in both Austrian and Prussian wounded.

When the field army, the *depôt* and garrison troops, and the provision and medical department trains have been mobilized, the Prussian army is fit to take the field. The necessary commandants and staffs of the districts where the *depôt* troops are stationed are composed either of officers detached from the regular army or of invalid officers. When the army takes the field, its

movements must be directed not only so as to pursue the original plan of the campaign, but also so as to keep pace with the enemy's combinations, and the movements of its different parts must be guided by orders from the directing general.

The above is a sketch of the general system on which the Prussian army is normally organized. How such an army is worked in the field, how its resources are made available, and how it achieves the objects for which it has been mobilized, must depend in a great measure upon the skill of the General to whose direction it is entrusted. What an army so organized can effect when its motions are guided by a skilful hand, the rapid victories of the late campaign have shown. When the field army enters on the theatre of war, the organizer and administrator has done with it; his province is then to take care that its recruits are forthcoming and its supplies are ready when required. But when an army is handed over to the general who is to use it, he has a right to expect that when he receives his divisions he shall also receive the means of manœuvring them; and when he assumes the command of his corps he shall be provided with every appliance which can help him to move them in the combination and unison without which different bodies of troops are not an army, but a series of scattered detachments, which must be easily defeated in detail, or in isolation taken prisoners by an active and energetic enemy. After the plan of a campaign has been once decided upon, the means by which a general moves his troops into positions where they may act most advantageously, and from which they may strike the heavy

blows that will gain a speedy and profitable peace. A peace is the ultimate object of all wars—may be classed under the heads of Information, Intelligence, and the Transmission of Orders. Information of the enemy's preparations, of the number of troops he can put into the field,—how those troops will be armed, organized, and administered,—should be obtained by the Government of the country to which the army belongs, and communicated to the General when he takes the command of the army.

To acquire this information concerning foreign armies during peace every country in Europe devotes a special department of its War Office, which is ever busy collecting and compiling statistics of every foreign army, because, however friendly the relations of any two countries may be, it can never be known how long they may remain so. As soon as hostilities are imminent, a War Office has little chance of obtaining much information from inside the lines of the probable enemy; then the duty of collecting information devolves upon the General himself, who must, by every means he can avail himself of, discover, as far as possible, every position and intention of his adversary's troops. For this purpose, during war, spies are generally employed. Spies have a dangerous task, and not an honourable one; consequently, except in very rare and extreme cases, officers will not accept the invidious duty, and it is often extremely difficult to find persons who will consent to act as spies sufficiently conversant with military matters to make their information worth having. Money is the great means of obtaining good spies; needy adventurers and unscrupulous men will, if well paid, do the work, and, for the sake of a sufficient sum, run the

risk of the certain death which awaits them if discovered in disguise within the hostile outposts. Even if it were accurately known how the Prussian information was derived from within the Austrian lines during the late campaign, it would be too delicate a subject to enter upon ; but it may be stated here, though such a statement is hardly necessary, that all the absurd rumours circulated at the beginning of the campaign, which implied that Austrian officers were guilty of the hideous crime of betraying the movements of their army to the enemy, are utterly without foundation, and are cruel libels against brave men who, however unfortunate in the result of the war, have won the admiration of every rank in the Prussian army by their gallantry, chivalrous bearing, and courage, not only on the field of battle, but in all the trying incidents to which a disastrous campaign gives rise. It is not proper even to express a guess as to how information was collected, but the Austrians have dealt out death with no sparing hand among suspected persons found within their lines, so probably they had cause to imagine that there were spies in the midst of their troops.

The information collected from spies is not, in most cases, completely trustworthy. In the first place, the men who undertake this duty are nearly always mercenary wretches, who will sell friend and foe alike as best suits their own interests ; in the second place, spies are seldom sufficiently acquainted with military matters not to exaggerate movements of slight importance and miss observing vital combinations. To test the accuracy of their reports intelligence is collected by means of recon-

reconnoitring officers, who, either alone or attended by a few troopers, get as close as they can to the enemy's posts ; observe as far as possible, without the use of disguise and in full uniform, the positions of his troops ; and, when discovered and pursued by his patrols, fight or ride to bring their intelligence safe home to their own outposts. Intelligence is also culled by every vedette and every advanced sentinel, but the reconnoitring officer is the main source. To reconnoitre well requires not only a brave but a very able officer, with a quick eye, a ready memory, and a great knowledge of the indications which tell the presence of hostile troops, and allow an estimate to be formed of the force in which they are. Two Prussian officers of the staff of Prince Frederick Charles, the afternoon before the battle of Königgrätz, boldly approached the Austrian lines, observed the positions of the Austrian troops, and, though both pursued and assaulted by cavalry, got safe home, and brought to their General certain intelligence which allowed him to frame the combinations that resulted in the morrow's victory. When the reconnoitring officer regains the shelter of his own outposts, he must either personally bring or by some means send his intelligence as quickly as possible to head-quarters. The plan usually pursued in European armies has been for the officer himself to ride quickly to his General, and to be the first bearer of his intelligence. This means has, however, been found to be too slow by the experience of the late campaign, and it is extremely improbable that a Prussian army will ever again take the field without a signal corps such as those which were so successfully used both by Federals



and Confederates in the great American struggle. By means of such a corps signals will be flashed by flags by day, by lanterns by night, from hill to hill, and the intelligence collected by the reconnoitring officer will arrive head-quarters within a few minutes after the officer has reached the outposts. The Prussians are also about to take another hint from the Americans; they are going to establish a regular system of reconnoitring balloons, elevated in which a staff-officer will be able to see over trees and rising grounds, and by signal communicate his observations to men below, who will pass them on to the next signal station, from which they will be transmitted to head-quarters.

When a General receives intelligence, he has to weigh it, consider it, and often strike the balance between conflicting information. He has then to move his own divisions in accordance with his deductions, and must send word to any co-operating force of what he has heard, and what he is about to do. Undoubtedly, the quickest way for a reconnoitring officer to despatch his reports to his General, and for the General to communicate with his own divisions and with his colleagues, would be by electric telegraph; but it would be almost impossible for a reconnoitring officer to communicate with head-quarters by electricity. Reconnoitring expeditions are made so suddenly and so uncertainly that, quick as the Prussian field telegraph is laid down, this means of communication is hardly available with the outposts. Nor is the electric telegraph easily used to communicate with every division; it might be so used, but its application would require a number of extra

waggons to be attached to every division, and would bring a confusing number of lines into the office of the chief of the staff. It is probable that in another war the communications from head-quarters to the divisions of the army will be made by signal. During the late campaign orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted officers, who were attached to head-quarters for this special purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a certain number attached to every General. These troopers form the General's escort, and act as orderlies to carry unimportant messages. When an officer is sent with an important order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in case of his being killed, to carry the order themselves to its destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken. During the campaign the communications between head-quarters and divisions were kept up by means of mounted officers; but communications between the head-quarters of each army and the King were maintained by means of the field-telegraph. For this purpose a field-telegraph division is attached to the head-quarters of each army. It consists of three officers, one hundred and thirty-seven men, seventy-three horses, and ten waggons. Two of the waggons contain batteries and instruments, and are fitted up as operating rooms; the other eight waggons each contain

the wires and means of putting them up over five miles of country ; thus each division can, with its own materials, form telegraphic communication over forty miles. These forty miles are, however, seldom all required, for the lines of the communications of armies usually run along railways, and as far as possible the permanent wires are repaired by the men of the division, and made use of for the telegraphic communication of the army. Each division carries with it five miles of insulated wire for the purpose of laying through rivers or lakes if these should come in the way of the line. The wires are coiled inside each waggon on rollers, from which they can be uncoiled as the waggon moves along, or in bad ground the roller can be transferred to a stretcher, which is carried between two men. The poles are exceedingly light, and about ten feet high, so that where the wire crosses roads it may pass clear over the heads of mounted men. As it is equally culpable in war to prevent communication by unfair means within the lines of an army as it is to seek to obtain the same in disguise between the enemy's sentries, any enemy not in uniform, or any one in the enemy's pay who is detected cutting the telegraph wire, is regarded as a spy, and treated accordingly.

During the late war this organization had not been entirely introduced into the Prussian army, and the arrangements for the prosecution of the war consequently slightly differed from those which would have been made if time had allowed the regulated organization to have been thoroughly introduced into the service.

It may be convenient to subjoin here a summary

statement, compiled carefully from the best authorities, of the organization and strength of the Prussian army, which was employed for the various purposes of the war.

Every Prussian who is twenty years old enters the army as a soldier without distinction of rank or wealth. Time of service is with the colours three years, in the reserve five years, and in the Landwehr eleven years.

### 1.—INFANTRY.

<i>a. GUARD.</i> —4 Regiments of Foot Guards			
of three battalions each	=	12 batts.	= 12,024 men
4 Regiments of Grenadiers			
of the Guard . . .	=	12 „	= 12,024 „
1 Regiment of Fusiliers .	=	3 „	= 3,006 „
9 Regiments of the Guard			
	=	27 batts.	= 27,054 men
 <i>b. LINE.</i> —52 Regiments of Infantry			
(13—32 and 41—72)			
of three battalions each	=	156 batts.	= 156,312 men
12 Regiments of Grenadiers			
(1—12) . . . . .	=	36 „	= 36,072 „
8 Regiments of Fusiliers .			
(33—40) . . . . .	=	24 „	= 24,048 „
72 Regiments of the Line .			
	=	216 batts.	= 216,432 men
 <i>c. RIFLEMEN and LIGHT TROOPS—</i>			
1 Batt. of Jägers of the			
Guard . . . . .	=	1 batt.	= 1,002 men
1 Batt. Schützen . . .	=	1 „	= 1,002 „
8 „ Jägers of the Line	=	8 „	= 8,016 „
<hr/>			
10 „ of Riflemen . .	=	10 „	= 10,020 men
<hr/>			
The total Infantry . . .	=	253 batts.	= 253,506 men

The armament of the Infantry regiments is the needle-gun with the ordinary bayonet; that of the Fusilier regiments the fusilier musket, which only differs from the ordinary needle-gun, in being rather shorter and lighter; that of the Jägers the needle-rifle with sword-bayonet.

## 2.—CAVALRY.

<b>a. GUARD.</b>		1 Regiment of <i>Garde du Corps</i> of four squadrons . . .	=	4 squad.	=	600 horsemen
		1 Regiment of Cuirassiers . . .	=	4 „	=	600 „
		3 Regts. of Uhlans . . .	=	12 „	=	1,800 „
		2 Regiments of Dragoons . . .	=	8 „	=	1,200 „
		1 Regiment of Hussars . . .	=	4 „	=	600 „
		8 Regts. of Cavalry of the Guard. . .	=	32 squad.	=	4,800 horsemen
<b>b. LINE.</b>		8 Regiments of Cuirassiers . . .	=	32 squad.	=	4,800 horsemen
		12 Regts. of Uhlans . . .	=	48 „	=	7,200 „
		12 Regiments of Hussars (of which eight had 4 squadrons, and four had 5) . . .	=	52 „	=	7,800 „
		8 Regiments of Dragoons (of which four had 4, and four had 5 squadrons) . . .	=	36 „	=	5,400 „
		40 Regts. of Cavalry of the Line . . .	=	168 squad.	=	25,200 horsemen
		Total of Cavalry . . .	=	200 squad.	=	30,000 horsemen

The armament of the Cuirassier regiments is cuirass, helmet, sabre, and pistol ; that of Uhlans, lance, sword, and pistol ; of Dragoons and Hussars, sword and needle-carbine. Cuirassiers and Uhlans are heavy, Dragoons and Hussars light cavalry. The horses are all of Prussian breed, mostly from good English sires and grandsires.

### 3.—ARTILLERY.

1.—1 Brigade of Artillery of the Guard, three divisions of field batteries, of which each consists of four batteries of 6 guns <sup>1</sup> . . . . .	=	72 guns
1 Division of Horse Artillery of the Guard, consisting of six batteries of 4 guns each . . . . .	=	24 „
Total Field Artillery of the Guard . . . . .		<hr/> 96 guns
2.—8 Brigades of Artillery of the Line = 144 batteries . . . . .	=	768 guns
Total of Field Artillery = 162 batteries . . . . .	=	<hr/> 864 guns
2 Divisions of Garrison Artillery called out = 18 batteries . . . . .	=	96 „

### 4.—SPECIAL TROOPS.

Battalion of Pioneers of the Guard . . . . .	=	1,002 men
8 „ „ „ Line . . . . .	=	8,016 „
9 Battalions of Pioneers = 36 companies . . . . .	=	<hr/> 9,018 men

### 5.—MILITARY TRAIN.

1 Battalion of Military Train of the Guard of two companies . . . . .	=	1,226 men
8 Battalions of Military Train of the Line . . . . .	=	9,808 „
Total Military Train . . . . .		<hr/> 11,034 men

<sup>1</sup> Of these 4 batteries were armed with the rifled 6-pounder gun.

4 „ „ „ 4 „  
4 „ „ „ smooth 12 „

### DEPÔT TROOPS.

Each regiment of Infantry on being mobilized forms a depôt battalion, each regiment of Cavalry a depôt squadron, each Jäger battalion a depôt company, each brigade of Artillery a depôt division, each battalion of Pioneers a depôt company:—

81 depôt battalions of Infantry . . .	=	81,162 men
10 „ companies of Jägers . . .	=	2,500 „
48 „ squadrons . . .	=	7,200 „
9 „ divisions of Artillery (228 guns)	=	7,400 „
9 „ companies of Pioneers . . .	=	2,250 „
<hr/>		
Total of Depôt troops . . .	=	100,512 men

Thus the strength of the Prussian regular army at the commencement of the campaign was—

Infantry . . .	253,504 men	
Cavalry . . .	30,000 „	
Artillery . . .	35,100 „	with 864 guns
Pioneers . . .	9,018 „	
Train . . .	11,034 „	
Non-combatants with regiments, &c. . . .	18,000 „	
Depôt troops . . .	100,512 „	with 228 guns
Officers . . .	13,000 „	

Total about 473,600 men, with 100,000 horses and 1,092 guns.

The Landwehr, the first levy of which forms the troops of reserve supports, and for garrison duties in support of the regular army, and consists of men between twenty-eight and thirty-two years of age, was organized as follows:—

INFANTRY.—4 Regiments of Landwehr of the Guard, each of three battalions . . . . .	}	116 batt. = 118,900 men
32 Regiments of Landwehr battalions, each of three and eight independent battalions . . . . .		

At first the majority of the battalions were formed 500 strong, and at a later period raised only to the strength of 800 men by calling up some of the second levy of the Landwehr, so that the actual strength of the Landwehr did not reach 118,900 men. Of these one hundred and sixteen battalions, twenty-four were amalgamated together in the first reserve corps d'armée; the remainder were used as garrisons for fortresses and for the maintenance of occupied territories.

The Cavalry of the first levy of the Landwehr consisted of twelve regiments :—

1 Heavy Cavalry Regiment of 4 squadrons . . . . .	=	4 squad.	=	600 horsemen
5 Regiments of Uhlans . . . . .	=	20 „	=	3,000 „
1 Regiment of Dragoons . . . . .	=	4 „	=	600 „
5 Regiments of Hussars . . . . .	=	20 „	=	3,000 „

7,200

During the course of the war seven more  
regiments of four squadrons each were  
formed . . . . .

= 4,200 „

Total Landwehr Cavalry . . . . . = 11,400 „

The remainder of the Landwehr of the second levy, after the battalions above mentioned have been filled up to war strength, is only called out in special cases, and by particular orders. The men are then either sent to increase the strength of the battalions under arms, or can



be formed in independent regiments, which can consist of one hundred and sixteen battalions of Infantry, and one hundred and forty-four squadrons of Cavalry.

The regiment of Infantry consists of three battalions, each of four companies. Each company consists of two divisions. The formation for parade is in three ranks; in action the third rank men of the whole battalion act as skirmishers, or three of each company form a third two-rank deep division of the company.

Each squadron of Cavalry is formed of four divisions; the formation is always in double rank.

The Prussian fleet, which till within the last few years has never aspired to any very distinguished place amongst those of the great maritime Powers, consisted at the beginning of the war of eight screw corvettes, namely—

The Arcona	.	.	28	guns,	400	horse-power
Gazelle	.	.	28	"	400	"
Vincta	.	.	28	"	400	"
Nymph	.	.	17	"	200	"
Augusta	.	.	14	"	400	"
Victoria	.	.	14	"	400	"
Hertha	.	.	28	"	400	"
Medusa	.	.	17	"	200	"

of also eight gunboats of the first class, each of which had three guns, and was of 80 horse-power; of fifteen gunboats of the second class, each of which mounted two guns, and was of 60 horse-power; of also four steam despatch-boats, namely—

The Eagle	.	.	.	4	guns,	300	horse-power
Loreley	.	.	.	2	"	120	"
Grief	.	.	.	2	"	50	"
Grille	.	.	.	2	"	160	"

of also two paddle-wheel steamers—

Arminius	.	.	4	guns,	300	horse-power.
Cheops	.	.	3	„	300	„

Thus the whole steam-fleet mustered altogether only 245 guns.

Of sailing-vessels Prussia possessed the frigates *Gepin*, 48 guns ; *Thetis*, 36 ; and the *Niobe*, 26 : the brigs *Rover*, 16 guns ; *Mosquito*, 16 ; *Hela*, 6 ; the schooners *Iltis* and *Leopard*, and the guard-ship *Barbarossa*, of 9 guns, as well as thirty-four sloops of 2 guns each, and four yawls of one gun each.

The *personnel* of the fleet is formed of a ship's complement division of 1,882 men, among whom are included officers, officials, and boys ; of a dockyard division of 589 men ; and of the marines (infantry and artillery), who number 952 men.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA.

SINCE the late war the Government of Austria has decided upon a total re-organization of its army. It is therefore only necessary here to show as briefly as possible the organization of the Austrian army as it existed at the beginning of the campaign, more with a view to deduce therefrom the actual number engaged, than to take any special notice of a system which the most bitter experience has proved to be grievously faulty.

The Empire of Austria had at the beginning of the war an area of about 294,000 square miles, and a population of about 35,000,000 inhabitants, of many nationalities, such as German, Slave, Maygar, and Czech. Its annual receipts amounted to 48,850,000*l.*, its annual expenditure to almost 52,100,000*l.*, so that every year there was a considerable deficit. To the army and navy 11,700,000*l.* were annually devoted. The national debt amounted in April 1864 to 309,600,000*l.*, and must since that time have increased by at least 20,000,000*l.*

The Austrian army consisted of—

80 Infantry regiments of the Line (1—80)	}	Infantry.
1 Imperial regiment . . . . .		
32 Battalions of Feldjägers (1—32) .		
14 Border Infantry regiments (1—14)		
(Grenz Infanterie-regimenter) .		
1 Border Infantry battalion (Titler) .		

12 Cuirass regiments (1—12)	}	Cavalry.
2 Regiments of Dragoons (1—2)		
14 Regiments of Hussars (1—14)		
13 Regiments of Uhlands (1—13)		
12 Regiments of Artillery (1—12)	}	Artillery.
1 Regiment of Coast Artillery		
2 Regiments of Engineers	}	Special Troops.
6 Battalions of Pioneers		
10 Sanitary companies	}	Troops of Administration.
48 Transport squadrons		
Besides other Administration troops and departments		
10 Regiments of Gens-d'armes	}	Troops for Pro- vincial Defence.
A military police corps		
The Tyrolean Provincial corps		
Against Provincial Rifle battalions		
Volunteer Companies of Sharp- shooters and Landsturm		

Each regiment of Infantry of the Line consisted in peace of four battalions and a depôt. The fourth battalion to which the depôt was attached remained in peace in the district to which the regiment belonged, and served as a depôt battalion, while the three first battalions were, as a rule, quartered in a totally different province than that from which their recruits were drawn. In time of war the depôt was formed into a depôt division, and the fourth battalion was sent into some fortress as a garrison battalion, while the three first battalions were sent into the field to join the army of manœuvre.

Each battalion mustered, or ought to have mustered, in war, 1,018 combatants, divided among six companies. Every two companies formed the so-called division : each company consisted of two subdivisions.

The Imperial regiment of Jägers had in war six battalions and one depôt battalion. Each battalion mustered in six companies 1,011 combatants, as did also each battalion of Feldjägers.

The whole of the duty of the Military Borderers is divided into three portions. The first levy formed the regular border infantry regiments and the Titler battalion : the second, the armed population, was only formed for service in its own particular province, and consisted of, in all, 22,000 men. The third levy was only specially called upon in cases of urgent necessity, and formed a force of about 28,000 men.

In war, each regiment of the Military Borderers of the first levy consisted of three battalions, each of six companies. The first eight regiments formed, at the outbreak of a war, one battalion of four companies as a depôt ; three others formed an independent division for the same purpose. Of these eleven regiments three battalions could be put into the field in war ; of the remaining three of the fourteen Border regiments two battalions could only be put in the field ; the Titler battalion sent one battalion into the field, so that forty battalions of Military Borderers were with the field army.

For the defence of fortresses there were left, after the army of operation took the field, eighty-four battalions of infantry regiments, and eleven Border battalions, in all about 100,000 men.

The Tyrolean Provincial corps, as well as the Border troops which did not join the army, were retained in their own particular provinces.

The principal weapon of the Infantry of the Line and of the Border regiments was a rifled musket on Lorenz's system, with a bayonet. The Jägers had a rather shorter musket, the rifling of which had a slightly sharper twist than that of the Line.

*Cavalry.*—The cuirass regiments, which were originally Cuirassiers, but had previously to the late war laid aside the cuirass, formed the whole of the heavy cavalry. Each cuirass regiment, with the exception of the eighth, the old Dampier Cuirassiers (which, on account of privilege derived as early as 1619, had never been reduced, and still contains six squadrons), consisted of five squadrons. Every light cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons. At the outbreak of the war each regiment of cavalry left one of its squadrons as a *depôt* squadron at home. The squadron contained one hundred and forty-nine mounted men. The whole cavalry mustered 29,000 sabres.

*Artillery.*—The field-artillery consisted of twelve regiments, of which nine were formed to accompany the corps d'armée of infantry; the remaining three were intended to form the army artillery of reserve, and to be attached to the cavalry of reserve.

The regiment of coast-artillery was divided into four battalions, of which the first and second battalion had in war each five active companies, two mountain batteries of eight guns, and one *depôt* company. The third and fourth battalions each had six active companies and one *depôt* company.

The heavy batteries of the field-artillery were armed with muzzle-loading rifled 8-pounder guns; the light with muzzle-loading rifled 4-pounder guns; the moun-

tain batteries with rifled 3-pounders. Garrison artillery of the latest pattern consisted of rifled breach-loading guns, 6-, 12-, 24-, and 48-pounders; but there are still many smooth-bored guns and howitzers in the armaments of the fortresses.

An Austrian corps d'armée, as a rule, consisted of four brigades of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry (one attached to each infantry brigade), four 4-pounder field-batteries (one attached to each infantry brigade), a reserve artillery, two companies of engineers, and two companies of pioneers, with four bridge-trains, besides administrative services. To an army which would be formed by the amalgamation of several of these corps d'armée, would be attached several brigades of light cavalry, each of which consisted of two regiments; therefore ten squadrons, and one 4-pounder battery of horse-artillery, some divisions of reserve cavalry, an army reserve of artillery, a reserve of engineers, and all necessary administrative services.

*Recruiting.*—In each year in Austria from 80,000 to 85,000 recruits were called into the army. The time of service was ten years, of which the last two were spent in the reserve.

In the Infantry the recruit was kept from one to three years with the colours, in the Cavalry seven or eight years, in the Engineers and Artillery three years: he was, after his period of actual presence with his corps expired, dismissed to his home on furlough, and called out annually for military exercise till he had accomplished eight years' service, when he was transferred to the reserve.

In case of war the men on furlough were called in to

fill up the ranks of the army of operation, the men of the reserve to join the *depôt* and garrison corps.

The tactical unit in the Infantry was the division of two companies, in the Cavalry the squadron, in the Artillery the battery of eight guns. It was laid down as a rule by the Austrian regulations, that in action every division of troops was to retain a dependent reserve.

The Austrian army was divided according to nationalities, thus—

	German.	Poles.	Hungarian.	Italian.	Siebenbürger.	Borderers.	Mixed.
Infantry . .	23 regts.	13	23	7	7	7	
Jägers . .	27 batts.	4	3	2	2	—	
Cavalry . .	12 regts.	13	11	—	1	3	1
Artillery . .	— regts.	1	—	—	—	—	12

Subjoined is a summary, calculated from the best available authorities, of the Austrian troops available for the army of operation at the commencement of the war :—

### 1.—INFANTRY.

*a.* LINE.—80 Regiments of three battalions of three companies.

	Peace Strength.	War Strength.
1 battalion	= 470	= 1,018
80 Regiments	= 240 batts.	= 244,480 combatants

*b.* JÄGERS.—One Imperial Jäger regiment of six battalions of six companies, and thirty-two Feldjäger battalions of six companies.

1 battalion	= 627	= 1,011 combatants
38 battalions	=	38,420 „

*c.* BORDERERS.—Eleven Regiments of three battalions, three of two battalions, and one independent battalion.

1 battalion	= 956 combatants
40 battalions	= 38,240 „



## 2.—CAVALRY.

12 Cuirass regiments of four squadrons . . .	=	7,142
1 extra squadron . . .	=	149
2 Regiments of Dragoons of five squadrons . . .	=	1,490
14 „ Hussars of five squadrons . . .	=	10,430
13 „ Uhlans of five squadrons of		
114 horsemen . . .	=	7,410
		26,621

## 3.—ARTILLERY.

Twelve regiments of Artillery and one regiment of coast artillery. Of these twelve regiments, the nine which accompanied the corps d'armée of Infantry each consisted of—

6 4-pounder field-batteries of four and eight guns	=	40 guns <sup>1</sup>
2 8-pounder field-batteries of eight guns . . .	=	16 „
2 4-pounder horse artillery batteries of eight guns	=	16 „
1 rocket battery of eight guns . . . . .	=	8 „
1 park } companies . . . . .	=	8 „
4 fortress }		
1 regiment	=	12 batteries . . . = 88 „
9 regiments	=	108 batteries . . . = 792 „

The three regiments which were attached to the reserve and cavalry divisions consisted of—

4 8-pounder field-batteries of eight guns . . .	=	32 guns
5 4-pounder horse artillery batteries (one of four, four of eight guns) . . . . .	=	40 „
1 park } companies . . . . .	=	4 „
4 fortress }		
1 regiment	=	10 batteries . . . = 76 „
3 regiments	=	30 batteries . . . = 228 „
1 regiment of coast artillery	=	2 batteries of
eight guns . . . . .	=	16 „
Total number of guns . . .		1,036

<sup>1</sup> Two 4-pounder field-batteries have in peace only four guns, which in war are combined into one battery of eight guns.

## 4.—SPECIAL TROOPS.

2 Regiments of Engineers . . . .	=	6,172 men
6 Battalions of Pioneers . . . .	=	5,022 „
		<hr/>
		11,194

Total strength of available combatants in the army of operation :—

Infantry . . . . .	321,140
Cavalry . . . . .	26,621
Artillery . . . . .	24,601, with 1,036 guns
Special troops . . . . .	11,194
<hr/>	
383,556, with 1,036 guns	

*Austrian Navy.*—Austria had done more for her navy within the few years which immediately preceded the war, than would have been anticipated from the small extent of her seacoast, and her little interest in European commerce. The Austrian navy mustered twenty-eight screw-vessels, namely—

- 1 line-of-battle ship,
- 5 frigates,
- 7 armour-plated frigates,
- 2 corvettes,
- 7 second-class gunboats,
- 3 third-class gunboats,
- 3 schooners,
- 12 paddle-wheel steamers,

besides sixteen sailing-vessels, of which two were frigates, three corvettes, three brigs. The above formed the Austrian fleet of seagoing vessels ; but for the navigation of interior waters, and for the defence of the coast, there were ten screw-steamers, sixteen paddle-wheel steamers, and thirty-five guardships.

The steam fleet of seagoing ships numbered forty vessels, which carried 651 guns, amounted to 11,475 horse-power, and were manned by 7,772 men.

The sailing fleet of seagoing vessels, which was only practically valuable for purposes of transport, consisted of eighteen vessels, with 225 guns, and 1,804 men.

The twenty-six vessels on the inner waters had together 72 guns, 1,511 horse-power, and 961 sailors; while the thirty-five guardships mounted 115 guns, and bore 1,060 sailors.

## CHAPTER III.

### WAR STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING STATES OF GERMANY.

*Bavaria.*—Population, 4,700,000 ; area, 34,750 square miles ; revenue, 4,700,000*l.* ; national debt, 34,300,000*l.* In Bavaria the time of military service is six years. It is allowed to find substitutes for military service. The time of actual presence with the colours is twelve months in the first year, eight in the second, three in the third, and fourteen days in the fourth. Except for this time, the soldier is sent home on furlough.

The army consisted of—

#### INFANTRY.

16 Regiments of three battalions of six companies,			
1 battalion	.	.	= 1,950 men
8 Battalions of Jägers	.	.	= 668 „
Total	.	50,768 men	

armed with Podewil's muskets and sword-bayonet.

#### CAVALRY.

3 Regiments of Cuirassiers	}	1 regt. of 4 squadrons = 591 horsemen
6 Regiments of Light horse		
3 Regiments of Uhlans		
12 regiments	.	= 7,620 horsemen

Cuirassiers armed with iron cuirass and helmet, straight

sword, and pistol ; the other regiments with bent sabre and pistol ; Uhlans with lances.

### ARTILLERY.

Four Regiments, of which—

No. I. and II. each 2 6-pounder batteries of 4 guns = 16 guns

                    3 12-pounder batteries of 4 guns = 24 „

III. Horse Artillery, with 4 12-pounder batteries

                    of 6 guns . . . . . = 24 „

IV. 2 6-pounder batteries of eight guns . . = 16 „

                    2 12-pounder batteries of eight guns . = 16 „

Total . . . . . 96 „

The 6-pounders were rifled on the Prussian system ; the 12-pounders were smooth-bore.

*Engineers.*—One regiment of eight companies, 1,380 men.

The army had divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions. Tactical units were the company in two ranks, the squadron, and the battery. The formation for battle of the Bavarian infantry battalion was four Fusilier companies in line, and the two light companies in column in rear of the wings.

*Saxony.*—Area, 6,775 square miles ; population, 2,225,000 ; revenue, 2,100,000*l.* ; debt, 9,600,000*l.* The time of service in Saxony was six years in the Line and two years in the reserve.

### INFANTRY.

16 Battalions of four companies, 1 battalion = 983 men

4 Battalions of Jägers of 4 companies, 1 bat. = 999 „

Total . . . 19,752 men

armed with Podewil's muskets and sword-bayonet.

## CAVALRY.

1 Guard regiment	} of five squadrons, 1 regiment = 802 men	
3 Line regiments		
Total		3,217 men.

## ARTILLERY.

1 Regiment of field-batteries, with 22 6-pounder rifled guns . . . . .	=	22 guns
6 rifled 12-pounder batteries . . . . .	=	36 „
1 Horse Artillery regiment of 2 batteries of 6 guns	=	12 „
Total . . . . .		70 „

## SPECIAL TROOPS.

One company of Engineers and two of Pioneers.

The army was divided into two divisions, each of which had two brigades. One brigade consisted of two regiments and one battalion of Jägers. Besides these divisions, there was a cavalry division of two brigades, each of two regiments, and a corps of artillery; the infantry fought in three ranks, with a reserve formation out of the third rank in rear of the wings.

*Hesse-Cassel*.—Area, 4,350 square miles; population, 740,000; revenue, 500,000*l.*; debt, 1,400,000*l.*

Military service was universal, and for a period of ten years, of which five years were spent in the Line and first levy of reserve, five in the second levy. The time of actual presence with the standards varied from twenty-one to thirty-four months.

## INFANTRY.

2 Brigades of 2 regiments of 2 batts. of 4 companies	=	879 men
1 Jäger battalion . . . . .	=	619 „
1 Schützen . . . . .	=	387 „
Total . . . . .		8,614 men

armed with the Prussian needle-gun.

## CAVALRY.

Garde du corps (sword and pistol)	. . . =	264	horsemen
2 Regiments of Hussars (sword and carbine)	=	521	„
Total	. . .	1,306	horsemen

## ARTILLERY.

1 rifled 6-pounder battery	. . .	6	guns
1 smooth 6-pounder battery	. . .	6	„
$\frac{1}{2}$ smooth 12-pounder battery	. . .	4	„
1 Horse Artillery 6-pounder	. . .	6	„
<hr/>			
Total	. . .	22	„

## ENGINEERS.

1 company of Pioneers.

*Hanover.* — Area, 17,450 square miles ; population, 1,890,000 ; income, 3,750,000*l.* ; debt, 7,200,000*l.*

Recruiting conducted by conscription : time of service seven years, in the cavalry ten years.

## INFANTRY.

Two divisions, each of two brigades, each of two regiments and one light battalion = 8 regiments, and four light battalions = 18,000 men.

## CAVALRY.

2 Cuirassier regiments	. . . =	1,000	horsemen
1 Dragoon	„ . . =	1,000	„
2 Hussar	„ . . =	1,000	„
<hr/>			
Total	. . .	3,000	„

ARTILLERY—50 guns.

*Württemberg.*—Area, 8,875 square miles ; population, 1,720,000 ; revenue, 1,500,000*l.* ; debt, 7,500,000*l.*

The contingent of Würtemberg formed the first division of the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation.

Recruiting conducted by conscription, but substitutes allowed. Time of service twelve years, six of which were passed in the line, six in the Landwehr. Time of actual presence with the standards about eighteen months.

#### INFANTRY.

1 Division of 2 brigades of 4 regiments, each of 2 battalions (4 companies)			
16 Battalions (1 battalion = 851 men)	.	.	= 13,616 men
2 Battalions of Jägers (1 battalion = 849 men)	=		1,698 „
Total . . . . .			<hr/> 15,314 „

armed with Podewil's musket.

#### CAVALRY.

1 brigade of 4 regiments, each in 4 squadrons	
1 regiment	= 714 to 880 horsemen
Total . . . . .	3,271

of which one regiment acts as a dépôt.

#### ARTILLERY.

1 Regiment=	2 Horse Artillery 4-pounder batteries of 8 guns	= 16 guns
	2 light field 6-pounder batteries of 8 guns	= 16 „
	2 heavy field 12-pounder batteries of 6 guns	= 12 „
	3 siege batteries . . . . .	„
Total . . . . .		<hr/> 44 „

#### ENGINEERS.

210 men on a war footing.



*Baden.* — Area, 6,950 square miles ; population, 1,400,000 ; revenue, 1,700,000*l.* ; debt, 10,800,000*l.*

The contingent formed the second division of the eighth corps of the army of the Germanic Confederation.

#### INFANTRY.

5 Regiments of two battalions	}	= 10,745 men
2 Fusilier Battalions . . .		
1 Battalion of Jägers . . .		

armed with Podewil's musket.

#### CAVALRY.

3 Regiments of Dragoons, each of 4 squadrons = 2,100 horsemen.

#### ARTILLERY—38 guns.

*Hesse-Darmstadt.*—Area, 3,800 square miles ; population, 860,000 ; revenue, 950,000*l.* ; debt, 2,000,000*l.*

The army of Hesse-Darmstadt formed the third division of the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation.

#### INFANTRY.

Two brigades, each of two regiments, each of two battalions, each in five companies.

8 Battalions (1 battalion = 831 men)	. . . . .	= 6,648 men
1 Battalion of Jägers	. . . . .	= 594 „
Total . . . . .		7,242 „

armed with Podewil's musket.

#### CAVALRY.

1 brigade of 2 regiments.

1 regiment . . . . .	= 648 horsemen
Total . . . . .	1,296 horsemen.

### ARTILLERY.

1 Horse Artillery battery, with 4 smooth and	
2 rifled 6-pounder guns . . . . .	= 6 guns
3 Field-batteries of 6 guns . . . . .	= 18 „
(One 12-pounder battery, one rifled 6-pair	
one smooth 6-pounder battery)	—
Total . . . . .	24 „

ENGINEERS—1 company.

*Nassau.* — Area, 2,137 square miles ; population, 460,000 inhabitants.

### INFANTRY.

1 brigade of 2 regiments, each of 2 battalions.	
1 battalion = 1,033 men	
4 battalions . . . . .	= 4,132 men
1 battalion of Jägers . . . . .	= 809 „
Total . . . . .	4,941

### ARTILLERY.

1 rifled 6-pounder battery of 8 guns . . . . .	= 8 guns
1 smooth-bore battery . . . . .	= 8 „
Total . . . . .	16 „

The contingents of the other minor States are so small that it would be tedious to enter into their composition in detail. The military of those which voted for the Austrian motion on the 14th June in the Diet were :—

Saxe-Meiningen . . . . .	2,000 men
Reusz Grez . . . . .	400 „
Frankfort-on-Maine . . . . .	1,000 „
Total . . . . .	3,400

Of those which voted against the Austrian motion :—

The Saxon Duchies . . .	7,500 men
Mecklenburg . . .	7,500 „
Oldenburg . . .	3,500 „
Lübeck, Bremen, Hamburg .	3,600 „
Anhalt . . .	2,000 „
The two Lippes . . .	1,200 „
Waldech . . .	800 „
Reusz-Schleiz . . .	700 „
The two Schwarzburgs . .	1,800 „
<hr/>	
Total . . .	28,500

Brunswick, Lemberg, and Luxembourg also voted against Austria, but the two former put no contingents in the field ; the contingent of the last took so much time in its mobilization that it was not ready for employment until very nearly the conclusion of peace.

## CHAPTER IV.

### WAR STRENGTH OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

THE kingdom of Italy had, with an area of 116,750 square miles, a population of about 21,775,000 inhabitants. Since the formation of this monarchy, in 1860, its finances have never been in anything but the most unsatisfactory condition. Large armies and fleets have been maintained at a ruinous expense, and have both proved their incapacity to accomplish the purposes for which they were intended; large numbers of useless officials, who did no public work worthy of the name, and served as impediments more than as facilities to the transaction of business, were suffered to live idly on the resources of the State. In the year 1864 the revenue of the country amounted to 27,000,000*l.*, the expenditure of the Government to nearly 37,000,000*l.*, and since that year this annual deficit has remained about constant.

In the year 1864 9,280,000*l.* were spent upon the army, and 2,500,000*l.* upon the navy.

The Italian army, according to the latest organization, consisted of :—

#### INFANTRY.

- 8 Regiments of Grenadiers (Nos. 1—8).
- 72 Regiments of Infantry of the Line (Nos. 1—72).
- 5 Regiments of Bersaglieri (Nos. 1—5).

The regiments of Grenadiers and of the Line differ only in some slight details of clothing from each other. A regiment of either consists of the regimental staff, four battalions, and a dépôt.<sup>1</sup>

Each battalion consists of four companies, and each on a war footing musters four officers and 149 men. Thus the effective strength of each regiment amounted to, with the staff, 81 officers and 2,453 men, or altogether 2,534 men; and the eighty regiments of Grenadiers and of the Line amounted in all to 202,720 combatants.

The dépôts remained at home to find more drill recruits, and then forward them to the troops in the field. Each dépôt consisted of 14 officers and 61 men.

Every regiment of Bersaglieri consisted of a staff, eight field battalions, each of four companies, and a dépôt division. The companies of the Bersaglieri were of the same strength as those of the Line. Thus the effective strength for war of each regiment of Bersaglieri amounted to 152 officers and 4,872 men, or altogether to 5,024 men. The five regiments therefore would afford 25,120 combatants.

The Bersaglieri were armed with short rifles and sword bayonets: the rest of the infantry with Minié rifles and ordinary bayonets.

#### CAVALRY.

4 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line (heavy).

7 Regiments of Lancers.

7 Regiments of Light horse.

1 Regiment of Guides.

<sup>1</sup> According to the organization of 1865.

With the exception of the regiment of Guides, all the regiments of Cavalry have six field squadrons and a depôt squadron.

Each squadron on a war footing mustered 3 officers, 145 men, 112 horses. The regimental staff consisted of 11 officers, 7 men, and 18 horses. The regiment therefore numbers 41 officers, 877 men, and 738 horses. A regiment may accordingly be considered to bring about 700 sabres into the field.

This would give for the effective force on a war footing of the eighteen regiments (exclusive of the Guides) 12,600 sabres. The depôt of a regiment consists of 14 officers and 59 men. The regiment of Guides, which is chiefly intended to furnish orderlies for general officers, consists of seven squadrons, and has altogether 60 officers, 1,074 men, and 858 horses. The heavy Cavalry as well as the Lancers carry the lance.

### ARTILLERY.

- 1 Regiment of Pontoniers, who, in the Italian service as in the French, are included among the Artillery.
- 3 Regiments of Garrison Artillery, Nos. 2, 3, 4.
- 5 Regiments of Field Artillery, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
- 6 Companies of Artificers.

The regiment of Pontoniers has nine companies on a war footing ; each regiment of Field Artillery has sixteen field-batteries and two depôt batteries ; each regiment of Garrison Artillery has sixteen companies and two depôt companies. Two batteries of the fifth regiment are Horse Artillery batteries. Except these, the Italian army

possesses no horse artillery. From the five field regiments there can be placed in the field eighty field-batteries, each of six guns, forming a total artillery force of four hundred and eighty guns.

These guns are all rifled, and are divided into batteries of 8-pounders or 16-pounders.

#### ENGINEERS.

Two regiments of Sappers. Each regiment on a war footing has eighteen field companies and two dépôt companies.

#### MILITARY TRAIN.

Three regiments. Each regiment has on a war footing eight companies and one dépôt company. Each of the field companies musters 8 officers, 330 men, and 420 horses.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS

were divided into seven companies, which contained all the hospital attendants and commissariat soldiers.

The total strength of the Italian army in the field is thus :—

Infantry	.	.	.	.	202,720
Bersaglieri	.	.	.	.	25,120, with 480 guns
Cavalry	.	.	.	.	13,000

*Organization.*—In time of war the army is divided into divisions. Each division consists, as a general rule, of :—

- 2 Brigades of Infantry, each of two regiments ;
- 2 Battalions of Bersaglieri ;
- 1 Regiment of Light Cavalry ;
- 3 Batteries of Artillery (two 8-pounder batteries and one 16-pounder battery) ;
- 1 Company of Sappers.

Such a division would quite bring into the field a force of 10,000 Infantry and 700 Cavalry, with 18 guns.

Several such divisions, generally three or four, are amalgamated with a corps d'armée, for which a special reserve is then formed. This reserve consists of one battalion of Bersaglieri, four squadrons of Cavalry, and a 16-pounder battery for each division, which are deducted from the strength of the division. A company of Sappers, and a company of Pioneers with a bridge train to throw a bridge over three hundred yards, is added to a corps d'armée.

An army is formed by the conjunction of several corps d'armée, and has an additional force of reserve Artillery and Engineers, with a pontoon train capable of constructing a bridge six hundred yards long. A division of reserve Cavalry is formed out of the four Heavy Cavalry regiments, which are divided into two brigades, and of the two Horse Artillery batteries of the service.

*Recruiting.*—The recruiting of the Italian army is conducted by conscription; substitutes are, however, allowed. About 50,000 recruits were levied annually before the war. These were divided into two portions proportionately to the vacancies in the ranks. The recruits of the first portion served for eleven years, of which the first five were spent under the standards; those of the second portion were called out and then dismissed, but were liable to military service for a period of five years.

Besides the regular army, a National Guard exists in Italy. This is of the character of a burgher guard, and exists for the most part only upon paper. It is intended,



however, in future to form, in case of war, a mobilized National Guard of 220 battalions, mustering about 110,000 men, to act as garrison troops.

There exists also a corps of Carabineers who do the duty of a gendarmerie, and number over 20,000 men, but these would rarely be ever available against an external enemy, as to them is entrusted all the police duties of the Peninsula.

At the beginning of the war the Italian forces were strengthened by the formation of volunteer corps to serve under General Garibaldi; of these there were forty-two battalions. As with all irregular troops, it is extremely difficult to discover what number these corps mustered, but they may apparently be safely calculated as 35,000 men.

*Italian Fleet.*—The Italian fleet consisted of :—

- 1 screw line-of-battle ship ;
- 13 screw frigates ;
- 7 steam frigates of the second class, of which six were iron-clad ;
- 2 sailing frigates of the second class ;
- 8 steam corvettes of the first rank, of which two were iron-clad ;
- 2 sailing corvettes of the first rank ;
- 17 corvettes of the second and third rank ;
- 14 smaller vessels ;
- 8 screw gunboats ;
- 25 transport vessels.

The number of guns mounted on these vessels amounted to 1,524 ; the number of men employed in them was 14,000 officers, seamen, and engineers.

The Infantry of the Marine consisted of two regiments organized on the same principles as those of the Infantry of the Line, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the Bersaglieri.

## BOOK IV.

### CHAPTER I.

#### PRELUDE OF THE WAR.

THE Germanic Confederation possessed five Federal fortresses, originally raised to protect Germany against an invasion from France. These were Mainz, Luxembourg, Landau, Rastadt, and Ulm. At the end of May the garrisons of Mainz and Rastadt, in accordance with the constitution of the Confederation, were composed of Austrian and Prussian and some other Federal troops. When it became evident that war was likely to break out between the great German Powers, Bavaria proposed in the Diet on the 1st June that the Prussian and Austrian garrisons should be withdrawn from these fortresses, as well as from the free town of Frankfort, which was occupied in a similar manner, and that the guardianship of these places should be handed over partly to the troops of the States in which these places were situated, partly to the reserve division of the Federal army.

To prevent the bloodshed which would have in case of war ensued between the soldiers of these mixed garrisons, the motion was unanimously accepted. It was determined that Mainz should be held for the

Confederation by troops of Bavaria, Saxe Weimar, Saxe Meiningen, Anhalt, Schwarzburg, and the two Lippes; Rastadt by those of Baden, Saxe Altenburg, Coburg Gotha, Waldech, and Reusz; and that a Bavarian division should remain in Frankfort.

The Prussian and Austrian troops were, in accordance with this resolution, withdrawn from the fortresses of the Confederation. The Prussians were assembled under the command of General Von Beyer at Wetzlar. The Austrians were attached to the 8th Federal corps, which was placed under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse, an Austrian general who had gained distinction at the battle of Montebello in 1859.

On the 14th June, when Prussia declared the Germanic Confederation dissolved, war became inevitable. Prussia had at this time concentrated her main armies on the frontiers of Saxony and in Silesia. In rear of these lay the hostile States of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, the troops of which might either act against the communications of the Prussian armies, or by withdrawing south of the Maine unite with the Bavarians and Austrians, and swell the armies of these two Powers with their contingents. In front of the right wing of the Prussian main line lay the hostile kingdom of Saxony, which if left unoccupied would have formed a convenient ground for the *débouché* from the Bohemian mountains of the Austrian columns, covered by the Saxon army. In order to prevent the forces of the two former States from causing annoyance to the rear of her armies, and to seize the initiative in Saxony, Prussia took most rapid measures.

The decree against Prussia had been passed at Frankfurt on the 14th June.

A telegraphic summons was despatched to the three States of Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Hanover, which demanded that they should immediately reduce their armies to the peace establishment which had existed on the 1st March, and should agree to the Prussian project of the 10th June for the reform of the Germanic Confederation. If the three States agreed to this demand, Prussia would undertake to guarantee to them their sovereign rights; if they did not within twelve hours consent to do so, war would be declared.

The Governments of these States did not reply. Prussia declared war against them on the evening of the 15th June, and on the 16th Prussian troops invaded their territories.

POSITION OF PRUSSIAN TROOPS AT THE END OF THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF JUNE.—Prussia had commenced her preparations for war on the 27th March, when five divisions had been placed on a war footing, five brigades of artillery been strengthened, and the fortresses in Silesia and the province of Saxony armed. The mobilization of the whole army had been decreed on the 7th May, and on the 19th of that month the concentration of troops in Silesia, Lusatia, and Thuringia had begun. On the 1st June the corps d'armée of the Guard had been sent to Silesia, and the 8th corps and 14th division despatched to Halle: a reserve corps was at the same time formed at Berlin. The main Prussian armies were composed of three principal sections:—

1st. The First Army, under the command of Frederick

Charles, which consisted of the 2d corps d'armée (Pomeranian), 3d (Brandenburg), 4th (Saxony), and of a cavalry corps formed of fifteen regiments. It lay round Heyerswerda and Görlitz.

2d. The Second Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, which consisted of the Guard corps, the 1st corps (Prussia), the 2d (Poland), the 6th (Silesia), and of a cavalry corps of seven regiments. It lay in Silesia.

3d. The Army of the Elbe, under the command of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which consisted of the 8th corps (Rheinland), and the 14th division of the 7th corps (Westphalia), as well as a cavalry corps of three regiments.

In rear of these was the reserve corps in Berlin, under the command of General Mülbe, which consisted of two divisions of Landwehr and six regiments of Landwehr cavalry. A third division of Landwehr was also in course of formation at Berlin.

By the 15th June Prussia had prepared troops for the invasion of Saxony, Hanover, and Cassel. The First Army and the Army of the Elbe, which was stationed round Halle and Torgau, were designed to act against Saxony. Hesse-Cassel and Hanover were to be invaded by the then separated divisions, which after the occupation of these States were united under the command of General Vogel von Falckenstein, and on the 1st July named the Army of the Maine.

On the morning of the 15th June, the troops destined to act against Hanover consisted of the division which General Von Manteuffel had mobilized in Schleswig, and with which he had invaded Holstein. After the Aus-

trians quitted the latter duchy this division had been concentrated at Harburg, where it was supported by a flotilla of Prussian gunboats on the Lower Elbe and on the coast of the North Sea. A second division was also collected for the same purpose under General Von Falckenstein, near the fortress of Minden, in that portion of the Prussian province of Westphalia which projected into the southern boundary of the kingdom of Hanover. The greatest part of this division was formed by the 13th division, one division of the Westphalian corps d'armée. The Prussian garrisons, which had been withdrawn from the Federal fortresses were united with some other detachments, and formed into a division under General Beyer, which numbered 17,000 men. It was posted at Wetzlar, in the Prussian enclave, that was surrounded by the territories of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau.

POSITIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY AT THE END OF THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF JUNE.—Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek, the hero of San Martino, assumed the supreme command of the Austrian Army of the North on the 18th May, and spread the seven corps d'armée and five divisions of cavalry, of which it was composed, between Cracow and the Elbe, along the lines of railway which run through most parts of the Austrian provinces. These seven corps were :—

The 1st, under the command of Count Clam Gallas, which was posted at Prague.

The 2d, under Count Thun Hohenstadt, at Olmütz.

The 3d, under the Archduke Ernst, at Brünn.

The 4th, under Count Festetics, at Teschen.

The 6th, under Baron Ramming, at Olmütz.

The 8th, under the Archduke Leopold, at Brünn.

The 10th, under Count Huyn, afterwards under Count Gablenz, with only nine battalions, at Bömisch Trübau.

The cavalry divisions attached to this army were:—

The 1st light cavalry division (Baron Edelsheim), consisting of six regiments and three batteries of horse artillery.

The 2d light cavalry division (Prince Thurn and Taxis), four regiments and two batteries.

1st reserve division of cavalry (Prince Schleswig-Holstein), six regiments and two batteries.

2d reserve division of cavalry (Von Zajtsek), six regiments and two batteries.

3d reserve division of cavalry (Count Coudenhove), six regiments and two batteries.

**POSITIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH.**—The Austrian army of the South consisted of three corps d'armée, and was under the command of the Archduke Albrecht. One of these held Eastern Venetia and Istria, while the other two were posted in the renowned Quadrilateral formed by the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, and Verona and Legnano on the Adige.

The third corps d'armée, under the Archduke Ernst, served as a general reserve, which might be either directed against Italy, or sent into Bohemia, as circumstances required.

**POSITIONS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.**—The Italian army was divided into four corps d'armée. The first of these, under Giovanni Durando, was stationed in the middle of June at Lodi. It consisted of four divisions, and was

intended to act upon the Lake of Garda and the Upper Mincio. The second of these divisions, under Cuchiari, was at Cremona. It consisted of three divisions, and was designed to act upon the Lower Mincio, and against Mantua. The third, under Della Rocca, was posted in rear of the two former on both sides of the Po, with its head-quarters at Placenza. It contained four divisions. The fourth, under Cialdini, consisted of five divisions, and had its head-quarters at Bologna, where it was intended to operate on the Lower Po and Lower Adige.

The campaign on the Mincio did not commence quite so soon as hostilities in Germany. It is necessary, in order to preserve the clearness of the narrative, to disregard the Italian campaign until the course of events in Germany has been tolerably developed. It is sufficient here to mention that Italy declared war against Austria on the 20th June.

**ARMY OF SAXONY.**—The army of Saxony had been mobilized, and was by the end of the first fortnight of June ready to take the field. It was distributed through the kingdom of Saxony, with its main body in Dresden and Pirna.

**ARMY OF HANOVER.**—The army of Hanover was totally unprepared for war, and was for the most part peaceably garrisoned in the neighbourhood of the town of Hanover.

**ARMY OF BAVARIA.**—The Bavarian army was concentrated, in the middle of June, between Bamberg and Würzburg, under Prince Charles of Bavaria, in three divisions of infantry, one reserve brigade of infantry, one corps of reserve cavalry, containing eight regi-



ments and two batteries, one corps of reserve artillery of ten batteries.

**EIGHTH FEDERAL CORPS.**—The eighth corps of the Federal army was formed at Frankfort, but not with great alacrity. The Government of Baden was by no means eager to put its troops into the field against Prussia, but was obliged to do so for fear of the duchy being overrun by its powerful neighbours in case of refusal to do so. When this corps was formed, it occupied Frankfort, and was placed under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse. The troops which composed it were :—

Those of Württemberg, 14,000 men and 42 guns.

Those of Baden, 12,000 men and 38 guns.

The troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, 10,000 men and 24 guns.

The Nassau brigade, 5,000 men.

An Austrian division, formed from the garrisons which had withdrawn from the Federal fortresses and mustered 12,000 men.

The total strength of this corps was in round numbers fifty-three thousand infantry, thirty-three squadrons, and one hundred and fourteen guns.

## CHAPTER II.

### PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER.

ON the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. The two former States, unless their armies were quickly disabled, could hinder effectually the Prussian communications between Berlin and the Rhenish provinces. An Austrian occupation of Saxony would have much facilitated operations against the open province of Brandenburg and against Berlin, while it would have seriously impeded a Prussian advance into Bohemia. Against these States, then, it was necessary that Prussia should act with immediate energy, in order, if possible, to disarm, certainly to occupy, them before she could turn her attention against her principal enemy Austria, and the States allied thereto. By excellent combinations punctually carried out this result was obtained. In the course of a few days three of the most important middle States of Germany were completely overrun by Prussian troops: and their sovereigns driven from their capitals and countries as if by a thunderbolt.

The Prussian invasion of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel was effected by combined movements from different points

far apart : the enterprise was accordingly attended with considerable difficulty. It was very undesirable to weaken the main Prussian armies on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia by the smallest detachments. Orders were accordingly sent to General Falckenstein, who was in Westphalia, to invade these States with both his divisions, and to occupy them. Göben's division was to be directed from Minden on Hanover, to which town that of General Manteuffel from Harburg was also to march. Beyer's division was ordered at the same time to invade Hesse-Cassel from Wetzlar. The Hanoverian army was not yet mobilized, that of Cassel was but a weak contingent, so that it was calculated that it would be quite possible, with these three Prussian divisions, to bring superior numbers to bear upon any decisive point. It was however necessary, in order to carry out these combinations, to withdraw all the troops from Holstein, where demonstrations in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg might cause trouble. In order to insure tranquillity in that duchy, several Landwehr battalions were despatched to Altona and Lauenburg, as soon as the invasion of Hanover was resolved upon. Wetzlar was evacuated, but the 8th Federal corps at Frankfort was not yet sufficiently organized to cause any apprehension, as for several days it would be unable to make a movement forward.

The rapid progress of affairs and the Prussian declaration of war on the 15th had caused great excitement in Hanover. When the Austrian troops, round which the army of Hanover might have rallied, had been withdrawn from Holstein, all idea of defending the capital

of that kingdom had been given up ; and on war being declared, it was determined to save the army by a movement towards the south, where it might unite with the Bavarians. This movement was made on the night of the 15th, chiefly by railway to Göttingen, but with such hurry that many important articles of equipment were forgotten : such were the reserve ammunition and the field dispensaries. On the morning of the 16th, King George of Hanover, who suffered under the fearful calamity of blindness, followed his troops and collected them round Göttingen, having first sent his private property to England by way of a harbour on the North Sea. General Falckenstein broke up from Minden at daybreak on the 16th, and on the 17th, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the first Prussian troops, after two forced marches, entered the town of Hanover. The railways from Hanover northwards towards Lüneburg, eastwards to Brunswick, and westwards to Minden, as well as the line behind the retreating army of King George, had been broken up by the Hanoverians. The main body of the division of General Manteuffel had a long portion of railway to restore, and was obliged to wait the resumption of transport along the line, so that it did not reach Lüneburg until the evening of the 18th.

Here two battalions of the 25th regiment were placed on the railway, and pushed up to the capital : the remainder of the division reached the town on the next evening.

18th.—The government of the country was immediately taken under Prussian superintendence, and no opposition could be made by a population which was

surprised, and totally unfit to defend itself, as its members were untrained to the use of arms.

At the same time the Prussian navy had commenced operations. A battalion of the 25th regiment was, at ten o'clock on the evening of the 17th June, placed on board of the two transport vessels, *Loreley* and *Cyclops*, which belonged to the Prussian squadron on the Lower Elbe, and on a private steamer which belonged to a merchant of Harburg. The vessels steamed down the Elbe, and, at one o'clock on the morning of the 18th, arrived at Twietenfelt. Here the battalion was disembarked, and immediately moved against the small fortress of Stade.

At its head marched a detachment of seamen from the transport fleet, who were destined to act as pioneers. About three o'clock in the morning, the small column reached the neighbourhood of Stade. It was observed by a Hanoverian cavalry outpost, which immediately galloped back to alarm the unsuspecting garrison. The Prussians pursued as quickly as they could; but when they reached the place, the gates were already closed.

The sailor-pioneers rushed forward to the gate, and smote upon it heavily with their axes. After a few vigorous blows it gave way a little. The axes were more vigorously plied, and in a few minutes the door fell with a crash across the roadway. Over the obstacle the Prussian infantry dashed into the town, and were received by shots directed from a few of the garrison who had located themselves in some of the houses. These shots did little execution, and the Prussians pushed on towards the market-place. Here some forming detachments of Hanoverians opened fire upon them, and a slight skirmish

ensued. This was terminated by the commandant of the place, who, finding his men outnumbered, and in immediate danger of being surrounded and captured, ordered them to cease firing, and demanded a parley. This was granted by the Prussian commander; in a few minutes terms of capitulation were agreed upon, and Stade by the fortune of war ceased to be a fortress of the King of Hanover.

On the 19th June, Fort William and the batteries on the Weser, which were evacuated on the appearance of the Prussian flotilla, were occupied; and two days later, in a similar manner, Emden and the coast batteries on the Ems fell into the hands of the invaders. Thus on the 22d June, the Prussians were in possession of the whole of Hanover with the single exception of the southern enclave of Göttingen.

In consequence of these vigorous and energetic measures, all the Hanoverian provisions of weapons and ammunition for the war fell into the hands of the Prussians, as well as the whole field equipment for the army in the way of waggons and *matériel*. These gains amounted to sixty cannon, ten thousand new rifled small arms, eight hundred waggons, and a large quantity of gunpowder. These losses were of great detriment to the Hanoverian cause, and gave into the hands of Prussia instruments of offence which her generals knew full well how to turn to account.

The Hanoverian army halted at Göttingen,—paralysed, it was unable to move, and had to be organized. Had it been in a fit state of preparation for war, it might on the 16th or 17th have reached Cassel, and by the Cassel

and Bebra railway effected a retreat in safety to the south. As it was, however, on account of the tardy measures and want of foresight of the Hanoverian Ministry, the brave soldiery of which it was composed were forced, after a display of great gallantry, valour, and devotion, to succumb to a catastrophe which will be treated of in another portion of this history.

## CHAPTER III.

### PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HESSE-CASSEL.

THE Electoral Prince of Hesse-Cassel was fortunate enough to save his army from falling into the hands of the enemy, but could not prevent the invasion of his country. The troops of Cassel, on the receipt of the Prussian declaration of war, immediately prepared to retire from Cassel towards the Maine. On the 16th the retreat was commenced; and that day, chiefly by means of the railway, they reached the neighbourhood of Fulda. This movement could not be prevented by the Prussians, for the nearest Prussian troops were those at Wetzlar, and the railway between Cassel and Marburg had been broken up. On the 19th June the army of Hesse-Cassel reached Hanau, and secured its communication with the eighth corps of the Federal army at Frankfort.

The territory of Hesse-Cassel did not, however, escape an invasion. On the night of the 15th June, General Beyer concentrated his troops, which numbered 17,000 combatants, on the frontier of Hesse-Cassel at Gieszen, and began his march into Hessian territory on the morning of the 16th at two o'clock. At Gieszen he published a proclamation, in which he announced to the people that Prussia had been obliged to declare war



against the Elector, but that the war was only to be carried on against the Government, not against the country, which, on the contrary, was about to behold the dawn of better days and more fortunate circumstances.

On the 16th Beyer's advanced guard reached Marburg. The Prussian pushed through this town, and during the next two days urged his troops by forced marches towards Cassel. He sent a detachment to his right against the railway which leads from Cassel by Bebra to Hersfeld and Eisenach, and broke up the line at Melsungen. His object in this was to prevent the retreat to the south of any Hessian troops which might still be in the north of the electorate. He was, however, too late to attain this object, as Cassel had been cleared of its garrison on the night of the 16th, and it was already at Hanau.

On the evening and during the night of the 19th the Prussian troops passed into Cassel, the capital of the electorate, which is about eighty miles, or five long ordinary marches, from Wetzlar. The Elector had not gone away with his troops, but had remained at his castle of Wilhelmshöhe, which was long renowned for the orgies held there by Jerome, King of Westphalia. On the night of the 22d the Prussian envoy, General Von Röder, made fresh propositions to him. Of these the principal was that the Elector should agree to the Prussian project for the reform of the Germanic Confederation. The latter did not, however, feel able to comply with the Prussian demands, and on the 22d was taken as a State prisoner to the Prussian fortress of

Stettin on the Oder, where a portion of the old castle of the Dukes of Pomerania was given up to him as a residence. Shortly afterwards cholera broke out at Stettin, and permission was given him to go to Königsberg, in East Prussia ; of this permission, however, he made no use. Hesse-Cassel was now in the power of the Prussians. A more important result of the invasion was that the Prussian General Beyer was established in the rear of the Hanoverian army at Göttingen, which, without preparation, commissariat, military train, or reserve ammunition, was thus exposed to attack by a force nearly as large as its own, in its flank if it attempted to move southwards, in its rear if it turned to bay and faced its pursuers from the north. The Hanoverian army was already practically disarmed, paralysed, and prisoners.

## CHAPTER IV.

### PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY.

THE troops designed for the invasion of Saxony were the army of the Elbe and the First Army. The former was to advance from the north, the latter from the east. On the evening of the 15th June, when the Saxon Government had rejected the Prussian ultimatum, and received the declaration of war, the retreat of the Saxon army commenced, in order to gain Bohemia by way of Bodenbach, and there to unite with the Austrians. The funds from the treasury and the royal plate had already been packed up, and the waggons in which they had been placed accompanied the army.

Means were also adopted to impede as much as possible the advance of the Prussian troops. Saxon pioneers were set to work upon the railways which lead from the frontier upon Dresden. Of such railways there are two, that which follows the valley of the Elbe and joins the Leipsic line at Rieza and that which from Görlitz leads by Bautzen upon the capital of Saxony. At nightfall the Saxon pioneers commenced their work, but in the dark, and under constant apprehension of being broken in upon by the Prussian advanced guards, they made but little progress. The rails were taken up, but were neither car-

ried away, nor twisted, nor broken so as not to be again immediately available. At eleven o'clock at night the wooden bridge which carries the railway branches to Leipsic and Chemnitz across the Elbe, near Rieza, was set on fire by means of petroleum. Its destruction was not accomplished, for only two piers were burnt, and the whole bridge was again made passable within a few days.

While the work of destruction went slowly on in Saxony that night, heavy masses of Prussian troops were drawing together, and closing down to the very frontier line of that kingdom. Between Görlitz and the border on the west, Prince Frederick Charles marshalled three strong corps d'armée. On the north General Herwarth von Bittenfeld divided his force into three columns, which were to advance by Strehla, Dahlen, and Wurzen, on the left bank of the Elbe. During the few dark hours of the short summer night, the last preparations for the invasion were made. The main bodies were collected together about midnight, and the soldiers piled arms to rest and wait for dawn. Few slept; a dull and heavy murmur continually rose from the crowded columns, and told the subdued but deep excitement which pervaded the hearts of the men; and this excitement was not without a cause, for the soldiers thought that the Austrian was in Dresden, and that there would be a battle on the morrow. At last the first faint streaks of dawn appeared; the troops eagerly fell into their ranks, and before the sun had risen the advanced guards were pushing briskly over Saxon ground.

The pioneers engaged upon the railway fled before the invaders' columns, fortunate to avoid being taken.

Bittenfeld, from the north, reached Rieza about nine o'clock, and occupied that town in force. Two pontoon bridges were thrown across the Elbe below the town, a portion of the troops crossed, and marched on to Grossenhain, while the rest were directed up the left bank of the river, towards Meissen. Hardly had Bittenfeld's troops established themselves in Rieza, when a detachment of the field railway corps came up, who immediately commenced the restoration of the lines which had been removed, while pioneers were set to repair the burnt portions of the bridge.

In the meantime, the columns of the First Army were advancing in Lusatia. A detachment entered the town of Lobau, which was found without any garrison. The railway bridge here was not blown up, though it had been mined. The lines were, however, torn up, and laid in confusion on the way; but the Prussians employed the country people immediately to restore the railway. Bautzen was also occupied. Here the line had again been torn up, but was quickly repaired. But Prince Frederick Charles moved cautiously, for the passes of Reichenberg and Gabel were on his left. To cover his communication with Görlitz, and to shield his left flank, he pushed a strong detachment along the Zittau road to a point a little beyond Ostritz.

On the 17th a detachment was thrown out on the right to feel Bittenfeld's left, and the Prince pushed troops to Bisschofswerda, on the Dresden road, while Bittenfeld's advanced guard occupied Meissen. On the 18th a simultaneous advance was made on the capital. The advancing columns met with no opposition, and

that afternoon the Prussian colours were hoisted over Dresden.

The Prussian outposts were then pushed forward without encountering any opposition up to the frontier of Bohemia. Leipzig and Chemnitz were occupied, and the line of railway between Leipzig and Plauen, as well as that between Dresden and Chemnitz, secured by Prussian troops. On the 20th June the whole of Saxony was in the undisturbed possession of the troops of Prince Frederick Charles and of Herwarth, except where the Saxon standard floated above the virgin fortress of Königstein.

At the time of the intrusion into Saxony, Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia issued this address to the inhabitants :—

“His Majesty the King of Prussia, my most gracious master, having been compelled to declare war against the King of Saxony, a portion of the troops under my command have to-day crossed the frontier between Prussian and Saxon Lusatia.

“We are not at war with the people and country of Saxony, but only with the Government, which by its inveterate hostility has forced us to take up arms.

“Private property will be everywhere respected by my troops, who are also directed to protect every peaceful citizen from injury.

“I intreat you to repose confidence in our intentions, and to be assured that my soldiers, by strict discipline and good fellowship, will alleviate the hardships of war as much as possible. Provisions will never be exacted without a due receipt for them.


“FREDERICK CHARLES, *General of Cavalry.*

“HEAD QUARTERS, GÖRLITZ, *June 16, 1866.*”

The administration of the country was undertaken by Royal Commissioners ; but the Saxon officials and organs of administration were retained. A kindly feeling soon

sprang up between the soldiery and the inhabitants although there were occasional disturbances with the officials, chiefly with regard to the war contributions of fuel and forage which the country was required to furnish. The excellent discipline of the Prussian soldiery, showed itself conspicuously in Saxony. The fears and prejudices of the inhabitants subsided more and more every hour, and the Prussians within a few days regarded themselves and were regarded as if in a friendly country.

At this time, as a security against the chances of an Austrian attack, and as a support for further operations, the reserve corps of General Mülbe was ordered up from Berlin to Dresden. The positions of the armies about to be engaged in hostilities were, on 20th June, after the occupation of Saxony, as shown in the subjoined sketch :—



POSITION OF TROOPS ON 20TH JUNE.

The Prussian dash into Saxony was a great military success. It gave Prince Frederick Charles the advantage of being able to attack the Austrians on a narrow front, if they should issue from the passes of the mountains, instead of being obliged to fight them on their own terms in an open country, as would have been the case had they been allowed to occupy this kingdom. At that moment the Prussian patrols and pickets were pushed close up to the Austrian frontier, the issue of the narrow defile which the Elbe cleaves in the Iron Mountains was secured, the Saxon troops had retired into Bohemia, and without pulling a trigger the Prussian army had, by the rapid action of its chief, gained as great advantages as could have been looked for from a victorious battle in this part of the theatre of war. There was only one point in Saxony where Saxon troops were still found, and where the Saxon standard was still hoisted. The little fortress of Königstein, situated on an isolated sandstone cliff on the left bank of the Elbe, about nine miles from the Austrian frontier, was still occupied by a Saxon garrison. Inaccessible, from the steepness of the rock on which it stands, and at a considerable distance from the surrounding heights, this fortress has never been reduced. From the hill of Lilienstein, which stands on the opposite side of the river, and has a command over the fortress of more than 150 feet, Napoleon attempted to bombard Königstein, but his artillery was not heavy enough to send shot over the 3,000 yards which separate the summit of the two hills. With their rifled cannon the Prussian artillery could now easily, from the hill of Lilienstein or from that of Puffenstein on the opposite side, have engaged the



guns of the fort on equal terms ; but the Prussian commander did not deem it worth while to drag artillery to the top of these steep hills in order to force the capitulation of the small garrison of 1,200 men, who, in the event of Saxony remaining in his possession, must fall into his hands, and, in case of his being obliged to retire, could add so little to the force of his enemies. Königstein, guarded by its escarpments and impossibility of approach, was still allowed to retain its reputation for impregnability.

In most of the villages and hamlets of Saxony, certainly in all those which lay on roads leading to the frontier, Prussian soldiers were billeted ; cavalry and artillery horses filled the farmsteadings of the border farmers, and field guns and artillery carriages were parked on many a village green. But the Saxons had no complaints to make, and, as far as could be judged from appearances, seemed highly to approve the occupation of their country by the Prussian army. The Saxon peasantry and the soldiers were on the most friendly terms, and a stranger who did not know the Prussian uniform, in passing through the villages, would have supposed that the troops were quartered among the people of their own country. As soon as the Prussian vanguards crossed the frontier, Prince Frederick Charles issued a most stringent order, in which he insisted upon the troops showing every respect for private property and for the comfort of the inhabitants. This order was strictly observed both by officers and men. The kind-hearted soldiers brought with them none of those horrors which too often follow in the train of an army which occupies a strange country. On the

contrary, had it not been for the swords and bayonets of patrols which glittered in the sun along every road, the scene was one of perfect peace. In some places the men were helping the peasantry to carry the hay harvest, in others they might be seen working in the cottage gardens, and nearly always were spending money in the village shops; the bare-legged country urchins got taken up for rides on the cavalry or artillery horses as they went to be watered, or were invited, half afraid, to peep into the muzzle of a rifled gun; only when, with the contempt bred by the familiarity, some too adventurous youngster tried to introduce a handful of cornflowers into the mouth of a piece of ordnance, was he warned off the precincts of the battery by the reluctant sentry.

The Prussian military authorities took care to make the inconveniences of the existing state of affairs sit as lightly as possible on the inhabitants of the country in which the troops were quartered. Passenger traffic on the railways of Saxony was soon resumed, except where the broken bridge of Rieza caused a gap. Telegraphic messages were received at the bureaux, and were certainly and regularly delivered.

The successful occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave the Prussian leader also great moral, material, and strategical advantages. His adversaries had seen the energy and vigour with which the Prussian blows were delivered. Two armies were established on hostile territory, which facilitated the supply of provisions to these large masses of troops. The theatre of war for the armies was also transferred to foreign soil. But the main advantages were gained in reference to the whole theatre of

the war throughout Germany. The wide semicircle in which the Prussian army had been spread along the Saxon and Bohemian frontiers, was much contracted by the advances of Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth. The communication between the individual armies was much facilitated by the possession of the Saxon railways, and an invasion of Bohemia was rendered possible, because the frontier passes of the mountains were secured; while in the case of it being necessary to act on the defensive, the Erz-Gebirge and the Lusatian hills afforded much superior military positions to any along the quite open frontier between Saxony and Prussia.

The invasion of Saxony brought immediately conditions of open war between Prussia and Austria. Saxony appealed to the Diet at Frankfort, from which Prussia and several other States had since 14th June withdrawn their representatives. The remaining members of the Diet decreed, on the 16th June, that Austria and Bavaria should give aid against Prussia; not only to Saxony, but also to Hanover and Hesse-Cassel. Austria declared herself ready to devote all her military forces to the support of the States which had been invaded by Prussian troops. This declaration was regarded by Prussia as an open and official announcement of a declaration of war. That Austria also intended it to be such was shown by the publication, on the 17th June, of this war manifesto of the Emperor:—

“TO MY PEOPLES.

“While engaged in a work of peace, which was undertaken for the purpose of laying the foundation for a Constitution which should augment the unity and power of the empire, and at the same time secure to my several countries and peoples free internal development,

my duties as a Sovereign have obliged me to place my whole army under arms.

"On the frontiers of my empire, in the south and in the north, stand the armies of two enemies who have allied with the intention of breaking the power of Austria as a great European State.

"To neither of those enemies have I given cause for war. I call on an Omniscient God to bear witness that I have always considered it my first, my most sacred duty, to do all in my power to secure for my peoples the blessings of peace.

"One of the hostile Powers requires no excuse. Having a longing to deprive me of parts of my empire, a favourable opportunity is for him a sufficient cause for going to war.

"Allied with the Prussian troops, which are now up in arms against us, a part of my faithful and valorous army two years ago went to the shores of the North Sea. I entered into an alliance with Prussia for the purpose of upholding rights secured by treaties, to protect an imperilled German race, to confine within the narrowest possible limits an unavoidable war, and by means of an intimate connexion of the two central European Powers—whose principal duty it is to maintain the peace of Europe—to obtain a lasting guarantee for the peace of my empire, of Germany, and of Europe.

"Conquests I have never sought for. Unselfish in my alliance with Prussia, I did not, in the Vienna Treaty of Peace, seek to obtain any advantage for myself. Austria is not to blame for the series of unfortunate complications which could not have arisen had Prussia been equally disinterested and equally mindful of her Federal duties. Those complications were brought about for the furtherance of selfish purposes, and, consequently, could not be done away with by my Government in a peaceful way.

"The state of affairs became more and more serious.

"Even when it was notorious that the two hostile States were making preparations for war, and that there was an understanding which could only be based on an intention to make in common an attack on my empire, I, being mindful of my duties as a Sovereign, remained in a state of profound peace, as I was willing to make all those concessions which were compatible with the welfare and honour of my peoples. But when I saw that further delay would not only render it difficult to ward off the intended blow, but also imperil the safety of the monarchy, I was obliged to resolve on making those heavy sacrifices which are inseparable from preparations for war.

"The assurances given by my Government of my love of peace, and the repeated declarations which were made of my readiness to disarm at the same time with Prussia, were replied to by propositions which could not be accepted without sacrificing the honour and safety of the monarchy. Prussia not only insisted on complete disarmament in the northern provinces of the empire, but also in those parts of it which touch on Italy, where a hostile army was standing, for whose love of peace no guarantee could either be given or offered.

"The negotiations with Prussia in respect to the Elbe duchies clearly proved that a settlement of the question in a way compatible with the dignity of Austria, and with the rights and interests of Germany and the duchies, could not be brought about, as Prussia was violent and intent on conquest. The negotiations were therefore broken off, the whole affair was referred to the Bund, and at the same time the legal representatives of Holstein were convoked.

"The danger of war induced the three Powers—France, England, and Russia—to invite my Government to participate in General Conferences, the object of which was to be (*sein sollte*) the maintenance of peace. My Government, in accordance with my views, and, if possible, to secure the blessing of peace for my peoples, did not refuse to share in the Conferences, but made their acceptance dependent on the confirmation of the supposition that the public law of Europe and the existing treaties were to form the basis of the attempt at mediation, and that the Powers represented would not seek to uphold special interests which could only be prejudicial to the balance of power in Europe and to the rights of Austria. The fact that the attempt to mediate failed because these natural suppositions were made is a proof that the Conferences could not have led to the maintenance of peace.

"The recent events clearly prove that Prussia substitutes open violence for right and justice.

"The rights and the honour of Austria, the rights and the honour of the whole German nation, are no longer a barrier against the inordinate ambition of Prussia. Prussian troops have entered Holstein; the Estates convoked by the Imperial Stadtholder have been violently dissolved; the Government of Holstein, which the Treaty of Vienna gives to Austria and Prussia in common, has been claimed for Prussia alone; and the Austrian garrison has been obliged to give way to a force ten times as strong as itself.

"When the German Bund, which saw in the measure no infraction of the Federal laws, accepted the Austrian proposition to 'mobilize' the

Federal troops, Prussia, who prides herself on being the defender of the interests of Germany, resolved to complete the work she had begun. Violently severing the tie which unites the German races, Prussia announced her secession from the Bund, required from the German Governments the acceptance of a so-called project of Reform, which in reality is a division of Germany, and now she employs military force against those Sovereigns who have faithfully discharged their Federal duties.

"The most pernicious of wars, a war of Germans against Germans, has become inevitable, and I now summon before the tribunal of history, before the tribunal of an eternal and all-powerful God, those persons who have brought it about, and make them responsible for the misfortunes which may fall on individuals, families, districts, and countries.

"I begin the war with confidence, arising from the knowledge that my cause is a just one, and with the consciousness of the power which is possessed by a great empire when the Prince and the people have one and the same thought—that the rights of their country must be steadfastly upheld. My heart beats high at the sight of my gallant and well-appointed army—the bulwark against which the force of the enemies of Austria will be broken—and of my faithful peoples, who are full of loyal confidence and self-devotion. The pure fire of patriotic enthusiasm burns with equal strength and steadiness in all parts of my vast empire. Joyfully do the furlough men and reserves take their places in the ranks of the army; numerous volunteers present themselves; the whole of the able-bodied population of the countries which are most exposed are preparing to take the field, and everything that can possibly be done to assist the army and provide for its necessities is willingly done. All the inhabitants of my kingdoms and countries have one and the same feeling—the feeling that they belong to one and the same nation, that unity gives strength, and that a gross violation of justice has been committed.

"It is doubly painful to me that the settlement of the questions relative to the internal constitution of the Empire has not yet made so much progress that I, at this important moment, can assemble around my throne the representatives of all my peoples. Although I am now deprived of this support, my duty as a Sovereign has become clearer, and my resolution stronger, that for all future time my empire shall have the benefit of it.

"We shall not be alone in the struggle which is about to take place. The Princes and peoples of Germany know that their liberty and in-

dependence are menaced by a Power which listens but to the dictates of egotism, and is under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandizement, and they also know that in Austria they have an upholder of the freedom, power, and integrity of the whole of the German Fatherland. We and our German brethren have taken up arms in defence of the most precious rights of nations. We have been forced so to do, and we neither can nor will disarm until the internal development of my empire and of the German States which are allied with it has been secured, and also their power and influence in Europe.

"My hopes are not based on unity of purpose, on power alone, I confide in an almighty and just God, whom my house from its very foundations has faithfully served, a God who never forsakes those who righteously put their trust in Him. To Him I pray for assistance and success, and I call on my peoples to join me in that prayer.

"Given in my residence and metropolis of Vienna, on this 17th of June, 1866.

"FRANCIS JOSEPH (M.P.)."

On the same day the following general order was also issued to the Austrian Army of the North by Feldzeugmeister Benedek:—

"HEAD QUARTERS, OLMÜTZ.

"SOLDIERS,—We are on the eve of grave and sanguinary events. As in 1859, you are collected in great numbers around our flag. Soldiers, we have now to repair in the eyes of the world the faults of that period; we have to punish an arrogant and faithless enemy. I have the full and entire conviction that you are aware of and are worthy of this mission. Have also confidence in me, and be assured that on my part I will exert my best efforts to bring this campaign to a speedy and glorious termination. We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the Line and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed to privations and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their Government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle. Veterans of the Mincio and of Palestro, I hope that

with tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an adversary. On the day of battle the infantry will adopt its lightest campaign accoutrement, and will leave behind their knapsacks and camping material, in order that they may be able to throw themselves with rapidity and promptitude upon the heavily-laden enemy. Each soldier will receive his flask filled with wine and water, and a ration of bread and meat easily to be carried. The officers will discontinue the use of their wide scarves, and all the useless insignia of their ranks, which but renders them too distinguishable in action. Every man, without distinction of name or position, shall be promoted whenever he shall distinguish himself on the field of battle. The bands will place themselves in rear of the front of the respective positions, and will play heroic pieces for the warlike dance. The enemy has for some time vaunted the excellence of their fire-arms, but, soldiers, I do not think that will be of much avail to them. We will give them no time, but we will attack them with the bayonet and with crossed muskets. When, with God's help, we shall have beaten and compelled to retreat our enemies, we will pursue them without intermission, and you shall then find repose upon the enemy's soil, and those compensations which a glorious and victorious army has a right to demand."



## BOOK V.

### CHAPTER I.

#### THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR.

WHOEVER casts a glance upon the map of Central Europe must at once observe the range of mountains which, starting from the Black Forest, passes through Germany from west to east, separates the basin of the Danube from the plain through which the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder glide to the German and Baltic seas, and terminates in the chain of the Carpathian Hills. This range about midway divides into two branches near the source of the Saale, which again join together near the east of the county of Glatz, and enclose in the so-formed quadrilateral the kingdom of Bohemia. On the north of these mountains lie the kingdoms of Saxony and Prussia; on the south the territories ruled by the Emperor of Austria. Bohemia, although a dependency of the Austrian empire, is geographically separated from the valley of the Danube, in which lie the majority of the provinces of the Kaiser, by the hills of the Bohemian Forest and the mountains of Moravia. The advanced post of Austria towards the north, it stands as a strong bastion against an invasion of the empire from that direction, and is also a most valuable

base of operations from which to hurl troops against the valleys of the Elbe or the Oder. It was this position of Bohemia which caused the destruction of Napoleon in 1813, when Prussia and Russia held the Elbe, and Austria from Bohemia menaced his right flank. If he quitted his central position at Dresden to march on the Elbe, the Austrians issued from Bohemia, and cut off his communication with the Rhine; if he advanced against Bohemia, as soon as he passed the northern mountains of that province the allies debouched from the line of the Elbe, and separated him from France. It was a consequence of the natural configuration of Bohemia that, after having prevented the junction of his enemies by the victory of Dresden, the great Napoleon was surrounded at Leipsic.

In the midsummer of 1866, Bohemia was again about to play an important part in a European war. Austrian troops were collected there. Beyond the Erz-Gebirge, or Iron Mountains, and the Riesen-Gebirge, or Giant Hills, which form the Bohemian frontier on the north, lies in the first place the kingdom of Saxony, but beyond this again are the southern provinces of Prussia, from which two Prussian armies available for service in the field had now advanced. In the event of war, Saxony appeared likely to be the first battle-field, if the Austrian general should assume the offensive. But in a life-and-death struggle between the great German Powers it was impossible that the theatre of war could be restricted to one tiny kingdom; the area of operations on the contrary extended nearly throughout the district which spreads from the sea on the north to the Danube on the south, from the Rhine on the west to the Vistula on the east.

This is a district not unacquainted with war. After the last attempt to overthrow an established monarchy in England it was the scene of that Seven Years' strife through whose baptism of blood Prussia advanced into the hierarchy of the great Powers of Europe. It was repeatedly trodden under foot by the conquering legions of the First Emperor of the French, and it was in its very centre that the battle was fought which led to the first overthrow of his power. Its wide extent is inhabited by two distinct races, and is the seat of two antagonistic creeds. The Teutonic race prevails in the north, and the generally established religion is Protestant; the Slavonic blood predominates in the south, owns the Catholic faith, and politically is under the sway of the Kaiser.

The basin of the Elbe is the central geographical division of Germany. This basin is divided into two; that of the Upper Elbe forms a plateau surrounded by mountains, and is the kingdom of Bohemia; that of the Lower contains Saxony and the central provinces of Prussia. The upper basin is in general ill cultivated, and little has been done to develop its resources. It possesses, however, forests, considerable iron mines, and breeds horses which are valuable in war. Its roads, except one or two main *chaussées*, are few, mountainous, and bad; but it is a country easily defensible, for its forests, mountains, and rivers present at every point obstacles to an invading army. The lower basin of this river is, on the other hand, a country of plains, marshes, and small lakes: not very fertile, but well cultivated, thickly populated, and opened up by a multitude of roads. The Elbe, entering it from a close defile between

the mountains of Northern Bohemia, runs through its whole length, passing by the fortress of Königstein, Dresden, the capital of Saxony, and the fortified town of Wittenberg. This river, within Prussian territory, supported by the fortresses of Torgau and Magdeburg, forms a strong line of defence against an army advancing on Berlin from the west, but one which can easily be turned from Bohemia.

The basin of the Oder, bounded on the south by the mountains which overhang Braunau, Glatz, and Troppau, contains on the upper course of the river the province of Prussian Silisia. The river itself forms an angle near Breslau, which allows of its being used as a line of defence for the eastern districts of the kingdom of Prussia against an attack from either the south or west. This line is supported by the fortresses of Glogau, Küstrin, and Stettin. The country through which the Oder flows is in general flat, marshy, and woody; the land is fertile only in pasture, but is well cultivated, and inhabited by an active and industrious population.

The basin of the Weser, in which lies the western portion of the kingdom of Hanover, is bounded on the south by the mountains of the Thuringian Forest and the Hartz, and is in general sandy and covered with thickets; its principal riches are flocks and herds. The Danube, the southernmost of the four rivers which were introduced into the theatre of war in Central Germany, runs through a plain which lies on the south side of the Bohemian and Moravian mountains.

Starting from the confluence of the Main with the Rhine at Mayence, following upwards the valley of the former

river, skirting the southern slopes of the Thuringian Forest, passing along the summits of the Erz-Gebirge, the Riesen-Gebirge, and the mountains of Moravia, and terminating at the southernmost point of Upper Silesia, runs the line which geographically divides Northern from Southern Germany. This line now divided from one another the territories occupied by the troops of the two great parties into which the Germanic Confederation was rapidly splitting. By the sudden razzia made by her troops into Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, and by surrounding the Hanoverian troops, Prussia secured free communication between her Rhenish provinces and Berlin, disarmed the hostile forces in her rear, and divided the whole of Germany into two distinct areas for military operations.


These northern and southern areas, separated by the central geographical line of Germany, were now in the possession of the troops of the northern and southern antagonists respectively.

The Prussian occupation of Saxony had also the effect of separating the troops of the southern league quartered on the east of the line of the Saale from those assembled on the west, and divided Germany into an eastern and western theatre of war.

On the western theatre the Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were ranged against the Hanoverians, the Bavarians, the troops of Cassel, and those of the eighth Federal corps.

On the eastern theatre the main armies of Prussia were drawn up against that of Austria with its Saxon allies, where they occupied positions in Saxony and Silesia on the one side, on Bohemia and Moravia on the

other. Between Bohemia and Saxony lie the chains of the Iron and Giant Mountains; between Moravia and Silesia, a part of the Giant chain, the mountains of Schweidnitz, and the Sudetic hills. These mountains as a rule are steep towards Prussia, and slope more gently towards Bohemia. They consist of several parallel ridges, and are of very unequal heights, sometimes falling as low as a thousand feet, sometimes, raising their peaks



high into the air, they tower over spires themselves fifteen hundred feet high. On the west of Bohemia the Fichtel Mountains divide the passes which lead from North Germany into Bohemia from those which by the sources of the Saale lead in the neighbourhood of Hof and Eger into Bavaria. This fact added to the import-

tance and to the value of the Prussian occupation of Saxony, for the presence of the troops of Prince Charles in that kingdom, if it did not entirely prevent, certainly threw great difficulties in the way of a junction between the Austrians and Bavarians, and placed the Prussians in about the advantageous position of having broken the line of the armies of the South German States.

The south-western frontier of Bohemia is formed by the hills of the Bohemian Forest; the south-eastern by the mountains of Moravia. The eastern theatre of operations lay between the mountains which separate Bohemia and Moravia from Saxony and Prussia and the Danube.

In this theatre two main lines of railway exist, and show the lines along which the troops on either side would draw together, in order to repel an offensive movement of the enemy. The northern line is that which runs from Oderberg, by Oppeln, Brieg, Breslau, and Görlitz to Dresden and Leipzig; the southern is that which leads from Prerau by Olmütz and Pardubitz to Prague. These lines at three points are joined to each other by lines from Dresden to Prague, from Löbau to Türrau, and from Oderberg to Prerau.

Within Bohemia lies the important quadrilateral of railways between Prague, Türrau, Josephstadt, and Pardubitz, from which lines lead to Leipzig, Dresden, Berlin, Görlitz, Breslau, Cracow, Vienna, Pilsen, Nüremberg, and Regensburg, and which, in consequence, forms a highly advantageous position for the concentration of troops.

The fortresses enclosed in this theatre are, on the Austrian side, Cracow on the Vistula, Olmütz on the

March, Josephstadt and Königgrätz on the Upper Elbe, Prague on the Moldau, and Theresienstadt on the Eger. On the Prussian side are Kosel on the Oder, Neisse on the Neisse, Glatz, Schweidnitz, and Torgau, on the Elbe. From Schweidnitz, which is of little importance as a fortress, to Torgau, the distance is about one hundred and fifty miles.

After the Prussian occupation of Saxony, the main armies of the two great Powers were separated by the mountains along which run the northern frontier lines of Bohemia and Moravia. The Prussian army consisted of three principal parts, which all received orders from the King as commander-in-chief of all the forces, and numbered, inclusive of the reserve corps of General Mülbe in Dresden, about 280,000 combatants, with 900 guns.

The Austrian army, on the south of the mountains, mustered about 245,000 combatants, with 600 guns, to which was added the Saxon army, that had retired into Bohemia, with a force of 25,000 combatants, and 60 guns.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—The Austrian army was not in such a forward state of preparation for taking the field as the Prussian. Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek had not apparently anticipated such extreme rapidity and energy of movement as was exhibited by the Prussians, and had before the outbreak of hostilities announced his intention of assuming the offensive, and of invading Prussian territory, when he had given most humane and praiseworthy directions to his own troops for their behaviour in the enemy's country. An Austrian invasion of Prussia




may be effected by either of two routes : the first leads over the Lusatian mountains to Bautzen and Görlitz to Berlin ; the second by the valley of the Oder into Silesia. An offensive movement by the first route would have given the Austrians the advantage of seizing Saxony, and of covering the passage of the Bavarians by the passes of the Saale to Wittenberg, where the whole of the invading army might have been united. The other route did not offer these advantages, and in it lay as obstacles the Prussian fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, and Kosel.

The rapid invasion of Saxony by Prussia, and the consequent retreat of the Saxons, appears to have determined the Austrian commander to relinquish any attempt of crossing the mountains into that kingdom. His army was concentrated round Brünn and Olmütz ; he could not draw it together in time to seize the passes into Saxony ; and he appears to have then determined to act upon the defensive, and to hold one portion of the Prussian troops in check, while he threw himself with strong force on the others issuing from the mountain passes, in order to crush them in detail. To secure a favourable position for this operation, he concentrated his army towards Josephstadt. He sent one corps d'armée with the Saxon troops to cover the issues of the passes from Saxony, there to check the armies of Prince Frederick Charles. With his forces from Josephstadt he intended to hold the Crown Prince in issuing from the mountains, and to reinforce Clam Gallas to crush Prince Frederick Charles at Gitschin. On the 19th June the Austrian movements with this aim commenced : that

day the head-quarters of Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek were moved from Olmütz to Böhmisches Trüban, and on the 23d June his army occupied the following positions:—

The 1st corps, the Saxons, the brigade Kalik, and the 1st light cavalry division, were posted under the supreme command of Count Clam Gallas, amounting altogether to nine brigades, with 60,000 men, on the left bank of the Iser, between Weisswasser, Münchengrätz, and Türnau, in order here to check the enemy advancing from the north-west. The 4th and 8th corps, and 1st division of reserve cavalry, were at Josephstadt; the 10th and 6th corps were pushed forward to the Silesian frontier on the north-east of Josephstadt; the



3d corps and the 2d and 3d divisions of reserve cavalry were held in reserve north of Pardubitz; the 2d corps and the 2d light cavalry division formed the extreme right of the Austrian line at Böhmisches Trüban. By this disposition of his troops, Feldzeugmeister Benedek held a force much superior to that of the Crown Prince, immediately opposite to the defiles leading to Silesia, and covered the ground on which all the roads from Saxony and Lower Silesia unite

together in Bohemia, so that he actually stood in front of the point where the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and of the Crown Prince must unite.

PRUSSIAN PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—How and why Prussia assumed the offensive in Saxony has been already seen. To increase the advantages gained by the possession of this kingdom, it was extremely desirable to push forward into Bohemia, and thus diminish, by a concentration forwards, the extent of the arc covered by the different armies. Political and financial reasons also required a speedy termination of the war. It was determined in the Prussian councils to assume the offensive.

An invasion of the Austrian dominions from the positions of the Prussian armies could be effected in two ways: by the first the armies could cross the north-eastern and north-western frontiers of Bohemia, and be directed to unite in the north of Bohemia. By the second plan the Elbe Army and the First Army could have been ordered to cross the frontier, and to move on Prague, while the Second made an offensive movement against Olmütz. The latter plan was considered too dangerous; by its prosecution the communications between the two armies would have been entirely broken; and if Benedek had ignored the Second Army he could have fallen with much superior forces on Prince Frederick Charles, and overthrown him, when the distance from Olmütz to Vienna would not have been less than that from Josephstadt to Berlin. The first plan was accordingly adopted; and in order to carry it out, it was determined that the Army of the Elbe, acting as

the extreme right wing of the Prussian advance, should move from Dresden by Neustadt, and over the mountains by the passes of Schluckenau or Gabel. The First Army, which formed the centre of the invading forces, was to move with the cavalry corps from Zittau, Görlitz, and Lobau, by the passes of Krottaw Friedland and Neustädtl or Reichenberg. The Second Army, as the left wing, was to move from Landshut and the county of Glatz through the passes near Schatzlar or Trautenau, and through the pass of Nachod or Skalitz.

The First Army and the Army of the Elbe were to unite near the Iser, and to gain together the left bank of that river towards Gitschin. The Second was to gain the right bank of the Elbe. When these points were gained, the two armies would be in close communication, and could act in conjunction along the line of railway leading by Pardubitz and Brünn to Vienna.

The distance from Schluckenau to the county of Glatz, along which the Prussian front extended, is about one hundred miles. The Army of the Elbe and the First Army, which were to move through passes only about thirty or thirty-five miles distant from each other, could unite on the Iser in four marches, and immediately assail the enemy with four and a half corps d'armée, if the Austrians attempted to make an offensive movement towards Silesia. The circumstances of the country, and the strategical situation, threw more difficulties in the way of the Second Army during its defiling through the mountains, and there was considerable danger that it might be attached while still isolated. On this account the Army of Silesia was made stronger by one corps

d'armée than the First Army, and was to commence its movements four days later, so as to allow the Austrian attention to have been distracted by the presence of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia, and to permit of the complete junction of the First Army and of the Army of the Elbe on the Iser.

To hold the Austrian commander as long as possible in uncertainty as to the points at which the army of the Crown Prince was about to break into Bohemia, and, if possible, to make him remove his guards from the passes by which the descent was really to be effected, a false demonstration was made by the Second Army. This army had been concentrated round Landshut and Waldenburg, but on the 15th June, the Crown Prince, leaving only one corps d'armée in its original position, moved two of his remaining three corps thirty miles to the south-east, and there placed them in position near Neisse, sent at the same time the Guards to Brieg, and shifted his own head-quarters to the fortress of Neisse, in order to make the Austrians believe that the Army of Silesia intended to await attack in a defensive position near the fortress, or to break out southwards from that point upon Olmütz.

The possession of Saxony and of the passes over the Iron Mountains, enabled the defence of that kingdom to be entrusted to the single reserve corps of General Mülbe. In case, however, that Austrian raids might be made into Saxony, or to oppose the Bavarians in case they might attempt by way of Hof into that country, fortifications were thrown up round Dresden.

On the left wing of the Prussian base of operations,

Lower and Middle Silesia were covered from an Austrian attack by the nature of the Prussian offensive movement as well as by the fortresses of Glatz and Neisse. That portion of Silesia, however, above Oppeln, which penetrates into Austrian territory, was exposed to hostile attacks from Oderberg and from Galicia. In order not to weaken the armies of operations by detaching troops to protect this portion of the province, new and peculiar means were adopted. Two scouting parties were formed which were to support each other; and in case of formidable attack, to withdraw into the fortress of Kosel. One of these was under General Knoblesdorf, and consisted of three battalions of infantry, some battalions of Landwehr, a regiment of cavalry of the Line, and one battery. Its head-quarters were at Ratibor. The other consisted of Landwehr only, and mustered six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jägers, and one battery. It was commanded by Count Stolberg, and stationed at Nicolai. These parties were not only intended to watch the frontier and oppose an irruption by the Austrians, but were also to annoy the enemy beyond the frontier, and to break up his railway communications. As a consequence of these arrangements, a lively war of detachments was soon developed along the Upper Silesian frontier, the details of which afford many interesting records of personal adventure, and the results of which demonstrated that the Prussian possesses in rapidity, subtlety, and endurance, all the qualities necessary for the accidents of petty warfare. Each detachment protected well its own position of the frontier, and only at a few points did the enemy succeed in effecting momentary

sallies : they kept the Austrian troops in Western Galicia in check, and did considerable damage to their enemy. In one instance they destroyed the railway from Oswiecim to Oderberg so thoroughly, that the communication from Cracow to Bohemia as well as to Vienna was completely broken.







## CHAPTER II.

### PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.

ON the 23d June the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were to cross the Bohemian frontier. When it is considered that not only the concentration and advance of the troops had to be arranged after the occupation of Saxony, but also the supply of provisions and ammunition, the establishment of hospitals, and the bringing up of reserves, it seems wonderful that these two armies could have been ready in so few days to take the field.

The southern boundary of Saxon Lusatia runs forward for a distance of about fifteen English miles within the general line of the Bohemian frontier of Austria. In the salient angle of Saxony formed by this peculiar tracing of the border line stands within Saxon territory the frontier town of Zittau. This town covers the issue of the passes which lead from Reichenberg and Friedland in Bohemia, through the mountains into Lusatia, and commands the railway which by the pass of Reichenberg runs from Türrau to Bautzen. About six miles to the north-east of Zittau and about seventeen south-west of Görlitz the village of Hirschfeld is situated on the Neisse, at a point where this river receives a small affluent called

the Kipper. To this village the head-quarters of the First Army were moved on the 22d June. Directly to the south were clearly seen the bold swelling masses of the Bohemian mountains, which here rise higher than in any part of the chain except where the Schneekoppe looms over the passes which lead into Silesia. The break in the mountain line which shows the defile through which passes the road to Reichenberg could be distinctly seen from here. Many eyes were often turned towards the gap in the clear relief of the hills against the sky, and many sought to know whether Prince Frederick Charles had come south to force that pass, or expected the Austrians to issue from it. But those who had that day marched along the seventeen miles of dusty road from Görlitz could have little doubt with what object the First Army had advanced; the amount of transport which stretched in almost a continuous line for twelve miles of the way, told clearly that it was attached to an army destined for more than the mere defence of a frontier.

Prince Frederick Charles on the 22d broke up his quarters at Görlitz, drew the First Army together, and launched it by the two roads which lead through Zittau and Seidenberg respectively, towards the Austrian frontier. The head-quarter staff left Görlitz about three in the afternoon, and pushed along a road crowded with marching troops and military carriages to Hirschfeld. The road from Görlitz to that place was covered with an almost unbroken stream of infantry regiments, batteries of artillery, cavalry detachments, military carriages, and a long line of country waggons as supplementary transport,

while the thick cloud, of dust which rose about a mile and a half to the left, showed that an equally strong column was pushing forward by the Seidenberg road. The heat was great, and the dust, rising in dense clouds from beneath the feet of the men and horses, or wheels of the carriages, hung heavily upon the marching columns; but the men stepped out cheerily, for they were anxious to advance, and they did not seem to suffer from fatigue. The regiments marched in with drums and fifes playing, ranks closed up, no stragglers, and the men keeping step so well that, but for the dust on their clothes and appointments, they might have been imagined to be going for instead of returning from a march.

The *chaussée* leading from Görlitz to Zittau is broad enough to allow four carriages to pass. The march was excellently arranged; there was no confusion, and no halts had to be made except those which were necessary to allow the men to rest. The carriages of the military train were scrupulously kept to one side of the road, so as to leave the rest clear for the troops. Its own baggage marched in the rear of each battalion, but it was not much; only one waggon with the reserve ammunition, a cart for the officers' baggage, three or four packhorses to carry the paymaster's books and the doctors' medicine carts. The soldiers marched strongly; their faces were lit up with excitement, for they knew that every pace brought them nearer to the enemy, and they longed for battle. The country people on the road or working by the wayside exchanged kind words with the men, and expressed many good wishes for their success, and did so with sincerity, for the Prussian soldiers who had been

billeted in the Saxon hamlets had made themselves great favourites with the villagers.

Never was a march better conducted. The standing crops which fringed the road for almost its entire length were in no single place either trampled down or passed through. The road was crowded and dusty, but the men never left it, and, if there was a halt where corn grew by the wayside, no soldier went further from the line of march than to sit on the narrow fringe of grass which separates the *chaussée* from the cultivated ground, and in no case were the fields intruded upon. The staff officers, too, with a wise provision for the comfort of the troops, and with a careful regard for the farmers, had arranged that halts of long duration should be made by alternate regiments at places where the hay had been cut and carried home, and the short grass could, without itself suffering any harm, afford relief to the heated feet of the soldiers.

The road about a mile south of Görlitz descends a steep hill, formed by the spur of the Landeskron, which runs down to the edge of the Neisse, and on which the town of Görlitz is built. It then runs along the valley as far as Ostritz; on the right are wide unenclosed fields covered with rich crops, which terminate on the low line of hills that fringes the valley towards the west; on the left runs the slow stream of the Neisse, shrouded in willows; beyond the river a chain of gentle elevations separates its valley from that formed by the Rolte rivulet, up which runs the road from Görlitz by Seidenberg to Friedland. A mile south of Ostritz a chain of hills, standing directly across the road, forms a defile through

which the river winds with a narrowed stream, the road bends to the right, and goes over a hill thickly covered with fir-trees, but soon descends again, and at Hirschfeld rejoins the course of the river. Two good military positions for an army retreating on Görlitz are afforded on this road—that behind Hirschfeld, where in front of the hill a rivulet crosses the way; and a second where, in front of Görlitz, the road dips down into the valley.

The Prussian troops were on the night of the 22d in force in Zittau and Seidenberg, and the troops were placed along the road which connects those two towns. Head-quarters were established in a very picturesque, but not over-clean, Saxon village. Prince Frederick Charles and his staff occupied the village inn; the square in front, half market-place, half green, was crowded with the carriages of the military train. Soldiers were billeted in every cottage, and chargers stood in every stable. The little hamlet was a continual scene of busy turmoil; horses were being attended to, arms were being cleaned, and the men were making ready for to-morrow's march; while now and then a distant trumpet on the left told that the evening watches were being set by the troops that lay towards the frontier.

The resources of this little village were sorely taxed by the sudden inroad of hungry men; the common room of the inn was filled with a multitude of soldiers hungry with a long day's march. Each man bought a large piece of bread and a junk of meat, and retiring to a side table, or bench, cut it up with his pocket knife, and made a hearty meal. The regimental officers fared no better than their men. The campaign had already

begun, and a great deal of the outward distinctions of ranks had been, as is always the case, shaken off, but the real discipline was unimpaired.

The health of the army was excellent ; the sick only averaged  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which would be a remarkably small number even in a period of profound peace. The sanitary arrangements were so good that there seemed to be every chance of this small proportion of illness being maintained.

The surgeons, hospital attendants, and sick-bearers wore on their left arm a white band with a red cross, as a mark of their profession and their neutrality.

No declaration of war against Austria was made by Prussia ; but on the morning of the 23d, at daybreak, Prince Frederick Charles sent one of his aides-de-camp, Major von Rauch, to announce to the commander of the nearest Austrian post that he in the course of the day intended to pass the Bohemian frontier. Von Rauch, as is usual in such cases, accompanied by a trumpeter, whom he caused constantly to sound, and himself waving a white handkerchief, fell in with one of the Austrian patrols, which was furnished by Radetzky's Hussars. The patrol fired on the staff officer, fortunately without effect ; he boldly rode up to it, and on explaining the object of his visit, was conducted blindfold to the commandant of the advanced post, which was Reichenberg ; this officer, of course, apologized for the mistake which his patrol had made, and the aide-de-camp, after a long and early ride, was escorted back to within a short distance of the Saxon frontier, where he soon met the advancing columns of his own army.

Prince Frederick Charles, late on the night of the 22d, issued the following General Order to the First Army :—

“HEAD QUARTERS, GÖRLITZ, *June 22.*

“SOLDIERS !—Austria, faithless and regardless of treaties, has for some time, without declaring war, not respected the Prussian frontier in Upper Silisia. I therefore, likewise, without a declaration of war, might have passed the frontier of Bohemia. I have not done so. I have caused a public declaration to be sent, and now we enter the territory of the enemy in order to defend our own country.

“Let our undertaking rest with God ! Let us leave our affairs in the hands of Him who rules the hearts of men, who decides the fate of nations, and the issue of battles. As it stands written in Holy Writ —‘Let your hearts beat to God, and your hands on the enemy.’

“In this war are concerned—you know it—the maintenance of Prussia’s most sacred rights, and the very existence of our dear native land. Her enemies have declared their intention to dismember and to destroy her. Shall the streams of blood which your fathers and mine poured out under Frederick the Great, in the War of Independence, and which we ourselves latterly shed at Düppel and Alsen, have been spilt in vain ? Never ! We will maintain Prussia as she is, and by victories make her stronger and mightier. We would be worthy of our fathers.

“We rely on the God of our fathers, who will be mighty in us, and will bless the arms of Prussia.

“So, forward with our old battle cry, ‘With God for King and Fatherland ! Long live the King !’”

“FREDERICK CHARLES, *General of Cavalry.*”

On the morning of the 23d the Prussian armies crossed the frontier of the Austrian territories. General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, with the Army of the Elbe, marched by the high road from Schluckenau to Rumburg. Prince Frederick Charles, with the 4th corps d’armée, followed by the 2d corps, and the cavalry corps, advanced along the road and railway leading from Zittau to Reichenberg, while the 3rd corps moved from Seiden-



berg and Marklissa over the passes of Schönwald and Neustädtl on Friedland.

The troops were early under arms, and fell into their ranks a little after daybreak, under a steady downfall of drizzling rain. They had to march many miles from their billets to the places where they were to form columns for the advance, but they stepped out well over the slippery grass and sloppy roads, and were all ranged in proper order close to the Austrian frontier, but still on Saxon ground, a little after 7. At 6 the Commander-in-chief left his last night's quarters at Hirschfeld, and by the Zittau road reached the frontier a little before 8. The frontier is marked on the road by a tollhouse, in front of which a long bar supplies the place of a gate. This bar balances near its end furthest from the tollhouse on a pivot, and, by means of a weight at the end of its shorter arm, can be raised almost perpendicularly upwards when the road is to be left open for a free passage. On this bar are painted the alternate black and gold stripes which are the distinctive colours of Austria. The bar was raised that day, but not quite in a vertical position ; high enough to allow a man on horseback to ride under it, it still sloped over the road. It was here that Prince Frederick Charles took up his position to watch his troops march over the border. He had hardly arrived there before he gave the necessary orders, and in a few moments the Uhlans, who formed the advanced guard of the regiments that marched by this line, were over the frontier. Then followed the infantry. As the leading ranks of each battalion arrived at the first point on the road from

which they caught sight of the Austrian colours that showed the frontier, they raised a cheer, which was quickly caught up by those in the rear, and was repeated again and again till, when the men came up to the tollhouse and saw their soldier Prince standing on the border line, it swelled into a roar of rapturous delight, which only ceased to be replaced by a martial song that was caught up by each battalion as it poured into Bohemia. Their chief himself stood by the roadside calm and collected; but he gazed proudly on the passing sections, and well he might, for never did an army cross an enemy's frontier better equipped, better cared for, or with a higher courage than that which marched out of Saxony that day. Ever and anon he would call from a passing battalion, some officer or soldier who had before served under him, and with a kindly inquiry or cheerful word, won a heart, for soldiers love officers who take an interest in them. Everywhere the Prince was greeted by the troops with loud cries of joy; as he rode along the way by which the regiments were marching they cheered him continuously. At one point his reception was peculiarly remarkable. A Pomeranian regiment (the 2d), which had served under him when he was a divisional general, had piled its arms for a halt, and the men were lying down by the side of the road to rest. Suddenly the word was passed among them that the Prince was coming; with one accord they sprang as if by magic to their feet, made two long lines along the road through which he might pass, and gave him such a cheer as only old soldiers can.

The concentration of the troops and the advance into

Bohemia were most excellently managed. This same army had exactly a week before entered Saxony, prepared to fight in that country; within that time Saxony had been entirely occupied, and within six days the majority of the troops were again concentrated, and began their march into Austria. The advance was conducted in this way :—The troops the previous night were concentrated on the frontier; on the morning of the 23d, on the right, Herwarth Von Bittenfeld pushed forward two columns from Dresden by Schluckenau and Rumburg; Prince Frederick Charles advanced from Saxony; his troops marched in five columns; the column on the right followed the high road from Zittau; the right centre column marched along the railway lying to the left of that road; the centre column followed a road to the left of the railway. The left centre column marched by the Seidenberg road, and the left column by the Marklissa road east of this highway. Thus on a broad front, and by several roads all within a distance which would allow the different corps to concentrate in a very few hours, the army moved to the front well in hand and without inconvenience to the troops. The march within Austrian territory was distinguished by the same regard for private property that was so scrupulously observed in Saxony. The Austrian villagers at first looked on the irruption of the army of the northern Germans half in fear, half in curiosity, but soon they came to be on speaking terms with the soldiers, and then were quickly seen supplying them with drinking water and doing them other good services.

The Castle of Grafenstein, in which the head-quarters were fixed on the night of the 23d, is the property of

Count Clam Gallas, who commanded the first Austrian corps in Bohemia; it is beautifully situated on the top of a hill, covered with thick foliage, which rises abruptly from the low ground of the valley of the Neisse. The Count had not left much furniture for the use of his unexpected guests, as nearly all the moveables were sent away some time ago to Vienna, but a stock of mattresses were found in the house which the servants good-naturedly lent to the temporary occupants, and the Prince of Prussia and his staff were accommodated in the rooms of an officer who was waiting to fight a battle with their army beyond the mountains. Two of Radetzky's Hussars were taken prisoners; they were out with a patrol and came into collision with a patrol of the Prussian regiment of Magdeburg Hussars; in the skirmish the horses of these two Austrians were shot, and the men were taken. They were the first prisoners of the war. The rapid concentration of the Prussian army produced some feats in marching, which were quite extraordinary for troops who had only just taken the field. The 5th Pomeranian Hussars marched three days successively for long distances, and on the 22d made fifty English miles; they were again on the line of march on the 24th, with horses in excellent condition, and the men looking as if they had only just turned out of barracks.

The Prussians were now on the northern slopes of the mountains, and one day's march would, without opposition, take them through the passes. The highest hills were now so close that with a glass the stems of the fir-trees which clothed them could be easily distinguished. The road to Reichenberg lay straight and open before

them. The march of the 23d was different from that of the preceding day ; it was a march which showed that the enemy might be found in front. The heavy baggage and reserve commissariat transport was all a day's march in rear ; the only carriages which were present in the column of route were the guns and waggons of the artillery, the hospital carriages, and the few waggons which are necessary to regiments when actually about to fight.

The advanced posts, on the evening of the 23d, were pushed forwards about seven miles ; there were vigilant patrols and pickets out, and all was provided for against a surprise. These precautions are of course always necessary with an army in the field ; in the present case their utility was not put to the test, for the Austrians were not in force in the neighbourhood.

Count Clam Gallas, to whom the Austrian commander had entrusted the guidance of the Austrian and Saxon troops on the Iser, had only pushed patrols of light cavalry up to and beyond Reichenberg. Several skirmishes took place between them and the Prussian hussars, dragoons, and lancers, who formed the advanced scouts in front of each column, in which the Austrian cavalry was generally outnumbered and obliged to retire.

It rained steadily all the night of the 23d, and the morning brought no improvement in the weather, but the troops were in high spirits, and appeared to care nothing for the wet. On the 24th the army of Prince Frederick Charles marched by three roads : the left column by way of Eisniedel on Reichenberg ; the centre by Kratzkau on the same town ; while General Von Bittenfeld came from the mountains, and moved upon Gabel. Some of the regi-

ments halted at Reichenberg, and were billeted in the town for the night ; others were pushed through and took up positions in front. Many battalions had to bivouac that evening ; but, although the ground was moist and damp from incessant rain, the weather was warm, and the troops did not take much harm from their first night in the open. The army was now drawn together and concentrated round Reichenberg ; for General Von Bittenfeld at Gabel was only twelve miles to the right. On the night of the 24th, the Prussian advanced posts near Kratzkau could see the light of the Austrian bivouac fires, and the next morning the Magdeburg hussars who cleared the way for the army had a skirmish with some of Radetzky's Austrian hussars. Shots were exchanged, two of the Prussians were wounded and five of the Austrians were wounded, with two killed. A combat was expected at Reichenberg. Three Austrian cavalry regiments, Lichtenstein's hussars, Radetzky's hussars, and the hussars of the regiment of Hesse-Cassel, were known to be in front of the Prussian advance, and it was anticipated that in the fine strategical position of Reichenberg the Austrians might stand to fight ; for this town covers the junction of roads which leads over the mountains by Gabel, Grottau, Friedland, and from Hirschberg. But the Austrian cavalry retired through the town, and it was occupied about ten o'clock by the Prussian advanced guard ; and Prince Frederick Charles, without a blow, gained the south side of the mountains, and commanded the issues of the passes.

The march of the 24th, although over a hill country, was not over a severe road, for the summit of the moun-

tain chain dips so deeply into the gorge which forms the defile of Reichenberg, that the road through the pass both ascends and descends with a moderate gradient ; on either side of the way the mountains rise high, but not steep, for the whole character of this range is more rounded and swelling than bold and sharp. As the army passed between the hills in the early morning, the tops were shrouded in a dense mist, which occasionally lifted high enough to show the lower parts of the dense fir woods which clothe the upper mountain sides, but never to afford a glimpse of their summits. The rain fell heavily and without ceasing ; it battered down the grain which grew in the fields by the wayside, and filled the mountain watercourses with rushing mud-coloured streams ; there was no wind to give it a slanting direction, and it came straight down on the men's helmets, only to roll off in large drops upon their backs and shoulders, but it did not seem to depress the spirits of the troops ; they stepped along cheerily, marching as well as they did the first day they left their garrisons, and many of the soldiers said that they preferred the wet weather to heat. All along the line of march the commander of the army was loudly cheered.

When Prince Frederick Charles reached the market-place of Reichenberg, he halted to await the arrival of the troops who had marched by the Friedland road. The town looked dull, for as it was Sunday the shops were all shut, and at first the Bohemians seemed inclined to remain in their houses ; but the bands of the marching regiments roused their curiosity, and they soon collected and lined the street in dense crowds to see the troops go

by. The soldiers who had arrived early and had been dismissed from their ranks joined in the crowd, and a common language soon made them great friends with the townspeople. Many tales are told of the dreadful devastation to which a country is subjected by the plunderers of an invading army. So far as the Prussian army had yet advanced into Bohemia the soldiers had treated the Austrians with the greatest kindness ; as in the British service, everything that a soldier wished to buy must be scrupulously paid for, and there seemed to be no desire among the men that it should be otherwise ; in fact, the troops were much more plundered than plunderers, for the cigar merchants and public-house keepers were driving a most prosperous trade, and took very good care that they themselves did not suffer, for the soldiers were unaccustomed to Austrian currency, and had to pay an equivalent of Prussian coin.

Reichenberg was, on the morning of the 24th, occupied by the Prussians about ten o'clock. Before evening nearly the whole army, attended by artillery and waggons, marched through the narrow winding streets of a town which to these artificial disadvantages for free locomotion adds the natural one of being built upon a steep hill ; still there was no confusion in the marching columns, and, although the troops had to move by different streets and were sometimes obliged to march in and out of the town by country lanes and narrow paths, no column took a false direction or made an unnecessary halt ; yet the Quartermaster-General Von Stülpnagel had only a few minutes allowed him in which he could arrange his plans.



The column which had marched by the Friedland route was brought through the market-place and past the Commander-in-chief. This corps is composed of men of the province of Brandenburg; they are taller than the average of the Prussian infantry, but are not so thick and stout, and do not look so strong as the sturdy Pomeranians; but they have intelligent faces, and can readily be seen to be, as they are, men of an education superior to that which is usually found in the ranks. The regiment of the late King led; the men bore his cypher on their shoulder cords, instead of a number. The whole corps marched magnificently. After a wet day and a long journey they came up the hill of Reichenberg with ranks closed up, with as perfect a step as on a holiday parade, and went swinging along as if they could not know fatigue; yet they were heavily encumbered, for every man carried his knapsack, the weight of which tells severely against a soldier's marching, and might, in a country where transport is plentiful, be carried for him. After the late King's regiment came the 64th, Prince Frederick Charles's own: the faces of the soldiers showed that they recognised their colonel, and they went past him without cheering, for in the town the men marched as on parade, but with that appearance which is more pleasing to a soldier than any acclamations.

The head-quarters were established in the Schloss or Castle of Reichenberg, another of the properties of Count Clam Gallas, who thus twice became the involuntary host of Prince Frederick Charles. Here a curious scene was afforded: the castle stands on a hill, overlooks the

picturesque town, and commands a beautiful view of the plains and mountains beyond it. The side of this hill below the castle was covered with carefully-tended turf, and luxuriant shrubberies. The place seemed only fit to be the quiet home of a country gentleman, but up and down its gravelled avenue chargers were being led ready saddled for the aides-de-camp, who were waiting to carry out the evening orders; military train horses were being led to water, soldiers, in stable dress, were hurrying about, mounted dragoons were in attendance as orderlies, and near the door of the castle stood the horse of the officer of Uhlans, who had brought in the last report from the outposts.

On the afternoon of the 24th, the Thuringian regiment of Uhlans, who are much the same as lancers, took up outpost duty, and one squadron of them had a skirmish with some of Radetzky's hussars. The hussars were led by a staff officer, who came too near the Prussian infantry picket, and the deadly needle-gun shot the first officer who fell a victim to this war. The hussars and Uhlans mutually charged each other, and in the *mêlée* which ensued, two Prussian officers and seventeen men were wounded. The Austrian loss was not ascertained.

The possession of Reichenberg allowed Prince Frederick Charles to open railway communication with the Silesian and Saxon lines, which was of great importance in the supply of the army's necessities. The railway from Reichenberg to Zittau was almost immediately restored, for to each Prussian army was attached a corps of pioneers, architects, and railway officials, who follow the advancing army, lay down the lines torn up by the

enemy, and rapidly re-organize the working of the line for the purposes of military transport.

Two other excellent institutions of the Prussian army were quickly established, and put in working order at every halting-place; they are the Field Telegraph and the Field Post-office. As soon as it is determined where head-quarters are to be fixed for the night, the field telegraph division start off to the nearest permanent telegraph station where the line can be fixed in working order; from this starting point they carry a single line along the side of the shortest road to the head-quarter house, and generally by the time the chief of the staff arrives at his quarters he finds his telegraph ready, by which he can get information or send his orders. The field post-office is established also at head-quarters, but has branch offices at the head-quarters of each corps d'armée; it carries the private letters of soldiers and officers, as well as official despatches, and sends out a mail nearly daily. This is a greater convenience than the field telegraph, but the latter is one of the neatest appliances of modern science to the art of war which it is possible to conceive. The whole of its apparatus is carried in some light waggons; one contains the batteries and needles, and is used as a small room in which the telegraphist works; the other waggons carry the poles and wires, with the implements for putting them up. The wires are coiled round revolving discs, which are fitted in the waggon, so that the wire can be passed as the waggon goes along, or the disc can be transferred to a stretcher carried between two men, so that it may be laid off the road in places where it is desirable to cut off

corners. The detachment who lay the lines are all instructed in repairing damage done to the permanent wires. When it is remembered that on the morning of the 23d the Austrians were close up to the frontier, and that at midday the Castle of Grafenstein, five miles from the nearest permanent station, was in direct telegraphic communication with Berlin, some idea can be formed of the advantages which this apparatus gives to an army in the field.

The head-quarters of the First Army halted at Reichenberg on the 25th, to allow the cavalry that came by the Friedland road which had covered the march of the column to come in. During the day the outposts were pushed forward, but the Austrians were not felt.

Count Clam Gallas had drawn his army together on the south of the line of Iser, round Münchengrätz. The Poschacher brigade, supported by the light cavalry, was posted as his advanced guard on the northern side of the river, and was pushed forward along the road to Reichenberg. This was the same Austrian brigade which had in Schleswig, in 1864, on account of the sturdy manner in which it stormed and occupied the Königsberg, gained the name of the "iron brigade." It was now destined to commence the contest against its former allies in the

#### COMBAT OF LIEBENAU.

The Austrian brigade occupied the hills south of the village of Liebenau, about half way between Reichenberg and Türrau, and had pushed detachments into the village itself.

The road from Reichenberg to Türrau crosses a range

of hills which separates the valley of the Upper Neisse from the country beyond, and drops down from this range by some sharp zigzags to the valley in which lies the village of Liebenau. This village is built on the banks of a stream which forms a defile through a second range of hills lying between Liebenau and Törnau. This rivulet, in the part of its course above the village of Liebenau, runs at right angles to the defile, and forms a valley between the two hills which lie north of Liebenau towards Reichenberg, and those which lie to the south towards Törnau. The railway from Liebenau to Törnau passes through the defile formed by the stream which runs through the village; but the road turns to the left and ascends the southern range, passing near the top between a steep cutting through rocks. This cutting is about 100 yards in length, and here the road is only about 30 feet wide. The hills are on their side covered with thick plantations of fir trees; but when the traveller leaving Liebenau has by the road gained the summit of the range which lies south of the village, he finds before him a wild plateau extending for about two miles in the direction of Törnau. This plateau was this morning covered with high-standing crops of wheat and barley, already whitening for the harvest. The road runs through the corn-fields, and at the end of the plateau drops down by a gentle slope into the valley of the Iser. From the brow of this slope Törnau can be seen lying on the river towards the left front. The Schloss of Sichrow, standing on the very edge of the Liebenau defile, is directly on the right, and the view to the front is bounded by the fir-clad and fantastically rocky hills

which form the southern boundary of the valley of the Iser, while on the left the church of Gentschowitz stands raised on a knoll above the general plain, and looking down upon the orchards and cottages of the little hamlet which clusters round its foot.

Between the bottom of the slope which falls from this flat plain into the valley and the Iser, and about half way between the foot of the hill and the river itself, there runs a low range of hills, having an elevation considerably inferior to that of the plateau. On this lower range, immediately surrounded by orchards, but in the midst of a wide-stretching corn land, lies the village of Kositz.

On the evening of the 25th the Prussian advanced posts were pushed forward to the tops of the range of hills which bound the valley of Liebenau on the north. The next morning General Von Horne, who with the 8th division held the outposts, had advanced early to occupy Liebenau. As his advanced guard entered the village, the Austrian rear-guard were discovered tearing up the pavement, in order to form a barricade across the narrow street through which the high road runs. On the approach of the advanced guard they retired to the hill over which the road to Türnau passes south of the village. Here the Austrians took up position; their artillery, placed on the brow of the hill, looked down upon the village of Liebenau, which Horne had just occupied, and their cavalry covered the guns. But they were not in force. They had little infantry, and their main strength appeared to be only four regiments of cavalry, with two batteries of horse artillery. Horne's division passed through the village, and began to ascend

the hill, while General Von Hann came down to Liebenau with the Prussian cavalry, and the field artillery took up a position on the hills which bound the Liebenau valley on the north. Thus the guns of the Austrians were on the southern, those of the Prussians on the northern range, which form the valley of Liebenau; the valley between them is about 600 yards wide, and there seemed to be an opportunity for a smart combat. Down in Liebenau, between the opposed batteries, were the wings of Horne's divisions, and columns were already issuing from the village, making their way along both the railway and the *chaussée*, while the skirmishers were getting among the short spruce firs that clothe the hill beside the road.

A little before nine o'clock Prince Frederick Charles and his staff came upon the hill where the artillery was placed. It was almost exactly the same hour when a flash of fire, with a heavy puff of white smoke on the Austrian hill, showed that their artillery had opened, and a rifle shell came whistling over the heads of Horne's division. The Prussian artillery answered, and for a few minutes the hills echoed with the noise of their rapid discharges; while the smoke, drifting but slowly on the lazy breeze, hid from sight the opposite guns, though the quick reports and the whistling of the shells told that they were not idle. But the Prussian guns were too numerous, Horne's division was pushing up the hill, and the Austrian artillery had to retire. Then the Prussian cavalry pushed forward by the road, and in a short time eight fine cavalry regiments were formed on the northern edge of the plateau. The Thuringian Uhlans, the Uhlans

of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and the dragoons of the Prince of Mecklenburg were extended to the left, while the Brandenburg hussars of Ziethen, conspicuous by their red uniform, were nearer the road. On the right of the cavalry was the horse artillery, and Prince Frederick Charles, himself a cavalry officer, was in the front.

The retreat of the Austrians could be traced by the broad paths trampled down in the corn, and every now and then they halted, their artillery came into action, and two or three rounds were fired at the forming lines. When Prince Frederick Charles had completed his dispositions he ordered the advance, and the troops pressed forward. The cavalry and artillery moved on the plateau, while Horne's infantry, on the right, made for the Schloss of Sichrow and the woods around it. The cavalry pushed on quickly, and the guns moved well with it, but every now and then halted and came into action. The Austrians, inferior in numbers and already retiring, could not hope to stand against the force thus displayed, and they drew quickly over the plateau, making for the hills of Kositz. Three regiments of cavalry were launched after them, and went dashing through the corn, but did not reach the retiring troops before the latter had quitted the plateau, and then the woods and broken ground on the side of the slopes impeded their progress. As soon as the Austrians gained the Kositz-hills their artillery opened, and poured shells briskly into the advancing lines, but the gliding motion of the advancing troops and the undulating ground deceived their aim, for only about twenty casualties occurred. When the Prussian guns



gained the southern brow of the plateau, they opened on the Austrian batteries; a smart cannonade ensued, but the Austrians were ultimately silenced. Yet they did well, for they made good their retreat; but had not the Prussian horse been detained by having to pass through the narrow street of Liebenau, the field artillery which that day fired into the Prussian ranks would probably have gone as a trophy to Berlin.

It is evident that the Austrian commander had not calculated on the rapid advance of General Von Horne. His dispositions for the defence of the Liebenau position were incomplete; the street of Liebenau was not rendered impracticable, for the workmen were disturbed by the Prussian advance guard, and in the cutting which the road leading from the village passes through at the top of the hill leading on to the plateau, although the trees which stood by the wayside had been cut down, they were not formed into *abattis*, nor was the cutting blocked by waggons or any barricade. The Austrians retreated across the Iser, and broke the bridge of Türnau, but the Prussians after the combat occupied that town with Horne's division, while the main body of the army bivouacked on the plateau, and one division occupied Gablenz, which lies five miles to the north-east.

On the same day the 14th division, which belonged to the Army of the Elbe, occupied Böhmisches Aicha, and assured free communication between Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld.

The plateau that looks down on Liebenau was sadly changed in the course of the day. The corn was trampled down by the feet of horses and the wheels of

artillery ; dead horses lay dotted here and there over the plain, while large holes in the ground showed where shells had struck and burst. But these marks were not frequent, for the Austrian shells often penetrated into the earth without bursting, and several were dug out by the soldiers in the afternoon. Nor was the practice of their artillery good. The Ziethen hussars, whose red uniforms drew their fire, were at one time exposed to a heavy cannonade ; but though above fifty shells struck the ground around them, not one fell among their ranks, nor at that time had they a man touched.

The result of the combat of Liebenau was not over-valued in the Prussian army ; the officers on that side did not despise their enemy, and they fully recognised the fact that it was to superior numbers that the Austrians yielded. They had great confidence in their chief and in the needle-gun and their rifled cannon, but they had no vain assurance. They knew that the Austrian army was a good one, and they determined to omit nothing that their skill or science could suggest to let their troops meet it on the best of terms.

The Austrians retired to Podoll in order to hold that important point, where not only the road to München-grätz but also the railway between Türrau, Kralup, and Prague crosses the Iser.

General Horne, after the action of Liebenau, pushed forward to the Iser and occupied Türrau, the junction of the railway from Reichenberg with that to Prague. After a bridge of pontoons had been thrown across the river here in order to replace the one broken by the Austrians, he determined to occupy the bridges of Podoll

five miles below Türrau. The movement by which he effected this brought on the

#### ACTION OF PODOLL.

The railway and high road which lead down the valley of the Iser from Türrau to Münchengrätz run for a distance of about five miles from the former town on the north side of the river, but on reaching the village of Podoll cross to the south bank by two bridges, which are about 200 yards distant from each other, that of the railway being on the right, and that by which the road crosses on the left of a person, looking towards Münchengrätz. The railway bridge is constructed of iron; that which carries the road across the stream is made of wood, and lies on a level with the causeway, which is raised on an embankment about ten feet above the flat meadows lying alongside it. The Iser is at Podoll near upon 100 yards wide, and runs with a deep but fast stream between steep banks, which only rise about four feet above the level of the water. By the side of the road and on the banks of the stream grow large willow-trees, planted at equal distances from each other, and at about ten yards apart. Three roads lead from the plateau of Sichrow to the high road that runs down the valley of the Iser. That on the east, a country road, which leaves the plateau near the Schloss of Sichrow and joins the highway near the village of Swierzin, almost at an equal distance between Türrau and Podoll; in the centre the *chaussée* from Liebenau strikes into the high road halfway between Swierzin and Türrau, and the road from Gentschowitz on the west joins it close to this town.

On the afternoon of the 26th, Prince Frederick Charles threw a light pontoon bridge over the river a little below the broken bridge of Turnau, and occupied the town with a small force without opposition. Part of Horne's division marched at the same time by the country road on the east, occupied the village of Swierzin, and pushed its advanced guard towards Podoll. The troops directed on this point consisted of two companies of the 4th Jäger battalion, the 2d and fusileer batalions of the 31st regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 71st. The Jägers, who were leading, got to within three-quarters of a mile of Podoll-bridge before they came into collision with Austrian outposts, but here they found the enemy, and a sharp action ensued, for the Austrians had six battalions in the village, and meant to hold the place and cover the passage of the river.

It was about 8 o'clock, and the dusk of the evening was rapidly closing in, when the Jägers first felt their enemy. On the right-hand side of the road, about half a mile before the bridge, stands the first house of the village. It is a large square farm-house, with windows without glass, but with heavy gratings. The Austrians had occupied it in force, and their outlying pickets, as they retired before the advancing Prussians, formed line across the road beside it. As soon as the Jägers came within sight the garrison of the farmhouse and the formed-up pickets opened a bitter fire upon them. From the grated windows and from the line of soldiers in the road there came one rapid volley, which told severely on the Prussian riflemen, but these went quickly to work, and had fired about three times before the Austrians, armed only with

muzzle-loading rifles, were able to reply. Then the noise of musketry rose high, occasionally swelling into a heavy roar, but sometimes falling off so that the ear could distinguish the separate reports. But this did not last. Major Von Hagen, commanding the 2d battalion of the 31st, which was following the Jägers on the first sound of the firing, had put his troops into double quick time, and was soon up to reinforce the riflemen. It was now nearly dark, and the flashes of the rifles, the reports of the shots, and the shouts of the combatants were almost the only indications of the positions of the troops; yet it could be seen that the rapid fire of the needle-gun was telling on the Austrian line in the road, and the advancing cheers of the Prussians showing that they were gaining ground. Then while the exchange of shots was still proceeding rapidly between the window-gratings of the farmhouse and the Prussian firing parties, who had extended into a cornfield on the right of the highway, there was a sudden pause in the firing on the road, for the Jägers, supported by the 31st, had made a dash, and were bearing the Austrians back beyond the farm-house to where the cottages of the village closed on each side of the road, and where the defenders had hastily thrown some hewn down willow trees as a barricade across the way.

Then the tumult of the fight increased. Darkness had completely closed in, and the moon had not yet risen; the Prussians pressed up to the barricade, the Austrians stoutly stood their ground behind it, and, three paces distant, assailants and defenders poured their fire into each other's breasts. Little could be seen, though the flashes of the discharges cast a fitful light over the surging

masses ; but in the pauses of the firing the voices of the officers were heard encouraging their men, and half-stifled shrieks or gurgling cries told that the bullets were truly aimed. This was too severe to endure. The Prussians, firing much more quickly, and in the narrow street, where neither side could show their whole strength, not feeling the inferiority of numbers, succeeded in tearing away the barricade, and slowly pressed their adversaries back along the village street. Yet the Austrians fought bravely, and their plans for the defence of the houses had been skilfully though hastily made ; from every window muskets flashed out fire, and sent bullets into the thick ranks of the advancing Prussians, while on each balcony behind a wooden barricade Jägers crouched to take their deadly aim ; but in the street the soldiers, huddled together and encumbered with clumsy ramrods, were unable to load with ease, and could return no adequate fire to that of the Prussians, while these, from the advantage of a better arm, poured their quick volleys into an almost defenceless crowd.

As the battle in the street was pushed inch by inch towards the Iser, the Austrians, in every house which the foremost ranks of the Prussians passed, were cut off from their retreat, and were sooner or later made prisoners, for the houses of the village do not join on to each other, but are detached by spaces of a few yards, and there is no communication from one house to the other except by the open street. The whole of the Prussian force was now up, and extending between the houses which the first combatants had passed by, cut off the escape of their garrisons, and exchanged shots with the defenders.

With shrieks and shouts, amid the crashing of broken windows, the heavy sounds of falling beams, and the perpetual rattle of the fire-arms, the battle was heavily pressed down the narrow street, and about half-past eleven the moon came up clear and full to show the Austrian rearmost ranks turning viciously to bar the Prussians from the bridge. The moonlight, reflected in the stream, told the assailants that they were near the object of their labour, and showed the Austrians that now or never the enemy must be hurled back. Both sides threw out skirmishers along the river bank, and the moon gave them light to direct their aim across the stream; while on the first plank of the bridge the Austrians turned to bay, and the Prussians pausing some short paces from them, the combatants gazed at each other for a few moments. Then they began a fiercer fight than ever. The discharges were more frequent, and in the narrower way the bullets told with more severe effect. Herr Von Drygalski, leading the fusilier battalion of the 31st, a lieutenant-colonel of only two days' standing, went down with two bullets in his forehead, and a captain at his side was shot in both legs; many men fell, and the grey horse of a Prussian field-officer, with a ball in his heart, fell heavily against the wall, kicking amid the ranks; but he was soon quieted for ever, and at that moment men regarded but little such wounds as could be inflicted by an iron-shod hoof, even in the agonies of death. The Austrians stood gallantly, and made an attempt to set fire to the bridge; but the difference of their armament again told upon them here; and it is said that, galled by their hard fortune, they charged with the bayonet, but that the Prussians also

took kindly to the steel, and this charge caused no change in the fortune of the fight: certain it is that the defenders were ultimately obliged to retire across the bridge.

While this combat was proceeding slowly along the street, another fight was carried on upon the railway almost with an equal progress, and with an almost similar result. A party of the Austrians fell back from the point where shots were first exchanged, and where the railway crosses the road, along the line. They were pushed by some Prussian detachments, but neither side was here in strong force, and the principal fighting was done upon the road; but here, too, the needle-gun showed its advantage over the old-fashioned weapons of the Austrians, for the latter fell in the proportion of six to one Prussian. The railway bridge was not broken, but the lines were torn up by the retiring troops, and the line was not passable by trains. The Prussians pushed over both bridges after the retreating Austrians; the latter threw a strong detachment into a large unfinished house, which stood by the *chaussée*, about a quarter of a mile beyond the bridge, and again made a stand, but not of long duration; they had lost many killed, wounded, and prisoners; many of their officers were dead or taken; but they stood till they could gather in all the stragglers who had escaped from the houses of the village, and, harassed by the pursuing Prussians, drew off sullenly by the main road to Münchengrätz. Thus terminated a contest which, fought upon both sides with the greatest vigour and determination, yet resulted in a clear victory for the Prussians; for, when the last dropping shots ceased, about four o'clock in the morning, there were



no Austrian soldiers within three miles of Podoll-bridge except the wounded and the taken. There was no artillery engaged on either side ; it was purely an infantry action, and the Prussians derived in it great advantage from the superiority of their arms over that of their opponents, not only in the rapidity, but in the direction of their fire, for a man with an arm on the nipple of which he has to place a cap, naturally raises the muzzle in the air, and in the hurry and excitement of action often forgets to lower it, and only sends his bullet over the heads of the opposite ranks, while the soldier armed with a breech-loading musket keeps his muzzle down, and if in haste he fires it off without raising the butt to his shoulder, his shot still takes effect, though often low, and a proof of this is that very many of the Austrian prisoners were wounded in the legs.

The road to Podoll was next morning crowded with hospital waggons and ambulance cars bringing in the wounded ; every cottage in the way was converted into a temporary hospital, and the little village of Swierzin was entirely filled with stricken men. The sick-bearers, one of the most useful corps which any army possesses, were at work from the very beginning of the action. As the combatants passed on these noble-minded men, regardless of the bullets and careless of personal danger, removed with equal hand both friend and enemy who were left writhing on the road, and carried them carefully to the rear, where the medical officers made no distinction in their care for both Austrian and Prussian. Not only was it those whose special duty is the care of the wounded who alone were doing their best to ease the

sufferings of those who had suffered in the combat; soldiers not on duty might be seen carrying water for prisoners of both sides alike, and gladly affording any comfort which it was in their power to give to those who overnight had been firing against their own hearts! Nor is this wonderful; for after the flush of the battle was over, and the din of the musketry had died away, the men of the Prussian army could not forget that one common language linked them to their adversaries, and that, after all, it was probably German blood which, flowing from an Austrian breast, trickled over the white livery of the House of Hapsburg.

In the village the utmost disorder gave evidence of the severity of the contest. Austrian knapsacks, shakos, clothes, and arms were scattered about in wild confusion. Dead horses lay in the ditches by the roadside. White coats and cloaks, which had been thrown off in the hurry of the fight, lay scattered along the road; the trees which had formed the Austrian barricade were still on the side of the street, and many held a bullet. The cottages had been ransacked of their furniture, and their beams and roof-trees had been torn down to form defences for the doors and windows; while along the street and upon the banks of the river lay objects which in the distance look like bundles of untidy uniform, but which on nearer approach were seen to be the bodies of slain soldiers. Sometimes they lay in groups of twos or threes, twisted together as if they had gripped one another in their mortal agony, and sometimes single figures lay on their backs, staring with livid countenance and half-closed hazy eyes, straight up against the

hot morning sun. The dark-blue uniform with red facings of Prussia, and the white with light-blue of Austria, laid side by side, but the numbers of the latter much preponderated, and on one part of the railway three Prussian corpses opposite nineteen Austrian formed a grisly trophy of the superiority of the needle-gun.

Close on 500 unwounded Austrian prisoners were next morning marched up to head-quarters, and the Austrian loss in killed and wounded was very considerable. The Prussians lost two officers dead, and seven or eight wounded. The medical officers officially reported that the proportion of wounded Austrians to wounded Prussians was as five to one. Thus the needle-gun told both on the battle-field and in the hospital.

On the 27th the head-quarters of the First Army halted at the Castle of Sichrow. There had been no skirmishing; but white smoke curling up from beyond some fir woods beside the Iser told that the bridge of Mohelnitz, about five miles below Podoll, which the Austrians had set on fire to obstruct pursuit, was burning steadily.

The results of the actions of Liebenau and Podoll were, that two of the important passages of the Iser, those of Turnau and Podoll, fell into the hands of the First Prussian Army. That of Münchengrätz still was in the hands of the Austrians, but was soon also to be seized from their grasp. The Army of the Elbe had advanced on the 23d by Schluckenau, and on the 26th the fourteenth division, under the command of General Mündter, had been pushed to Bömisch Aicha, in order to feel Prince Frederick Charles's right.

Count Glam Gallas had only opposed a few hussar regiments to the advance of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, so that this general met with no serious opposition in issuing from the mountains. On the 27th, the day after the night action of Podoll, his eighth corps, which was advancing from Gabel by Niemes, in the direction of Münchengrätz, first fell in with any serious hostile force. The Prussian advanced guard, consisting of two squadrons and two battalions of Schöler's brigade, which, followed by the whole 8th corps, was on the march from Hayda, pushed forward on a reconnaissance as far as Hühnerwasser.


The Austrians, bound only to furnish intelligence, and ordered not to engage seriously, retreated, after a slight skirmish, to Münchengrätz, and evacuated the right bank of the Iser, thus permitting a full communication to be opened between the Army of the Elbe and that of Prince Frederick Charles. The two armies were able on the following day to advance in concert, so as to take possession of the whole line of the Iser.

Count Clam Gallas, after the skirmish at Hühnerwasser, withdrew the greater part of his force to the left bank of the Iser, occupied Münchengrätz in force, and made preparations for the destruction of the bridge over the river on the west of the town. The Prussian plan to seize that place brought on the

#### ACTION OF MÜNCHENGRÄTZ.

On the 27th Prince Frederick Charles halted in the position of Sichrow, and made his dispositions for his further advance. The seventh division had occupied

Turnau, where the engineers had quickly thrown a pontoon bridge over the Iser, to replace the permanent one, which had been burnt by the retiring Austrian cavalry. The eighth division, under General Horne, occupied the village and bridge of Podoll; the sixth division, under General Manstein, moved forward to the support of Horne. The main body of the army was on the plateau



Gitschlin

of Sichrow, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, after a sharp skirmish, in which he took many prisoners, seized Hühnerwasser.

The road and railway which lead from Turnau to Jung Bunzlau cross the Iser near together at the village of Podoll, and run beside each other on the southern side of the river to a point about three miles below Münchengrätz; about a quarter of a mile below Podoll the hills which form the plateau of Sichrow, turning southwards,

come close to the northern bank of the Iser, and form a chain of heights which descend with a steep slope to the water's edge. The hills which form the southern boundary of the valley of the Iser rise to a height of about 500 feet in the Muskey Berg, which, running parallel to the road for a mile of its length from its extremity nearest Podoll, then trends southwards and strikes the road from Münchengrätz to Unter Bautzen at the village of Bossin. The Muskey Berg presents towards the river on its upper part a rocky, precipitous front; below this the *débris* fallen from the rocks has accumulated and formed a slope, which, although steep, would, were it not for the precipice above, be still practicable for light infantry. This lower slope is covered with a dense forest of fir trees; the summit of the hill is in general a flat plateau, clothed with greensward, but near the edge of the precipice fir trees are thickly planted, and form a belt along the summit, with an average breadth of 100 paces, while, conspicuous near the place where the hill line turns towards Bossin, stands a high solitary cone rising 100 feet above the plateau, bare of trees, but covered with green grass. Opposite this high cone of the Muskey Berg, and close to the river, but still on the southern bank, lies the isolated hill of the Kaczowberg. It is considerably lower than the Muskey Berg range, and is not wooded. Its length is about 500 yards, and its longitudinal direction is at right angles to that of the stream. The distance between the summits of the Muskey Berg and the Kaczowberg is about two miles, and through the valley between these two hills run the road and railway from Podoll to Münchengrätz. Between these hills the valley is a dead flat

plain. It was at the time of the action richly cultivated, intersected by rows of fruit trees, and covered with wheat, barley, clover, and potato patches. No hedges divided the different farms, but brooks and ditches made the ground very difficult for the action of cavalry. Looking from the bridge of Podoll along the valley towards Münchengrätz, the Muskey Berg lies to the left front, the Kaczowberg to the right front ; between them are seen in the distance the Schloss and spires of the town, but further view is stopped by a low range of elevations, topped by dwarf plantations, which lie between the roads from Münchengrätz to Fürstenbrück, and from Münchengrätz to Jung Bunzlau, and runs from the village of Bossin to that of Wessely.

The Austrians had thrown up a redoubt and a battery for eight guns on the Kaczowberg ; the latter would have enfiladed the Podoll road, but no guns were in it, for the Prussian advance had been rapid, and there was not time to arm the work. Still, it was expected that the enemy would stand here, and the Prussian commander advanced prepared to fight. He intended to strike for no meagre victory. He formed a plan by which to capture the whole opposing force ; but, though skilfully designed and punctually executed, his adversary did not stand quite long enough to allow of its complete development, for the Austrian commander sacrificed his position and the town of Münchengrätz, after a sharp combat, but without a regular battle.

The Prussian leader calculated that if he made a demonstration of a careless march towards Münchengrätz by the high road and railway, the Austrians who

might be on the Muskey Berg would lie there quiet till the heads of his columns had passed their position, in order that their artillery might take the marching troops in reverse, and that he might himself in the meantime turn their position. By the same bait he also hoped to hold his adversaries on the Kaczowberg until their retreat was cut off. To effect this double object the 7th division was to move from Törnau by a road on the south side of the Iser, which at the village of Wschen crosses the road from Podoll to Sobotka, at Zdiar. It was then to take the Austrians on the Muskey Berg in rear, for this hill slopes gently on its reverse side towards a rivulet which forms the little lake of Zdiar. The division was afterwards to push on over the hill and strike the road from Münchengrätz to Fürstenbrück, between the village of Bossin and the former place. On the right bank of the river General Herwarth was to advance from Hühnerwasser on Münchengrätz, cross the Iser, and occupy the town, throwing out at the same time the fourteenth division to his left, which by Mohelnitz and Laukewitz should take in reverse the defenders of the Kaczowberg. The divisions of Horne and Manstein were to push down the main road from Podoll, while strong reserves closed down to Podoll. A division of infantry was to cross at Hubelow and attack the Kaczowberg in front, while a division of cavalry kept the communications open between the divisions on the right bank of the river. A strong division of cavalry was also sent from Törnau to scour the country towards Jicin, in the direction of Josephstadt.

About eight o'clock on the morning of the 28th,



Prince Frederick Charles, with General Von Voigt-Rhetz, his chief of the staff, and General Stülpnagel, his Quartermaster-General, came down to the bridge of Podoll, and almost immediately the Jägers, who formed the advanced guard of Horne's division, crossed the bridge, but not before an opening cannonade in the direction of Münchengrätz told that Bittenfeld was already engaged. On a hill upon the northern bank there was a convenient spot from which to see the whole theatre of the combat, and here the Prussian staff went to watch the course of the action.

There was not a cloud upon the sky, and the sun poured down a tremendous heat ; thick clouds of dust rose from the columns on the road, but this line was only followed by the artillery, the train, and the main body of the regiment. As the Jägers passed the bridge they threw out skirmishers to the right and left, who went in a long wavy line pushing through the standing corn. The cavalry scouts clustered thickly on the flanks of the skirmishers, and horsemen in more solid formation followed in their rear. It was a fine sight ; the long line of rifles extending almost across the valley, felt carefully through the crops. The Uhlans, with their tall lances and fantastic pennants, hovered about the flank, and the heavy masses on the road pushed on steadily behind the centre of the light troops.

But attention was called towards Münchengrätz, where the progress of Bittenfeld's attack could be traced by the puffs of white smoke which rose from the discharges of the artillery. The Prussian cannonade was seen to be slowly advancing, and that of the Austrian to be

retiring, while a heavy cloud of black smoke rising close beside the town showed that the Austrians had retired from the right bank of the river and had burnt the bridge. For a short time the fight was stationary, but in about a quarter of an hour a bright flash of flame and a much heavier smoke rising from the Austrian line told that an ammunition waggon had exploded. Their battery then ceased firing, and rapidly retired, while a quick advance of the Prussian cannonade showed that Bittenfeld's pioneers had quickly thrown their bridge, and that his corps was across the Iser. But the Austrians did not go far, for in a short time they were again in action in the direction of the Jung Bunzlau road, and one battery was drawing off towards Fürstenbrück. It then seemed that Bittenfeld had halted; the cannonade ceased in this direction. The view of the Muskey Berg from the position occupied by the staff is extremely beautiful, but it was not the sandstone cliffs of the opposite mountain, nor even the advancing Prussians in the plain, that General Voigt-Rhetz, the chief of Prince Frederick Charles's staff, was so carefully scanning with his glass,—he saw a group on the highest point of the cone of the Muskey Berg which looked like a general's staff, and he smiled quietly as he saw his adversaries getting entangled in the toils which had been so carefully woven for them. The heads of the Prussian columns were some way past the hill, and were pushing steadily towards Münchengrätz, when the well-known puff of smoke rising from the dark firs on the Muskey Berg plateau showed that the Austrians had opened fire upon them. The battery on the hill did not appear to be of more than four guns,

and at first they fired slowly, nor did they do much execution. Their shells, projected from so great a height, went straight into the ground, and did not ricochet among the troops; but they were well aimed, and in most cases burst at the proper moment, and every now and then a man went down. As soon as the Austrian guns opened fire the troops in the road were turned into the fields, and moved on in open order; the train waggons were also hurried on to the softer ground, and halted separately where best concealed. Four Prussian batteries quickly opened fire, but the Austrian guns stood high, and the height of the hill deceived their aim; at first their shells fell short, but soon they got the range; still the fir-trees and rocks protected the Austrian gunners, and the batteries in the plain seemed to do little execution.

Orders were soon sent to them to cease firing, for the enemy's guns did not much harass the marching troops, and other means were taken for clearing the hill. A squadron of Uhlans was directed to pass close along the foot of the Muskey Berg, so that the guns on the plateau could not be depressed sufficiently to hurt them, and were to gain a steep path which leads to the summit between the highest point and Bossin, while an infantry brigade was to support the movement; but before this plan could be carried into execution the seventh division was heard engaged on the reverse side, and the Austrian battery quickly limbered up and retired. The guns were not intercepted by the seventh division, but here General Franzecky made 600 prisoners from the infantry which was on the hill to support the battery. While the seventh division was still engaged behind the Muskey

Berg, four Austrian guns appeared on the summit of the hill, between Bossin and Wessely, and opened fire against the Prussian columns, who were now again advancing over the plain. But Franzecky was pushing towards them, and his artillery threatened to enfilade them, so that they soon had to retire. The seventh division then struck the road between Münchengrätz and Bossin, and attacked the latter village. Bittenfeld had already pushed towards it from Münchengrätz, and supported this attack. The first round of Franzecky's artillery set fire to a house, which began to burn fiercely, and the flames were soon communicated to the next, for most of the cottages in this country are built of wood, which, dried in the hot summer sun, readily takes fire. After a sharp skirmish the Austrians were driven from the village and retired in the direction of Fürstenbrück, and they left here 200 prisoners, and General Herwrath von Bittenfeld had already captured 200. The Austrian soldiers who had been taken chiefly belonged to Italian regiments, and showed no disposition to fight; twenty-five of them in one mass laid down their arms to Lieutenant Von Bülow, who, being one of Prince Frederick Charles's aides-de-camp, was returning from delivering an order, and saw these men separated from their regiment. He collected about half-a-dozen train soldiers and rode up to them, when they surrendered without offering any resistance.

The Austrians made no attempt to hold the Kaczowberg. The only points they attempted to defend were the Muskey Berg, Münchengrätz, and the village of Bossin. They lost at least a thousand prisoners, and about three hundred killed and wounded.

With the occupation of the village of Bossin ended the combat of Münchengrätz, in which by a series of strategical movements, with little fighting, and slight loss—for the Prussian killed, wounded, and missing did not number 100—Prince Frederick Charles gained about 12 miles of country, and took 1,000 prisoners, turned the strong position of the Kaczowberg, and effected his secure junction with the corps of General Bittenfeld.

The head-quarters of the Army of the Elbe and of the First Army were established at Münchengrätz. The majority of the inhabitants had fled from the town ; the army had outmarched its provision trains, and there was nothing to be bought in the place. On account of actual necessity the soldiers were allowed to take what eatables they could find in the place, but little had been left, for the Austrian army was there the night before, and their commissariat appears to have been as miserably corrupt as it was in the Italian campaign. The prisoners reported that they had had nothing to eat for two days, and begged for a morsel of bread ; but the Prussian army was hard set itself for provisions, and there was but little to give away. Nor were the Austrian hospital arrangements such as they ought to have been. Twenty-six wounded men were found here when the Prussians marched in, lying in a cottage on a floor covered with blood, untended, with their wounds undressed, and saying that they had had no nourishment for forty-eight hours ; no surgeon had remained with them, nor was their condition reported to the Prussian commander ; fortunately they were discovered accidentally by a Prussian staff officer. Hospital necessities were scarce, but Prussian medical men

were sent to attend them, and application was made to the magistracy of Münchengrätz to supply linen with which to dress their wounds. These are reported to have refused to assist in alleviating the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen, who were shot down in defending the very passage to their own town, till Count Stöhlberg, a Prussian officer of Cuirassiers, roused by their barbarity, drew his sword on the Burgomaster, and threatened him with death unless the wants of the wounded men were attended to, when the necessary materials came forth. The Prussian troops were very weary. They had marched and fought that day (the 28th) over a long distance and in a heavy country. There was little water away from the river, and the soldiers had suffered much from thirst; but they marched nobly. Few stragglers were ever seen, except those who had fallen fainting out of the ranks, and were lying half stupified by the roadside; but none lay long without succour, for the *Krankenträger*, or sick-bearers, hovered with their water-bottles round the flanks and in the rear of the marching as well as of the fighting battalions, and gave a willing aid to all that needed it.

The army of Prince Frederick Charles was now concentrated round Münchengrätz; two divisions were near or in Bossin: a large force covered the left at Zehrow and south of Türrau, and threw its outposts towards Sobotka. The force in front of Prince Frederick Charles was the Austrian first corps d'armée, the brigade Kalik, which had lately returned from Holstein, and the cavalry division of General Edelsheim. To these the Saxon army was joined, and the whole allied force was

under the command of Prince Albert, Crown Prince of Saxony.

By the actions of Liebenau, Hühnerwasser, Podoll, and Münchengrätz, the whole line of the Iser was won by the Prussians, and a great strategical advantage gained. The distance from the Second Army which had on the 27th commenced its advance from Silesia, was still, however, great ; for from thirty to thirty-five miles lay between the left wing of Prince Frederick Charles and the extreme right wing of the Crown Prince : difficulties still existed which had to be overcome before the junction of the two armies could be effected. Count Clam Gallas, on being driven from the line of the Iser, retired to Gitschin, and there took up a defensive position. *Before tracing the means which Prince Frederick Charles adopted to dislodge him from this point, it is desirable to cast a glance over the preceding actions.*

The actions of Liebenau and Hühnerwasser were fought by the Austrians merely as reconnaissances, and may be passed over in silence. But why did Count Clam Gallas neglect to defend Türrnau at all, and hold Podoll with only a single brigade ? It was undoubtedly his object to hold the line of the Iser and to there check his enemy for as long a time as possible. Münchengrätz is, at the most, but twelve miles distant from Türrnau ; he had 60,000 men at his disposal, and could therefore have well held the whole line had he thrown up the necessary intrenchments. It seems, however, that the Austrian general committed the great error of despising his enemy. Had he ranged part of his army on the plateau south of Türrnau and Podoll, broken the bridges at these

places, and thrown up earthworks to impede the passage of the river, and at the same time collected the other part of his force at Münchengrätz, and there made similar defensive preparations, the line of the Iser might, indeed, still have been forced by the Prussians, but only by the employment of their whole strength; and, probably, only after the lapse of a considerable amount of time. Had it been forced, the Austrian retreat from both points to Sobotka would have been secure. Had it not, the Prussians would have been compelled to seek for a passage further to the north at Eisenbrod or Semil, and to have made a flank march in a country which in that direction is broken into ravines and hollows by the spurs of the Giant Mountains. It might be urged against such dispositions that by breaking the bridges Count Clam Gallas would have deprived himself of all chance of assuming the offensive in case of a favourable opportunity. His duty and object, however, was not to crush but to detain Prince Frederick Charles: the defeat of the Prussian First Army was to have been effected by the arrival of Feldzeugmeister Benedek himself with overwhelming forces, before or after having disposed of the Crown Prince.

The Austrian position on the Muskey Berg was tactically strong, but strategically weak. By the surrender of Türrau, Count Clam Gallas exposed the right flank of that position, and allowed his retreat to Gitschin to be threatened.



## CHAPTER III.

### ACTION OF GITSCHIN.

THE fourth Prussian corps, consisting of the seventh and eighth divisions, had been sharply engaged at Podoll and Münchengrätz, and was allowed to halt at the latter place on the 29<sup>th</sup> June. That evening it marched as the reserve of the First Army, which moved from the Iser towards Gitschin by three roads—the left from Türnau by Rowensko, the centre from Podoll by Sobotka, the right from Münchengrätz by Ober Bautzen on Sobotka, while the Army of the Elbe moved on the right wing of the First Army by Unter Bautzen and Libau.

On the evening of the 28<sup>th</sup>, the fifth division was pushed forward from Türnau as far as Rowensko, on the road to Gitschin, where it halted for the night, with the sixth division a short distance in rear of it. The same evening the third division, with the fourth in rear, was pushed to Zehrow, on the road from Podoll to Sobotka; and its advanced guard, consisting of the 14<sup>th</sup> regiment and two companies of the second Jäger battalion, in the course of the night occupied the defile of Podkost, after a sharp skirmish.

On the afternoon of the 29<sup>th</sup>, the fifth division broke

up from Rowensko at two o'clock, and advanced towards Gitschin. The third division, which had a longer march before it, left Zehrow for the same place at mid-day.

The distance from Türnau to Gitschin is about fifteen miles; from Münchengrätz to the same town about twenty miles; and Podoll to Podkost about six miles.

Four roads lead from the town of Gitschin, almost towards the four points of the compass; that of the north to Türnau, of the west to Sobotka, of the south to Kosteltz, and of the east, but bending southwards, to Höritz. From the Kosteltz road to the Türnau road runs, about three miles' distance from Gitschin, a semicircular range of steep broken hills; on their slopes and summits spruce and silver firs grow in thick woods which occasionally reach down into the cultivated ground. Here and there upon these hills are patches of corn or cloverland, while at various intervals there are little villages, which generally consist of ten or twelve large wooden cottages separated from each other, and standing in orchards. Near the foot of the range of hills the ground is much broken up by shallow ravines and gullies.

The Austrian first corps and the Saxons held an excellent position along this range of hills, the right flank of which rested on Eisenstadt, and the left on the Anna Berg, a prominent elevation on the south side of the Sobotka road. In the centre were the heights of Brada, which had been strengthened. The reserve was drawn up between these hills and the town of Gitschin.

Where the road from Sobotka passes through the hills they dip down so as to form a narrow pass, and the fir forests on each side run down close to the road. On the

Sobotka side of the woods there is a ravine about 100 feet deep, but with banks not so steep but that the road can descend and ascend them in a direct line. A quarter of a mile from this ravine, and nearer Gitschin, the road drops again into a similar hollow, but here the forest has retired from the side of the *chaussée*, and the ground is covered with standing crops, among which fruit trees are thickly studded. At about the same distance further on towards the town, a third break in the ground causes another sharp undulation of the roadway. On the Gitschin side of this hollow ground, partly on the bank, but more on the brow of the slope, and on the more level country beyond, stands the little village of Lochow, forming a clump of houses with low walls, but having high thatched roofs, which just rise above the tops of the orchard trees that cluster closely among and around the cottages. A quarter of a mile beyond the village lies the last break in the ground, for beyond this a flat plain stretches to the little river which, passing the town of Gitschin on its Lochow side, falls into the Iser near Türrnau. This last ravine is rather deeper and wider than the others; at the bottom there is a rivulet, which the road, after descending the Lochow bank, crosses by a low stone bridge, and then runs straight up the opposite side of the nullah, as it might be termed in Indian phrase, to gain the level plain.

The 2d corps of General Von Schmitt, which marched from the neighbourhood of Podoll, struck at Sobotka the road from Münchengrätz to Gitschin. General Von Schmitt there changed the direction of his march to the left, and advanced towards Gitschin. He moved

with his two divisions at some distance apart; that of General Von Werder, or the 3d division, led the way. Von Werder's advanced guard consisted of the 2d battalion of Jägers and the 3d battalion of the 42d regiment. In the rear of these followed the three battalions of the regiment of the late King of Prussia (the 2d), the two remaining battalions of the 42d, and one battalion of the 14th regiment, with one six-pounder and two four-pounder field batteries.

A strong Austrian force held the wood behind the first ravine, with its sharpshooters behind the trunks of the fir-trees, with the view of compensating for the inferiority of their rifle to the Prussian needle-gun. Behind each marksman two soldiers were placed, whose only duty was to load their rifles and hand them to the picked men to whom the firing was entrusted. The Austrian artillery was placed behind the wood, so that it could bring a cross-fire on the opening in front through which the *chaussée* passes, and strike heavily on the Sobotka bank of the ravine and the open country beyond. As the Prussian advanced guard approached the ravine, the Austrian batteries opened fire upon them, and the marksmen from behind the trees also soon commenced a biting fire. The Jägers and the men of the 42d quickly spread out as skirmishers, and, regardless of the withering fire to which they themselves were exposed, showered bullets from their quickly-loaded arms against the defenders of the wood, while some of their artillery, quickly brought into action, tried to silence the Austrian guns. But the fight was unequal, the sharpshooters behind the trees could rarely be seen, and the

fire of the Prussians did not tell much upon their concealed enemies ; nor were their guns in sufficient force to engage successfully the more numerous Austrian pieces. The Jägers from among the trees were aiming well ; the men of the 42d were falling fast, and it seemed that the defenders would be able to hold the wood. But the rest of the Prussian division was coming up ; more artillery was already in action ; and the Austrian gunners began to fire with less effect. The regiment of the King of Prussia soon arrived. The Prussian soldiers, unable to make much impression with their fire on the riflemen in the trees, were already anxious to come to close quarters, and then General Von Werder sent his men forward to take the woods with the bayonet. They were carried, but not without loss, for the Austrians retired from tree to tree, and only when pressed beyond the last skirt of the wood retired under cover of their guns and reserves to take up a position on the further brow of the next ravine. The musketry fire recommenced. The opponents stood on either bank of the hollow, and poured volley after volley into each other's ranks, while the artillery, from positions on the flanks of both lines, sent their shells truly among their adversary's infantry. But here the needle-gun had more success, for the Austrians stood up clear against the sky, and soon the white uniforms began to go down quickly. No troops so ill-armed could have stood before the murderous fire which the Prussians directed against the opposite line. The Austrians did all that men could do ; but, after losing fearfully, were obliged to fall back, and take up their third position in the village of Lochow, and on the Anna

Berg. The 42d regiment and the second Jäger battalion were sent against the Anna Berg, while the 2d and the 14th attacked the village.

It was now about seven o'clock in the evening; the combat had already lasted almost two hours, but here it was renewed more fiercely than ever. The Prussians, encouraged by their success—brave soldiers and bravely led—eagerly came to the attack. With hearts as big, and with officers as devoted, the Austrians stood with a desperate calmness to receive them. On both sides the fighting was hard; but at any distance the Austrian rifle had no chance against the needle-gun, and at close quarters the boyish soldiers of the Kaiser could not cope with the broad-shouldered men of Pomerania, who form the corps d'armée, one division of which was here engaged. Yet for three-quarters of an hour the little village of Lochow was held, and the continuous rattle of the rifles and the heavy cannonade of the guns remaining almost stationary told the determination of the assault and the stoutness of the defence. But the Austrians were slowly forced from house to house and from orchard to orchard, and had to retreat to their last vantage ground on the top of the Gitschin bank of the fourth ravine.

And here both sides re-engaged in the fight with the utmost fury. The defenders felt that this was their last standing point, and on its maintenance depended the possession of Gitschin; the assailants knew that success here would almost certainly bring them to the object of all their exertions. The Prussian line soon formed on the top of the opposite bank to that held by the

Austrians, and then began to fire rapidly against the brow where the Austrians stood. The latter returned the fire, but from necessity more slowly; still their guns smote the Prussian troops heavily, and the shells bursting in front of the assailants' line, caused many casualties. But the Pomeranians were highly excited, and it is said that a heavy mass of the Prussians dashed down the road and rushed up the opposite slope with their rifles at the charge. A fierce struggle ensued. The strong men of Pomerania pressed hard against their lighter opponents, and pushed them beyond the brow of the slope on to the level plain; yet the lithe and active Austrians fought hard, and strove to drive their bayonets into the faces of their taller antagonists; but strength and weight told, for their more powerful adversaries urged them back foot by foot till a gap was clearly opened in the defenders' line. The musketry bullets had also told sharply on the Saxons and Austrians, and they were obliged to retire. They drew off across the plain towards Gitschin, but not in rout; slowly and sullenly the Saxon rear-guard drew back, suffering awful loss in the open plain, where the needle-gun had a fair range; but they fought for every yard of ground, ever turning to send among the advancing Prussians shots which were often truly aimed, but which formed no sufficient return for the showers of bullets which were rained upon themselves. For long the plain was the scene of the advancing combat, and it was not until near midnight that General Von Werder occupied Gitschin. In the town the Austrians did not stand; they held some houses at the entrance for a short time, but these

were carried, and then they retired rapidly towards the south. In their haste they left their hospitals, and here, as in Lochow, Von Werder's division took a large number of prisoners.

But this was not the only combat that evening. On the northern side of Gitschin the Austrian position extended beyond the Törnau road, to cover the town against the Prussians advancing from the direction of Törnau. The range of hills which runs round the north-western side of Gitschin drops with a steep slope down to the Törnau road, near the village of Brada, and sends out a much lower prolongation of the range which runs at right angles to the direction of the road, and beyond it, as far as the river that passes by Gitschin and joins the Iser near Törnau. Over this lower spur the road runs, and on its summit lies on the Prussian right of the road, and close to it, the village of Podultz; while further to the right and on the top of the high hills is the village of Brada, standing about 300 yards further southwards than Podultz.

The 5th division, under General Tümpling, on the afternoon of the 29th, advanced from Rowensko, and about half-past four o'clock came within 2,000 yards of the village of Podultz. His division consisted of the 8th, 12th, 18th, and 48th regiments, with four batteries of artillery. As the Prussians advanced they saw the village of Podultz close to the road, and on their right, standing on the top of the gentle ascent by which the road rises to the top of the lower spur, on the other side of the road, and about three hundred yards from it nearer to the advancing division by two hundred yards



than Podultz, the village of Diletz lying in the plain ; while high on their right they could see the chimneys of Brada above the thick fir wood which, lying on the hill side, in front of that village, runs down nearly to Podultz, and trace by the different colour of the foliage the ground occupied by its orchards.

The three villages and the fir wood were held by Austrian and Saxon troops, supported by seven batteries of artillery, which were placed both on the spur and on Brada hill, while behind the spur were hidden three of Austria's finest cavalry regiments—the hussars of Radetzky, of Lichtenstein, and of the Austrian regiment of the King of Prussia. In front of the village of the Brada and of the fir wood an abattis was constructed which ran down the steep slope nearly as far as Podultz. As soon as the Prussians came within range the Austrian batteries opened upon them ; the Prussian guns replied, and under the cover of their artillery the columns advanced to the attack of the position. The 8th and 48th regiments advanced against the village of Diletz, which was garrisoned by the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Saxon battalions, and where, as the prisoners reported, the Crown Prince of Saxony himself took part in the fight. The Fusilier battalion of the 48th engaged the garrison of the village, while the rest of the regiment with the 8th turned towards Eisenstadt, but were sharply attacked by an Austrian column, and driven back to Zames. Both columns were exposed to a very hot fire. After a severe struggle both villages were carried, though that of Podultz, set on fire by a shell, was burning when the Prussians occupied it. Then General Edelsheim, who

commanded the Austrian cavalry, with a desperate valour attacked the burning village, but the horses would not face the flames, and the Prussian infantry from behind the blazing houses fired on the disordered squadrons and killed many troopers. After taking Podultz the 12th and 18th regiments pushed past Brada, leaving it to their right, and made for the Lochow road, in order to cut off the retreat of the Austrians, who were retiring from Lochow on Gitschin. The Austrian cavalry charged the advancing Prussians, but the latter received them without forming square, and the horsemen recoiled broken by their steady fire. The Austrian troops in Brada and the Saxons and Austrians in Diletz were quite separated by the capture of the village of Podultz, and the former were almost entirely taken ; the latter were cut off from retreat in large numbers, for Von Werder was pressing towards Gitschin, the roads were crowded, and the little river formed on the right of the broken allies a wide extent of marshy ground, which it was almost impossible to cross. The loss of the Saxons between Diletz and Gitschin was tremendous ; they fell thickly, and the ground was covered with corpses. The Prussians suffered much, but they fought most bravely, and, with only four regiments and half as many guns as their opponents, carried a very strong position held by a much superior force ; for the Prussians had in the field but 16,000 men, and the allied strength in the first line was estimated at 30,000. Under a crushing fire they advanced to the attack of Podultz and Diletz, and the vacancies in the muster-roll show how fearfully they suffered ; but every man who fell on the Prussian side was trebly avenged,

and a long broad track of fallen enemies marked the line of march of the four regiments who fought near Diletz. But though the Austrian position was strong, it was badly occupied. The troops on the hill of Brada seem to have been so enclosed in their defensive works that they could make no counter attack on the Prussian columns engaged at Podultz, nor could they attack in flank the 12th and 18th regiments as they passed. Many officers fell on both sides. General Tümpling, who commanded the Prussian division, was wounded, fortunately not severely.

The field of Diletz was thickly strewn with killed and wounded. Here the Prussians lay more thickly than at Lochow, for the more numerous artillery of the defenders ploughed with terrible effect through the dense columns of the assailants as they advanced to the attack. But between Diletz and Gitschin the ground was covered with broken arms, knapsacks, shakos, and fallen men, who were mostly either Saxons or Austrians, for here the needle-gun was more used than artillery.

The Prussians took about 7,000 prisoners in the two combats, many officers, and the Austrian loss in killed and wounded was about 3,000, so that the actions of that evening withdrew 10,000 soldiers from under the Austrian colours.

The Prussian head-quarters were moved to Gitschin. The town had been almost entirely deserted by the inhabitants, the streets were filled with military carriages and marching troops, while a Prussian garrison bivouacked under the colonnade which runs all round the market-place.

On the afternoon of the 30th, the strategic object of the movements of the two Prussian armies was achieved, for communications were opened in Bohemia between Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince. A regiment of dragoons sent from Gitschin that day to feel for the Second Army found the advanced troops of the Crown Prince at Arnau, and sent back intelligence that he had secured the passages of the Upper Elbe at Arnau and Königinhof. The Ziethen regiment of hussars in the front defeated an Austrian regiment, and captured a convoy of about fifty waggons on the same day.

Count Clam Gallas sent to Benedek to announce the defeat of his force at Gitschin, his incapability of any longer holding the First Prussian Army in check, and that he was retreating hastily on Königgrätz. This report reached the Austrian commander-in-chief early on the morning of the 30th, and had an important effect on the dispositions which he was making against the army of the Crown Prince. It is now necessary to trace the course by which the Second Army gained the position in which its outposts were found by the cavalry of Prince Frederick Charles on the 30th June.

## BOOK VI.

### CHAPTER I.

#### PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.

THE First Army and the Army of the Elbe, united under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, on the 30th June opened communication in Bohemia with the Second Army, which had marched through the mountains from Prussian Silesia, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia. It is necessary now to follow the steps by which the Crown Prince brought his army successfully through the passes of the Sudetic Hills.

The Crown Prince had been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Second Army on the 19th May, and on the 2d June was also named Military Governor of Prussian Silesia. On the 4th June he moved his head-quarters from Berlin to that province. The Second Army consisted of the corps of the Guards, and the first, fifth, and sixth corps d'armée of the Line.

When the Crown Prince assumed the command in Silesia, he fixed his head-quarters at the Castle of Fürstenstein. At this time the fifth corps lay round Landshut, the sixth round Waldenburg, the cavalry division





round Striegau, and the first corps, which was on the line of march from Görlitz, was moving to Hirschberg and Schönau. The independent corps, under General Knobelsdorf and Count Stolberg,<sup>1</sup> had pushed detachments close up to the Austrian frontier. The fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, Cosel, and Glogau were armed, and new fortifications were thrown up round Schweidnitz.

As has been already noticed, the Army of Silesia in the course of the second week of June, in order to deceive the Austrian commander, and to secure the safety of Prussian Silesia against a hostile invasion, took up a defensive position, on the 10th of that month, near the fortress of Neisse, behind the line of the river of that name. At the same time the corps of the Guards joined the Second Army from Berlin, and was posted at Brieg, but left one division to watch the passes of the mountains on the west of the county of Glatz, and to keep open the communications with the First Army, which was near Görlitz.<sup>2</sup>

At this time six of the Austrian corps which Feldzeugmeister Benedek held at his disposal were posted in Austrian Silesia and in Moravia. Political events developed themselves rapidly. The decree of the Diet, the declaration of war by Prussia against Saxony, and the irruption of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld and of Prince Frederick Charles into that country, followed each other in quick succession. The Saxon army retired into Bohemia, and the Austrian troops began moving towards Josephstadt.

On the evening of the 19th of June, the Crown Prince

<sup>1</sup> See page 193.

<sup>2</sup> See page 166.



received orders from the King, through General Von Moltke, the chief of the staff of the army, to leave only one corps on the Neisse, to move the first corps to Landshut, and to station the two other corps in such positions that they might be ready, either in conjunction with the first corps, to move into Bohemia, in order to effect a junction with the First Army, or, if it were necessary, to be equally ready to strengthen the corps on the Neisse.

As the Austrian troops kept moving into Bohemia, it became hourly more probable that the Prussian Second Army would be required to cross the mountains into that province. In order to lead the Austrian staff to believe that this movement was not contemplated, the sixth corps was drawn entirely to the left bank of the Neisse, and received orders that it should, immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, make a strong demonstration against the Austrian frontier in that direction. Officers were at the same time sent to prepare quarters for all the corps on the right bank of the Oder, as if a general movement in that direction was intended.

On the evening of the 20th June, a further order came from the King, which directed the Crown Prince to send intimation in writing to the commanders of the several Austrian outposts, that Prussia considered Austria's bearing at Frankfort as a virtual declaration of war.

As soon as the existence of war between the two great Powers was actually recognised, the Crown Prince issued the following general order to his troops :—

“*NEINKE, 20th June.*”

“**SOLDIERS OF THE SECOND ARMY!**—You have heard the words of our King and Commander-in-chief! The attempts of his Majesty to

preserve peace to our country have proved fruitless. With a heavy heart, but with strong confidence in the spirit and valour of his army, the King has determined to do battle for the honour and independence of Prussia, and for a new organization of Germany on a powerful basis. I, placed by the grace and confidence of my royal father at your head, am proud, as the first servant of our King, to risk with you my blood and property for the most sacred rights of our native country. Soldiers! for the first time for fifty years a worthy foe is opposed to our army. Confident in your prowess, and in our excellent and proved arms, it behoves us to conquer the same enemy as our greatest King defeated with a small army. And now, forward with the old Prussian battle-cry—'With God, for King and Fatherland.'

(Signed)

"FRIEDERICH WILHELM."

On the 22d of June the Crown Prince received from the King the order to prepare to assume the offensive in Bohemia, in order to join the First Army in the direction of Gitschin.

This order had been anticipated by the Crown Prince. On the previous day he had sent a letter by post, to request permission from the King to move towards his right. At the same time he expressed a wish to be allowed to send the sixth corps, which had been ordered to remain near Neisse, into the county of Glatz. By this disposition the sixth corps would both be available for the defence of its native province, Silesia, and, if necessary, could more easily be joined to the main army than from its previous position.

On the 23d June the Crown Prince received by telegraph permission to move the sixth corps as he desired. He had, however, on the 22d, already acted before receiving this permission. That day he sent the sixth corps from Neisse in the direction of Olmütz. This corps crossed the Austrian frontier, and moved through-

the highland border districts of Friedberg, Freywalde, and Zuchmantel, while the soldiers everywhere spread the news that they formed the advanced guard of the entire army of the Crown Prince. Some slight skirmishes between the advanced guards and some Austrian hussars ensued without much damage to either side. In consequence of this demonstration, however, Feldzeugmeister Benedek held the second and third Austrian corps between Hohenmauth and Bömisch Trübau in such a position that they could not be opposed to the Prussian columns at the point where the latter really crossed the frontier. On this day, the 22d June, the head-quarters of the Crown Prince remained at Neisse; the fifth corps was in the neighbourhood of Ottmachau; the corps of the Guards was drawn together round Münsterberg; the first corps was at Landshut, the sixth corps, as already stated, over the Austrian frontier, and engaged in its demonstration against Austrian Silesia.

The Second Army was now moved into positions which would facilitate its irruption into Bohemia; and on the 25th June, its one hundred and twenty-five thousand warriors were posted, so that the first corps was at Schömberg, the Guards at Schlegel, the fifth corps between Glatz and Reinerz, the first brigade of the sixth corps at Glatz, and the remainder of the sixth corps at Patschkau, the cavalry division at Waldenburg. On the same day the Crown Prince changed his head-quarters from Neisse by way of Camenz to Eckersdorf.

The staff of the Crown Prince knew that the Austrian first corps and the army of Saxony were engaged against Prince Frederick Charles, and that the second Austrian

corps had pushed forward towards the county of Glatz. It was, therefore, correctly argued, that only four Austrian corps could be opposed to the Prussians in issuing from the mountains; but even under these circumstances the march of the Army of Silesia through the passes was exposed to great difficulties, and to considerable danger.

The county of Glatz forms a salient bastion of hills in the highland frontier between Prussian Silesia and Bohemia. From Glatz four great roads lead into the Imperial dominions: the first on the north-west by Wünschelburg to Braunau, the second on the west by Reinerz to Nachod and Josephstadt, the third on the south by Mittelwalde to Gabel and Wildenschwert, the fourth on the south-east by Wilhelmsthal to Altstadt. On the east of the county of Glatz, a road runs from Neisse by Ziegenhals and Würbenthal in the direction of Olmütz, and on the west of the county a road runs from Landshut by Liebau to Trautenau and Josephstadt. The passage of the frontier by the Second Army had necessarily to be effected by one of these six frontier passes. The strategical intention of effecting a junction as soon as possible in Bohemia with the First Army, determined the selection of the three roads to Trautenau, Braunau, and Nachod, the directions of which also afforded to the Army of Silesia the advantage of being able to make its advance in three columns, which could afford to each other mutual assistance in case of any one being attacked by the enemy.

The roads on either flank were good. That by Reinerz and Nachod led through a defile five miles in length, and it was only beyond Nachod that troops who marched

through it could deploy. The pass to Braunau in the centre had the advantage that the Bohemian frontier at this point advanced for a space of twenty miles. In consequence of this geographical configuration it was the least liable to be blocked or broken up by the enemy, and the troops that marched by it were the least likely to be impeded in their formation after debouching. They would consequently be available to support either of the flank columns in case of opposition being made to their issue from the mountains. After passing the mountains, the junction of the Army of Silesia with that of Prince Frederick Charles could only be effected by a flank move to the right. In order to facilitate this subsequent movement, the plan of the passage of the army of the Crown Prince was determined as follows:—The right wing, which consisted of the first corps, was to move, followed by the cavalry division, from Landshut by Liebau on Trautenau. The fifth corps on the left was to occupy the pass of Nachod. The corps of the Guards in the centre was to move by the intermediate road from Wünschelburg on Braunau, in order to act as a reserve to either of the flank corps, or if necessary to occupy the pass of Eypel. The sixth corps was to remain for a short time on the south of the fortress of Neisse, but as soon as possible was to be withdrawn from this position and to be advanced to Reinerz to support the fifth corps. The protection of Upper Silesia was handed over to the detachments under Count Stolberg and General Knöbelsdorf. After passing the mountains the whole army was to make a wheel to its left, pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, to seize the railway from Josephstadt to Tür-

nau, and along that line gain its junction with the First Army.

To carry out the preliminaries of this plan, on the evening of the 26th June the first Prussian corps was stationed at Landshut with its advanced guard at Liebau. The guards occupied Münsterberg with advanced posts at Frankenstein and Silberberg. The fifth corps was at Ottmachau with its advanced guard at Lewin. The main body of the sixth corps was near Zuchmantel.

The Austrian commander thought that he had secured the left wing of his whole army by the first Austrian corps and the Saxons under Count Clam Gallas, and on the 26th June held his remaining forces in the following positions :—The tenth Austrian corps was at Pilnikau, the fourth at Königinhof, the sixth moved that day from Opocna to Skalitz, the eighth was in rear of Josephstadt, the second further south in reserve, and the third round Bömisch Trübau.

It is naturally difficult to say what was the intention of Feldzeugmeister Benedek: if, however, he had the idea of at any time assuming the offensive, he ought to have with might and main attacked the heads of the Prussian columns with overwhelming masses as they issued from the mountains. He was bound at any cost to prevent the passage of the fifth corps, which was the pivot of the Prussian army, and on the same terms to defeat the first corps and the Guards before they could reach the line of the Aupa. It must have been on the defeat of the army of the Crown Prince that he depended to be able to assume the offensive with superior numbers against the First Prussian Army and the Army of the Elbe.

Early in the afternoon of the 26th of June, the first Prussian corps was concentrated near Liebau, the corps of the Guards round Wünschelburg, and the fifth corps at Lewin.

That evening the heads of the columns of the Guards pushed across the frontier at Tunschendorf and Johannisberg, under the direction of the Crown Prince in person. The troops cheered loudly as they stepped upon Austrian ground without opposition. Some detachments of the third regiment of Uhlans of the Guard had a little beyond the frontier a skirmish with some of the Austrian Windischgrätz dragoons and Mexican Uhlans, in which the Prussians are reputed to have had the advantage. Certainly Austrian prisoners and captured horses were brought into the Prussian head-quarters, and the cavalry of the Second Army acquired the idea that it was fully equal if not superior to the horsemen opposed to it. The Guards bivouacked that night between Politz and Braunau.

On the left wing, the fifth corps the same evening was pushed forward towards the frontier in the direction of Nachod. The bridge over the little river Metau, which forms here the boundary line, had been broken; and as the Prussian scouts approached the river, two Austrian vedettes with two infantry sentries could be made out hidden behind some willow-trees at the Bohemian end of the bridge. These were dislodged by a few Prussian Jägers, who forded the river and pushed on in pursuit. At a toll-house about four hundred yards further on they were checked by the fire of two Austrian field-guns, and were driven back to the river, where the Prussian pioneers were already engaged in the repair of the broken bridge.

Two Prussian guns were quickly brought up, and after a few shots being exchanged the Austrian pieces withdrew, with their escort of two squadrons of cavalry and about ninety foot soldiers. General Löwenfeld, who commanded the leading division of the fifth Prussian corps, sent his Jägers in pursuit, and secured without opposition the town of Nachod, and the strong castle which about three quarters of a mile from the Metau covers the issue of the pass, and could have been easily held, by a handful of determined men, for at least two days against the whole Prussian army.

After these preliminary movements on the 26th, on the 27th commenced the series of brilliant operations by which the army of the Crown Prince wrestled its way through the mountains.



## CHAPTER II.

### PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT AND CENTRAL COLUMNS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.

THE first corps, which formed the right column of the army of the Crown Prince, was under the command of General Von Bonin. This officer ordered his advanced guard to advance from Liebau at four o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and to follow the road by Golden-Oels to Trautenau. At the latter town it was to halt until the main body arrived at Parschnitz in the road between Schömberg and Albendorf, then it was to move forward upon Arnau. The reserves of infantry and of artillery were to follow the advanced guard, the reserve of cavalry the main body.

The march commenced. Hostile dragoons were descried in front of the heads of the columns, but did not yet attack. The main body first came up to the advanced guard, which had halted at Parschnitz at eight o'clock, about ten, when the latter was ordered to move forward, and soon commenced

#### THE FIRST ACTION OF TRAUTENAU.

The town of Trautenau lies on the river Aupa, in a basin almost surrounded by mountains: by the river the ground is wet and marshy, on the hill-sides it is rough

and broken, so that it is nowhere particularly favourable for the action of cavalry or artillery.

The great heat made the Prussian troops suffer much from fatigue and thirst on their march, and they were weary when they reached the town of Trautenau. But the Austrians were in the town, and General Von Bonin was forced to attack them, as his road to join the Crown Prince, who was with the left column, led through Trautenau. The head of the advanced guard broke down the barricade on the bridge over the Aupa. The infantry fight soon began in the streets, and the Austrians were pushed back gradually from house to house. But the Austrians reinforced their troops, and then maintained their position, till the Prussians, calling up more battalions, again got a little the better of the combat. Both sides suffered heavily, and the Prussians gained ground but slowly, for from every house and from every corner hidden marksmen poured bullets into the ranks of the battalions that tried to push along the streets. When all the Prussian reinforcements had arrived, a general attack was made, and the Austrians were pushed out of the houses into the open country beyond. The Prussians pursued and followed step by step their slowly-retreating enemies. Beyond the town one of Austria's most celebrated cavalry regiments, the Windischgrätz dragoons, stood waiting to sweep the Prussian battalions from the open ground if they issued from the shelter of the houses. These dragoons have long held a high reputation, and, for a record of brave deeds done by the regiment, alone in the Austrian army wear no moustache. The Prussian infantry could not advance, and it seemed that the

houses of Trautenau had been won in vain. But assistance was at hand. The 1st regiment of the Prussian dragoons came trotting along the main street, deployed into line almost as they debouched from the town, and with their horses well in hand, and their sword-points low, bore in a steady canter straight down upon the Austrian cavalry; these did not wait inactive to receive the attack, but rushed forward to meet their foes; no shots were exchanged, not a saddle was emptied till the close. When within a few yards of each other, both sides raised a cheer, and, welcoming the hug of battle, the two lines rushed upon each other. Horse pressed against horse, knee against knee, swords went up quick and came down heavily on head-piece or on shoulder, points were given and received, blows quickly parried were returned with lightning speed; here an Austrian was borne to the ground, there a Prussian was sent reeling from his seat, and for a few minutes the mass of combatants swayed slowly backwards and forwards. But then, as if some mighty shell had burst among them, the Austrian soldiers flew scattered from the *mêlée*, and the Prussians riding hard after them drove them from the field, but themselves being under the fire of small arms suffered a heavy loss.

The Austrian infantry, which consisted of Mondel's brigade of the tenth Austrian corps, formed on a hill called the Capellenberg, which afforded a strong position beyond the town. This hill could only be scaled by the assailant infantry with great difficulty. Notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of the ground, and the strong resistance of the defenders, the right wing of the Prussian

advanced guard under Colonel Koblinski, which consisted of two battalions of the 41st regiment and a company of Jägers, gained the Capellenberg between twelve and one o'clock. The Austrians retired a short distance. The Prussian commander ordered eight battalions to advance from Parschnitz, cross the Aupa, and attack the right flank of the Austrian position. These battalions had great difficulties to encounter: the wooded hills close to the Aupa could only be traversed in extended order, and as soon as the open ground was gained they suffered much from some hostile skirmishers concealed in the standing corn.

Notwithstanding these disadvantageous circumstances, they gained ground. About three o'clock the advanced guard seized the village of Hohenbruck, south of Trautenau, and the brigade on the left wing occupied the heights on the west of the road from Trautenau to Rognitz. It was now three o'clock, the Austrians had retired, and General Von Bonin considered that the action was over.

The retreat of the Austrians had, however, been but a tactical manœuvre, and for once in the history of war a tactical retreat resulted in an advantage to the general who had made it, though even in this case the gain was only of a temporary nature. About half-past three o'clock the action began again. General Gablenz, who commanded the tenth Austrian corps, had advanced from Pilnikau with his whole force, and at that hour made a heavy attack on the Prussian troops, who were already weary with a hot march and a lengthened combat. General Gablenz directed some of his battalions against

the Prussian front, and with others made a movement against General Bonin's left flank. At half-past four o'clock the Austrians recovered Hohenbruck, and at five the Prussian troops commenced their retreat.

In order to cover this movement General Barnekow, with the 43rd Prussian regiment, occupied the commanding hills and plantations which lie on the north of the Capellenberg, supported by the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers, which was posted on the hills lying further back. The 43rd stopped the Austrian pursuit, though with great loss to its own strength, for an hour and a half, but they had to be withdrawn a little after six o'clock. The grenadiers again brought the Austrians up, and stayed their advance until all the Prussian troops had gained an unpursued retreat.

General Von Bonin had intended to hold the line of the Aupa on the north of Trautenau, but General Gablenz pressed upon him, and he was forced to continue his retreat to the same position as he had occupied on the morning of the day of the action, keeping his rear-guard at Golden-Oels, about three miles from Trautenau.

The cavalry division of the army, which was to have followed the first corps through the mountains as soon as the defile was cleared, remained at Schömberg.

The first Prussian corps lost in this action, in killed and wounded, sixty-three officers and twelve hundred and fourteen men; the Austrian tenth corps, according to Austrian returns, lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and five thousand five hundred and thirty-six men; a terrible disparity in numbers! The Austrian infantry, with a muzzle-loading arm, had indeed gained a victory

over an enemy equipped with a breech-loading weapon, but at such a sacrifice as made success almost as costly as defeat.

General Gablenz did not pursue beyond Trautenau. He kept his advanced guard there for the night, and bivouacked at Neu-Rognitz. His corps was considerably shaken by its victory, of which it was soon to be deprived by the fortune of war.

The corps of the Guards had crossed the Bohemian frontier at Steinethal on the evening of the 26th, and had pushed forward the second division by Braunau, as far as Weckelsdorf. On the 27th June this corps was to move in a south-westerly direction, in order to open the communication between the first corps, which was advancing against Trautenau on the right, and the fifth corps at Nachod on the left. At mid-day the first division of the Guards was to march on Eypel. At Qualitch, the general commanding this division hearing the heavy firing at Trautenau halted, and sent an offer of assistance to General Von Bonin. Then the Prussian infantry of the first corps, advancing on the road beyond Trautenau, were everywhere pressing the Austrians back, when a staff-officer came up to the commander of the first corps, and told him that the Prussian Guard was ready to come to his assistance. General Von Bonin thought his victory already secure, and declined the proffered aid. For another four hours he did not want it; for the Prussians kept advancing slowly, steadily, pressing the Austrians back, but at four o'clock large reinforcements of artillery came up upon the Austrian side, and General Von Bonin ordered his retreat.

The first division of the Guard corps, ignorant of the failure of the first corps at Trautenau, continued its march, and in the evening reached the neighbourhood of Eypel, on the Aupa, while the second division moved to Kosteletz, about five miles to the south-east of that place. The reserve artillery and heavy cavalry were still one day's march in rear. The Prince of Würtemberg, who commanded the Guards, received in the night intelligence of the result of the action at Trautenau, and of the retreat of the first corps towards Liebau. He immediately gave orders that at daybreak the next morning his corps should cross the Aupa, attack the corps of General Gablenz, and thus disengage the first Prussian corps, and restore the broken communication with General Von Bonin. According to the disposition of the Prince of Würtemberg, the first division of the Prussian Guard was to advance by Eypel, in a westerly direction, and the second division to move from Kosteletz to Eypel, to serve as a support to the first division. The first division, under General Hiller, defiled over the Aupa at Eypel on the 28th June, at five in the morning, and threw out cavalry patrols in the direction of both Trautenau and Königinhof. These patrols discovered that General Gablenz was bivouacked with the main body of his corps at Neu-Rognitz, about two miles south of Trautenau, and that he held the latter town with a strong advanced guard. His position was therefore pointed northward against the first Prussian corps, and his right flank was now threatened by the advance of the Guards from Eypel. The Prussian patrols also discovered that the baggage of the corps of General Gablenz was drawing

off towards Königinhof, but was still five miles distant from that town. Under these favourable strategical conditions, the first division of the Guards received orders immediately to advance by Standenz, to attack the enemy in the direction of Königinhof, while the second division, as a reserve, was advanced beyond the defile of Eypel. At the same time two battalions of the Franz Grenadiers were sent forward towards the north-west against Trautenau, in order to cover the right wing of the advance. These dispositions led to the

#### ACTION OF SOOR.

General Gablenz desired to change his front to the right, in consequence of finding his right wing thus threatened. To cover this evolution he ranged his whole artillery, covered by Knobel's brigade, on the hills between Neu-Rognitz and Burgersdorf. In this he succeeded, and extended his right wing to Prausnitz, where he gave his hand to Fleischacher's brigade of the fourth Austrian corps, which had been sent to his assistance. The advance of the two Prussian grenadier battalions against Alt-Rognitz threatened, however, to cut off from him the brigade which he had posted in Trautenau.

The Prussian advanced guard, under Colonel Kessel, which consisted of four battalions of the Fusiliers, one company of the Jägers of the Guard, two companies of the pioneers of the Guard, the fourth squadron of the hussars of the Guard, and one 4-pounder battery, came upon the Austrian position before the whole of General Gablenz's guns were formed. It was, however, received by a hot fire from twenty-four pieces, which



had already taken up their position. The single Prussian battery engaged these guns with considerable rashness, while the infantry attacked the plantations west of Standenz, and drove the Austrian position slightly in.

Soon the guns of General Gablenz were all in position, and sixty-four pieces opened a withering fire on the six Prussian guns, which, however, held their ground, though with great loss. While the Fusiliers and the Jägers of the advanced guard sought to gain some ground, some of the battalions of the Prussian main body, under General Alvensleben, came up, and hurried into the action wherever they were most required. Next arrived the first and second battalions of the Fusiliers, and the second company of the Jägers of the Guard, who moved in the direction of Burgersdorf and Alt-Rognitz. After these followed the second regiment of Grenadiers, and with them came a very welcome field-battery, which immediately opened fire to support the only Prussian battery as yet in action. Burgersdorf and the plantations near it were now captured by the Prussians, and at that moment the rest of the Prussian infantry and the remainder of the artillery came into play. The action then became general. The Prussian infantry advanced, and stormed the rising ground on which the Austrian battalions stood, but at an awful sacrifice; men fell every moment, and officers went down so quickly that hardly a company reached the summit commanded by its captain. But the Guards pressed on, and the Austrians had to retire from position to position, while the Prussians advanced steadily, urging them backwards. The Austrian corps of Gablenz was then defeated, for the troops could not rally under

the fire of the needle-gun, and every battalion which retreated was routed.

The two Prussian battalions which had been detached towards Trautenau to cover the right wing had been during this time heavily engaged. As they moved towards Trautenau, some columns were seen advancing towards them. It was uncertain at first whether these were some of the troops of the first Prussian corps, or some of the Austrians from Trautenau. The doubt was soon dispelled. As they approached, it became clear that, while three of the Austrian brigades of the corps of General Gablenz were resisting the front of the Prussian attack, the remaining brigade, that of Grivicics, had been ordered to sally from Trautenau against the Prussian right wing, and to it the advancing columns belonged—a movement which, but for the precautions of the Prince of Würtemberg, would have had an important influence on the action. The two Prussian battalions withstood the attack of this brigade with the greatest courage. The greater part of the officers and one-third of the soldiers of these battalions were laid on the field, either dead or dying, but they held their ground until the second division of the Guards, which had been held in reserve, could hurry up to their assistance. This division coming up, drove the brigade of Grivicics back into Trautenau, cut it off from the main body of Gablenz's corps, stormed the town, and captured there a stand of colours and over three thousand prisoners.

General Gablenz withdrew the rest of his corps along the road to Königinhof. The Prussians were too much fatigued to pursue in force: and the Austrian brigade of

Fleischhacker, which belonged to the fourth corps, was allowed to pass the night at Soor unmolested as a rear-guard, while the first division of the Prussian Guards bivouacked opposite to it at Burgersdorf. The next morning this brigade also retired at daybreak towards Königinhof. The Guards had but eleven hundred men killed and wounded in this action. The Austrians left behind them five thousand prisoners, three standards, and ten guns.

By the successful issue of this action the communication with the first corps which had been broken on the 27th by its failure at Trautenau, was completely re-established.

On the morning of the 29th, the Crown Prince caused the first corps, which had been defeated at Trautenau on the 27th, to march past before him through that town, where the victory of the Guards on the 28th had opened a free passage for it.

*The Guards on the 29th moved from Burgersdorf and Trautenau, on Königinhof and Rettendorf. Early in the morning of that day, one of the regiments issuing from Burgersdorf had a skirmish with some detachments of scattered Austrians who had been cut off from their corps, and passed the night in the woods.*

As the advanced guard of the first division of the Guards approached Königinhof, it again fell in with the army, and a combat ensued which terminated in the

#### CAPTURE OF KÖNIGINHOF.

The advanced guard of the first division of the Guards, consisting of four battalions of fusiliers, two companies of Jägers, and two field batteries, broke up from Burgers-

dorf at mid-day on the 29th, and were ordered to advance and occupy the town of Königinhof. The brigade of Fleischhacker, which belonged to the fourth Austrian corps, was posted as garrison of the place, and had drawn up several infantry columns, covered by skirmishers, in the corn-fields on the north of the town. The Prussian riflemen quickly engaged them : the slow shots of the muzzle-loading arms did little execution against the rapid discharges of the needle-gun, and these advanced columns were soon driven to seek shelter in flight. The defence of the houses was entrusted to the Austrian regiment of Coranini, and here took place a hot contest, for this gallant corps defended each yard of every street, and each window of every house. The fusiliers of the Prussian Guards pressed on, overthrew their opponents in the streets, and, dashing past the loopholed houses, occupied the bridge over the Elbe. The majority of the defenders were still in the town, and were completely surrounded. Nothing was left to them but to lay down their arms. The Prussians here captured four hundred prisoners and two standards.

The weak remnant of the Coranini regiment retreated to Miletin. The Prussian Guards were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Königinhof, and the first Prussian corps advanced to Pilnikau.

Feldzeugmeister Benedek had in the meantime drawn the second Austrian corps to the vicinity of Josephstadt. It arrived, however, too late to aid in a defence of the line of the Elbe at Königinhof. That important point for the passage of the river was already in the possession of the Prussian Guards, when, on the 30th June, Count Thurn

appeared with this corps on the heights south of the Elbe, at Königinhof. This Austrian general could do nothing more than open an ineffectual cannonade against the Prussian corps of the Guards, on the 30th June. That day one division of the latter corps bivouacked near Gradlitz, on the left bank of the Elbe, about two miles out of Königinhof, and the same day the first Prussian corps advanced to Arnau, on the river, about seven miles to the north of the same place.

It is now necessary to trace the passage of the left column of the Crown Prince's army through the mountains, and to show how, on the 30th June, it was able to effect a junction with the right and central columns on the bank of the Elbe.

## CHAPTER III.

### ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA.

To the fifth Prussian corps, which formed the head of the left column of the army of the Crown Prince, was the most difficult task given. Only one narrow road leads from the county of Glatz to Nachod, which beyond the Bohemian frontier runs in a winding course near the town of Nachod, through a difficult defile. A corps d'armée, with all its trains and baggage advancing by one road, forms a column of march twenty miles long. If only the combatants themselves and the most necessary train, such as ammunition columns and field hospitals, form the columns, it still will stretch over ten miles; so that if the head of the column is attacked as it issues from a defile where the troops cannot move off the road, the rearmost battalion will not be able to support the most advanced until four hours have passed.

In order to insure the safe issue from the mountain passes, the advanced guard of the fifth corps, under General Von Löwenfeld, was pushed forward as far as Nachod on the evening of the 26th June. The Austrians held the defile with a very weak force, and did not stand obstinately in the Castle of Nachod, so that the Prussian

advanced guard occupied that strong post with very slight opposition. General Ramming, who had been posted with the sixth Austrian corps and a portion of the first division of reserve cavalry at Opocna, about ten miles to the south of Nachod, marched on the 26th towards Skalitz, by order of Feldzeugmeister Benedek. He was intended next day to fall upon the head of the Prussian fifth corps as it issued from the pass, and drive it back into the defile. At the same time the eighth Austrian corps under the command of the Archduke Leopold was posted on the railway to Josephstadt, in order to act as a reserve to General Ramming. The next day the advanced guard of the Prussian fifth corps brought on the

#### ACTION OF NACHOD.

On the 27th, the same day that the first corps was defeated at Trautenau, as the advanced guard of the fifth Prussian corps d'armée was, about ten o'clock in the morning, moving out of Nachod towards Skalitz, it was suddenly assailed by a heavy fire from the Austrian artillery, and two Austrian cuirass regiments drew up across the road to bar the way against the Prussian infantry. These were supported by two Austrian infantry brigades, while a third stood in the rear as a reserve. The Prussians were then in a dangerous position, for the road through the defile of Nachod behind them was choked with the carriages of the artillery, and only a few battalions and two squadrons had gained the open ground. General Von Löwenfeld, who commanded the advanced guard, threw his infantry into a wood which was beside the road, where, protected by the trees to a certain extent from the shells

of the Austrian guns, they maintained their position until their artillery had cleared the defile. At the same time the small body of Prussian cavalry who were with the infantry charged straight down the road against the centre of the line of the cuirass regiments. The Austrians numbered eight times as many sabres as the Prussians, and their cavalry bore the highest reputation in Europe. All expected to see the Prussians hurled back, broken and destroyed, by their collision with the Austrian line, but the result was far different ; the Prussian squadrons thundered down the road, and seemed merely by the speed at which they were galloping to cut clean through the centre of the line of Cuirassiers ; but, though they were thus successful in their first onslaught, they were quickly assailed in flank and rear by overwhelming numbers, and with difficulty escaped without being cut to pieces. Many, however, managed to shake themselves free from the *mêlée*, and, galloping back, rallied under the protection of the fire of their infantry in the wood ; but the Austrians pressed forward, and they had to retire ; and it seemed that the issue of the defile would be lost, for Austrian infantry were quickly coming up, and were preparing to attack the wood held by the Prussians. Then upon Löwenfeld's battalions depended not only the safe passage of the fifth corps through the defile, but also the preservation of the whole of the artillery, for so crowded with carriages was the road that, had the Austrians pressed on, every gun and waggon must have fallen into their hands. But the infantry proved worthy of the trust placed in them, and nothing availed to dislodge them from the trees, though the shells went whistling in quick



succession through the trunks, and the splinters carried away the branches above the heads of the soldiers, and tore up the turf beneath their feet.

The Crown Prince was in Nachod when the firing commenced, but he pushed his way with difficulty through the crowded defile, and came to his advanced guard in order himself to be with his soldiers in their time of trial. Behind him followed as quickly as possible the battalions of the main body of the corps, and the guns of the artillery were also pushed forward ; but the road was long and crowded, and both regiments and guns made their way with difficulty. In the meantime the Austrians pressed hard upon the little band in the wood, and seemed as though they would pass it by, and close the defile with their columns. But before they could do so the battalions of the main body gained the end of the defile, and the Prussian guns began to come quickly forward, for waggons and all encumbrances had been pushed off the road into the ditches to facilitate the free passage of the troops going into action. The newly-arrived troops reinforced those in the wood, and the artillery replied to the Austrian batteries ; but at noon the battle was still stationary, and the Prussians had not advanced their position since the beginning of the fight, for the Austrian cavalry stood prepared to charge the Prussian infantry if it attempted to move forward on the open ground. The Crown Prince knew that on breaking that cavalry line depended the passage of the fifth corps into Bohemia, and he sent against it the eighth Prussian regiment of dragoons, and the first Uhlan regiment. It was an exciting moment. The Prussians, nerved by the importance of the issue of

their charge, and with the eyes of their infantry upon them, sprang forward readily : the Austrian horsemen, proud of their high renown, and eager to wipe out the memory of the former skirmish, also bounded forward as soon as they saw the Prussians approaching. The two lines met about half way, for one moment formed a tangled struggling crowd, and then the Prussian Uhlans, with their lance-points low and heads bent down, were seen pursuing. The most famous cavalry in Europe had been overthrown.

Before and during this charge both divisions of the fifth Prussian corps had cleared the defile, and scarcely had the effect of the cavalry charge been seen than General Steinmetz, who commanded the whole corps, determined to assume the offensive. Then, in rear of their cavalry, the Prussian infantry and artillery dashed forward. Some of the battalions turning aside, marched against the village of Wisokow, already in flames from a Prussian shell, with their bayonets at the charge. Among the burning houses the Austrians waited for them : a sharp struggle ensued, but the village was carried, and the Austrians were driven out of it.

In the meantime the Austrian heavy horsemen had rallied, and again returned to the charge. This time they advanced with skill as well as courage, and bore down on the flank of the Uhlans ; but their approach was seen, and before they reached the Prussian line it had quickly changed its front, and met the advancing squadrons face to face. Again the Austrians recoiled, but now without a chance of rallying ; they were broken and scattered, and the Uhlans, spreading out in pursuit, went dashing in

small knots over the plain after them, and captured two guns from their horse artillery. This cavalry charge decided the fortune of the day, and the Austrians retired, pressed by the Prussian infantry. General Steinmetz, who commanded the fifth corps, which was here engaged, led forward all his troops, leaving only three battalions of the royal regiment in reserve, and pushed the enemy back. But his men, after a long march and a severe action, were too fatigued to pursue in mass, so they were halted, and the cavalry and one or two battalions alone followed up the pursuit ; but they did well, for they brought back 2,000 prisoners and three guns, besides the two taken by the Uhlans ; and these were not the only trophies, for three sets of infantry colours were taken by the Prussians, and the standards of the Austrian cuirassiers fell into the hands of the Uhlans. The Crown Prince thanked General Steinmetz on the field in the name of the King for the victory, and well the general and his troops merited the compliment, for all the first part of the action was fought with twenty-two battalions against twenty-nine, and with an inferior force of cavalry and artillery.

This victory cost the Prussians a loss of nine hundred men killed and wounded ; among the latter were the two generals, Von Ollech and Von Wunck. The fifth Prussian corps, notwithstanding that on the 27th it had marched over fifteen miles through a narrow defile, and been engaged in action for eight hours, was still so strong and so confident that General Steinmetz resolved to resume the attack the ensuing day without loss of time.

General Ramming, who had deservedly the reputation

of being one of the most able and talented generals of the Imperial army, after having engaged the Prussians at Nachod, with his whole force retreated to Skalitz on the evening of the 27th. On arriving at that place he sent a despatch to the head-quarters of the army, in which he requested that the eighth Austrian corps, which was posted at Josephstadt, might be allowed to assist him with two brigades. Feldzeugmeister Benedek thereupon ordered that the eighth corps should advance to Skalitz, and be prepared to engage in the first line, while that of General Ramming should form its reserve. One brigade of the Prussian sixth corps, which was to follow the fifth corps through the defile of Nachod, had reached Nachod on the evening of the 27th, and was ready that day to advance with General Steinmetz. General Steinmetz determined to advance. At the same time the Austrian General Ramming, who had been reinforced by the eighth corps, also advanced from Skalitz in order to drive the Prussians back into the defile of Nachod. Hence arose the

#### ACTION OF SKALITZ.

The Austrians were soon forced to quit the offensive, and to assume the defensive energetically in front of Skalitz, on the road and railway, which are flanked on the north and south by two woods. The country was entirely unfavourable for the action of cavalry. Either side brought up as much force as possible. The battle swayed hither and thither, but ultimately the superior strength and armament of the Prussian soldier told against his weaker antagonist.

On the north of the railway the 37th and 58th Prus-

sian regiments and the 12th brigade advanced ; while on the south the King's own regiment, though exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, gained the wood on the south of the town, and here succeeded in sustaining the assaults of far superior numbers, until the 46th and 52d regiments could come up to its aid, and join with it in an attack on Skalitz.

The Austrian position was forced, and the Archduke Leopold compelled to fall back to a strong position behind the Aupa, where he intended to hold his ground, supported by his numerous artillery. This position was however also carried by the Prussians, after hard fighting, and by it they gained the command of the defile of the Aupa.

General Steinmetz, by this victory, captured four thousand prisoners, eight guns, and several stands of colours. On this day, the 28th, depended whether the Army of Silesia would effect its issue from the mountains, or fail in the attempt. The corps of the Guards was engaged at Trautenau, the fifth corps at Skalitz. The Crown Prince, in person, could not be present at either action. He was obliged to choose a position between the two, whence he could proceed to any point where his presence might be necessary. He accordingly posted himself on a hill near Kosteletz, where the heavy cavalry of the Guard took up its position on coming through the hills, and where it was joined at a later period of the day by the reserve artillery of the Guard. The time passed heavily on that hill of Kosteletz. The thunder of cannon rose ever louder from Skalitz on the south, and from the direction of Trautenau on the north. With anxious ears

the Commander-in-chief and his staff listened to the progress of the cannonade, and with eager eyes scanned the positions of the eddying clouds of white smoke which rose from the engaged artillery. It was the intention of the Crown Prince, if an unfavourable report of the progress of the action on either side was brought to him, to repair to that point, and in person to encourage his pressed troops. But every orderly officer, every aide-de-camp, brought the intelligence that the battles in both places were going well for the Prussians.

At last, between three and four o'clock, the Commander-in-chief received the positive report from General Steinmetz that he had stormed Skalitz, and driven back two of the enemy's corps. No longer had the Crown Prince to give a thought to this side. He immediately started for Eypel, in order to be present at the action in which the Guards were engaged. At this place the news reached him that the Guard had also victoriously achieved its task, and not only had forced the defile from Eypel, but had also opened the pass from Trautenau. Here, then, were the three issues from the mountains, the defiles of Trautenau, Eypel, and Nachod, popularly called the gates of Bohemia, in the secure possession of the Second Prussian Army, and the junction of the hitherto separated corps almost certain to be effected on the following day. To accomplish the junction of his united army with that of Prince Frederick Charles, the Crown Prince ordered the advance the next morning to be made as far as the Elbe.

The quarters of the Crown Prince on the night of the 28th were fixed at Eypel, where he heard for the first

time that the first corps had only returned on the 27th from Trautenau to their former bivouac, and were fit to advance again on the 29th, having halted there on the 28th. The report of General Von Bonin had not before reached head-quarters, and all that was heard of the first corps was that it had not assisted the Guards in the action of the 28th.

The Crown Prince immediately ordered General Von Bonin to advance at daybreak on the 29th, from Trautenau to Pilnikau.

On the 29th June, General Steinmetz was to advance from Skalitz in a westerly direction, towards Königinhof, in order to approach the other corps of the Crown Prince, so that the whole Army of Silesia might be united on the Elbe before commencing general operations in concert with the First Army. Fresh forces of the enemy opposed this march, and took post in a situation which caused the

#### ACTION OF SCHWEINSCHÄDEL.

The Austrian troops, which here opposed the advance of the Prussian fifth corps, were those of the fourth corps, under the command of General Festetics, whom Feldzeugmeister Benedek had sent forward from Jaromirz, after he had withdrawn the 6th and the 8th corps. Of this corps there were present only three brigades, for one brigade had been detached to Königinhof, where on the same day it was engaged in an action against the leading battalions of the Prussian Guard, as has been already noticed. General Steinmetz attacked, and after an action of three hours, which consisted of little more than a can-

nonade, the Austrians were driven back, and retreated under the guns of the fortress of Josephstadt, which opened hotly upon the advancing Prussians. General Festetics made his retreat in good time, in order not to suffer a loss similar to that which had befallen the other Austrian corps which had been engaged at Trautenau and Skalitz. Early as he retired, however, he lost eight hundred prisoners.

General Steinmetz, after pushing the retreating Austrians close up to Josephstadt, did not venture to press further in this direction, as by pursuing such a course he would have been exposed to be cut off and isolated from the other corps of the Crown Prince.\* He detached, accordingly, one brigade, to observe the garrison of Josephstadt, and moved the remainder of his corps to Gradlitz, about two miles east of Königinhof, in order to concentrate with the rest of the Army of Silesia. He arrived there on the night of the 29th June, and took up a position near the division of the Guards, which was already stationed there.

The sixth Prussian corps, which followed the fifth corps by the defile of Nachod, from the county of Glatz, had only sent forward one brigade to aid the corps of General Steinmetz in the actions of the 28th and 29th June. It reached Gradlitz, however, late on the 30th June, so that now three corps of the Army of Silesia were concentrated in the vicinity of Königinhof. The first corps had reached Arnau, where there is also a bridge over the Elbe, about seven miles to the north of Königinhof. Thus the army of the Crown Prince, four days after its inroad into Bohemia, had successfully united its divided



columns of advance, and had made itself master of the line of the Elbe from Arnau to near Josephstadt. Four Austrian corps had been repulsed, three of which were decidedly defeated, and had lost ten thousand prisoners, twenty guns, five colours, and two standards to the Crown Prince.

On the 30th June a cavalry regiment, sent out from Gitschin by Prince Frederick Charles, fell in with the outposts of the corps of the Crown Prince at Arnau. Communications between the two main armies was now established in Bohemia, and their secure junction almost certain. For the sake of simplicity, it may be here advisable to give briefly a general sketch of the steps taken each day by the two armies from the time of their crossing the Austrian frontier to bring about their common concentration.

#### SUMMARY OF THE ADVANCE OF THE THREE PRUSSIAN ARMIES INTO BOHEMIA FOR CONCENTRATION.

On the 23d June, the army of Prince Frederick Charles advanced in three columns from Zittau, Górlitz, and Laubau, towards Reichenberg.

The same day the Army of the Elbe advanced from Saxony.

On the 24th, Prince Frederick Charles occupied Reichenberg, and concentrated his three columns, which had passed through the mountains.

On the 26th, the advanced guard of the fifth corps (Army of Silesia) seized Nachod in the evening, and the Guards crossed the frontier of Bohemia by the Wünschelburg road.

The same evening Prince Frederick Charles secured the passage of the Iser at Törnau and Podoll, and the Army of the Elbe occupied Hayda and Böhmisch Aicha.

On the 27th, the first corps of the Crown Prince's army seized Trautenau, but was defeated and driven back by General Gablenz.

The fifth corps of the Crown Prince's army defeated General Ramming in the action of Nachod.

The Army of the Elbe, after a skirmish, occupied Hühnerwasser.

On the 28th, the Army of the Elbe and Prince Frederick Charles defeated the corps of Count Clam Gallas at Münchengrätz, and secured the line of the Iser.

The Guards, under the Crown Prince, defeated General Gablenz at Soor, and cleared the issue from the Trautenau defile for the first corps.

The fifth corps defeated the Archduke Leopold at Skalitz.

On the 29th, the Guard corps stormed Königinhof; and the fifth Prussian corps drove General Festetics from Schweinschädel. The Crown Prince concentrated his army on the left bank of the Elbe.

The army of Prince Frederick Charles that night stormed Gitschin.

On the 30th, communications were opened between the army of Prince Frederick Charles round Gitschin and the first corps of the army of the Crown Prince at Arnau.

## OBSERVATIONS.

For some reason, political or military, Benedek did not assume the offensive. He threw this advantage into the hands of his adversaries. It is supposed that political causes and the request of the Germanic Confederation prevented the Austrian general from taking this line of action, and carrying the war into Saxony.

After having determined to fight on the defensive, he intended to check one portion of his enemy's armies with a detachment, while with superior forces he threw himself upon the other. The lines of operation of the Prussian armies, convergent from separate bases, gave him a favourable opportunity to reap successful results from such a course. He could either send a detachment to hold Prince Frederick Charles while he assailed the Crown Prince, or could hold the latter while with the mass of his army he threw himself upon the former. To hold the Crown Prince, however, while he attacked Frederick Charles was much more hazardous than to adopt the alternate line. The Crown Prince, if he beat the detachments left to bar his way, could sweep down upon the Austrian communications with Vienna ere Benedek had laid his grasp upon the First Prussian Army. If this had been his intention, he should have held the Castle of Nachod and the passes at Trautenau and Eypel. If, on the other hand, he intended to delay Frederick Charles, the line of the Iser should have been tenaciously held between Türrau and Münchengrätz. None of these things were done. Inferior forces of the Austrians were

exposed at almost all points to superior forces of the Prussians ; while the masses, which cast at the proper moments to either side would have turned the scale, oscillated vaguely backwards and forwards under vacillatory or contradictory orders.

On the evening of the 26th June Benedek knew that the Crown Prince was on the frontier, and that Prince Frederick Charles was close to the Iser. His corps at this time were stationed, the tenth at Pilnikau, the fourth at Königinhof, the sixth near Skalitz, while of the three others two were south of Josephstadt and one as far off as Böhmisches Trübau.<sup>1</sup> On the 27th, after Türnau on the Iser had been evacuated without a blow by Clam Gallas, and the passage of that stream at Podoll stormed by Frederick Charles, Benedek appears to have made no movement to support with his reserves his corps at Nachod or Trautenau against the Crown Prince, or to send reinforcements to Clam Gallas.

On the 28th, the Crown Prince determined to retrieve the misfortune of his right on the previous day, by energetically attacking the position of the Austrian corps ; while at the same time the fifth corps, supported by the sixth, should move against Skalitz. Benedek had had only two corps engaged on the previous day. One of these had been defeated at Nachod, and driven back to Skalitz, but had by no means been routed. The other had well held its own and had repulsed its assailants. As yet the Austrian commander had lost nothing so important that he might not hope, by vigorous action on the 28th,

<sup>1</sup> The authority for the Austrian movements has been chiefly derived from private sources, as no official publications have yet been made at Vienna.

to gain a decided success, and with one blow to turn the fortune of the campaign, and the destiny of Austria.

The first Prussian corps was not on the morning of the 28th sufficiently recovered from its repulse on the previous day to engage at all. The fifth corps was able to engage, but was supported only by one brigade of the sixth, because the three remaining brigades of that corps were still in the defile through the mountains.

Thus, the Crown Prince had only the two divisions of the Guard corps, the fifth corps, and one brigade of the sixth corps ready to go into action on the morning of the 28th,—in all about 67,000 men.

General Benedek ought to have known on the 27th by daybreak, that he had nothing to fear in the direction of Olmütz, for the demonstration of the sixth Prussian corps made in that direction on the previous day had been withdrawn. He could therefore on the 27th have moved the third corps from Böhmisches Trübau to Josephstadt that day, and would then have had six corps, about 150,000 men, ready to push into action energetically on the morning of the 28th, and with them to drive the Crown Prince back into the defiles. This great opportunity, however, was missed. The sixth Austrian corps at Skalitz was indeed reinforced by the eighth; but the tenth corps was left without reinforcements at Trautenau, so that, although he had a force at hand double that of his adversary, on the morning of the 28th only three corps, about 70,000 men, were placed in position to come under fire.

It is natural to inquire why Benedek did not employ on the 28th the three corps which did not come into action that day. The reason, as far as yet can be

gathered, from the meagre details which alone Austrian official secrecy has allowed to creep out, appears to be, that Benedek made the vital error of attempting to check the Crown Prince when he was already past the defiles, and in a position to threaten the Austrian communications, with a detachment, while he directed his principal blow against Prince Frederick Charles. At this time the distance between the two Prussian armies was about forty miles. They were too far separated to afford each other mutual assistance. The distance from Benedek's headquarters<sup>1</sup> to the Iser was nearly fifty miles ; that from the same place to Skalitz, about eight miles ; to Trautenau about twenty. At the two latter places the Crown Prince was thrusting against the Austrian detachments. The Prussian Second Army was thus at less than half the distance from the mass of Benedek's troops than was the First Army. It was also in a more favourable position to sweep down on a vital point of Benedek's line of communication with Vienna than was the First. Clearly every exertion should have been made to crush the Crown Prince on the 28th. The Feldzeugmeister, however, designed to hold the Crown Prince by three corps while he made his great attempt against Frederick Charles. Orders were sent to the commanders of the corps at Trautenau and Skalitz, not to compromise themselves in a serious action, but to retreat slowly, if pressed by superior numbers. These orders were neglected. If they had been observed, it is doubtful whether the Crown Prince would not have pushed them back, and concentrated his army on the Austrian communications, before Benedek

<sup>1</sup> Josephstadt.

had time to strike down Prince Frederick Charles, and return with his main force to support his troops in front of the Second Army. The result of the neglect of the orders of the Commander-in-chief was, however, that the three Austrian corps engaged on the 28th near Josephstadt were severely mutilated for further operations. Intending to support Clam Gallas and the Saxons before he knew of the unfortunate issue of the combats of Nachod and Skalitz, Benedek instructed them to stand firm at Gitschin ; and promised to support them with his third corps on the 29th, and ultimately with other corps. This despatch was received at the Saxon head-quarters about mid-day on the 29th. The Saxons and Clam Gallas took up a strong position to fight at Gitschin. When they were already engaged, and had compromised themselves in a serious action with the leading divisions of Prince Frederick Charles, a second despatch arrived from Benedek. This had been written after the results of Trautenau and Skalitz on the 28th were known to him. In it he ordered the Crown Prince of Saxony to fall back slowly before Prince Frederick Charles, while he himself collected his forces on the heights above Königinhof to oppose the Second Army. By the crushing defeat at Gitschin, the left flank of this position was laid open to the Prussian First Army, and the Austrian commander was reduced to make fresh dispositions, unable any longer to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies on the ground upon which at the outbreak of hostilities he himself stood. Thus, by a neglect to strike boldly on his nearest adversary, Benedek sacrificed all the advantages which he had possessed from a central situation, and the separate lines

of operation of his antagonists. To the superior armament of the Prussians a degree of importance has rather hastily been awarded, which seems not to be wholly merited. The needle-gun came into action under certainly favourable circumstances. At Podoll the Prussians armed with breech-loaders fired upon the troops of Clam Gallas while the latter were crowded together in the narrow street of a village. At Nachod the soldiers of Steinmetz fired from the cover of a wood upon their Austrian assailants in the open. In both cases the rapid discharges told fearfully upon the men who were armed with the more slowly loaded weapons. The consequence was that the Prussians gained a great moral victory at the very beginning. They found confidence, their opponents lost heart. Yet in the subsequent operations the difference of armament had little physical effect. Superior strategical capabilities, superior organization, and greater activity seemed to have been more powerful in gaining the junction of the Prussian armies than superior armament. Yet the Prussian leaders hazarded much by their two convergent lines of operation. The result is but another proof of the old maxim that "in war he is the victor who makes the fewest errors."



## BOOK VII.

### CHAPTER I.

#### OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

AFTER his unsuccessful attempts at Soor and Skalitz on the 28th, to prevent the issue of the columns of the Crown Prince from the mountains, Feldzeugmeister Benedek determined to take up a strong position on the right bank of the Upper Elbe, in order to prevent the passage of that river by the Army of Silesia.

The Elbe, which runs in a course nearly directly from north to south between Josephstadt and Königgrätz, forms almost a right angle at the former fortress. Its upper course above that place lies from north-west to east. Parallel to the stream, and about one mile from it, a chain of hills thickly wooded with fir-trees rises with a steep ascent, and forms the southern bank of the valley. About half-way up the hillside runs the railway which leads from Josephstadt to Türau. It was along these heights that the Austrian commander designed to draw up his troops, in such a manner as to bar the passage of the Upper Elbe against the Crown Prince, and to command the bridges of Arnau, Königinhof, and Schurz.

The right wing of the troops under the immediate com-





mand of Benedek rested on the fortress of Josephstadt, and his position extended along the heights towards Danbrowitz, while his extreme left was formed and covered by the first corps and the Saxons under Count Clam Gallas at Gitschin. In Königinhof he left one brigade, and at Schweinschädel three brigades of his fourth corps, in order to check the advance of the Crown Prince while he was making his dispositions. These troops were, as has been already said, driven in by the Prussians on the 29th, when they retired and formed a portion of the new Austrian line near Josephstadt.

On the night of the 29th Prince Frederick Charles stormed Gitschin, and defeated Count Clam Gallas, who retired in disorder towards Königgrätz. The loss of Gitschin exposed the left flank of Benedek's intended position. As soon as he heard the news of Count Clam Gallas's failure on the morning of the 30th, he was obliged to make new arrangements to oppose the advance of the enemy towards Vienna.

Of his eight corps, five—namely, the first corps, the Saxons, the sixth, eighth, and tenth—had been decidedly beaten, and had suffered great loss both in men and morale. The fourth corps had also been under fire and suffered, though to a much less serious extent. Two corps only remained to the Austrian commander which were thoroughly intact. He had no hope of any supports, reserves, or reinforcements. His left flank was exposed, and no course remained open to him except to retire before he was cut off from his line of communication with Vienna, and to accept battle from his adversary in a chosen and prepared position. The Austrian army had suffered

a loss of about forty thousand men since the opening of the campaign in its attempts to prevent the junction of the Prussian armies. Notwithstanding this, its bravery and power of endurance were still great. High hopes were entertained that Benedek's generalship would retrieve all previous failures by a decisive victory.

The Austrian commander felt himself unequal to assume the offensive. He was forced to seek a defensive position, and could choose one in either of two entirely distinct manners. If he desired a purely defensive position he might withdraw behind the Elbe, and take up the line of that river between the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz ; or, what would perhaps have been better, he might have concentrated his army behind the Adler, between Königgrätz and Hohenbruck. Here his left flank would have been secured by the fortress, his right by the Adler, and he would have covered a safe retreat and source of supply in the railway between Pardubitz and Bömisch Trübau. On the other side he might choose a defensive position, where he would still retain the power of assuming the offensive. This appears to have been his object. He hoped in a great battle to repair the misfortunes of the last few days, and then on his side to advance as an assailant. Whether he would have done better to have taken up an entirely defensive position until the confidence of his army was restored is a question which few could decide. He has been blamed for not doing so, but in war success is generally regarded as the sole criterion of merit. Fortune declared against Benedek. He did not reap success.

On the afternoon of the 30th June, he issued orders for

the whole army to retire towards Königgrätz, and to concentrate in front of that fortress. This retreat along crowded country roads was attended with considerable difficulty, and it was not till the night of the 2d July that his whole force was assembled in front of Königgrätz, where it took up a position between that town and the little river Bistritz.

On the Prussian side four divisions of the First Army, and of that of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, had not yet been under fire. Of the Second Army three brigades had not as yet pulled a trigger. The first corps had had time to recruit itself after its defeat at Trautenau, and the remainder of the troops were flushed with victory, high of courage, and eager for battle. In order to complete effectually the junction between the army of the Crown Prince, which on the 30th June had concentrated on the left of the Upper Elbe, with that of Prince Frederick Charles, which, with the Army of the Elbe as its right wing, was halted that day round Gitschin, the Second Army would require to make a wheel to its left, pivoted on Gradlitz. To carry out this movement, on the 1st July the first corps, which formed the right wing of the Army of Silesia, advanced from Arnau to Ober Prausnitz, and threw its advanced guard forward to Zelejow on the road to Miletin. The cavalry division took post at Neustadt. The first division of the Guards occupied Königinhof, while its advanced guard seized the plateau of Daubrowitz, on the bank of the Elbe. The second division of the Guards, the reserve artillery, and the heavy cavalry of the Guard halted at Rettendorf, while the fifth and sixth corps concentrated round Gradlitz. The head-quarters of the

Crown Prince were in Königinhof. The Prussian generals thought that Feldzeugmeister Benedek would accept battle on the left bank of the Elbe, with his flanks resting on the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz, which lie ten miles apart along the river, and with his front covered by the stream ; or that, if he did not do so, he would cross the Elbe at Pardubitz, and take up a position there behind the river.

Under this idea two and a half Prussian corps were held on the left bank of the Elbe both to observe the fortress of Josephstadt and to be prepared vigorously to oppose any attack made from behind the cover of that fortress against the line of communication of the Crown Prince with Silesia.

Prince Frederick Charles, on the 1st July, pushed forward from Gitschin. The Army of the Elbe formed his right wing, and occupied Smidar and Hoch Wessely. The sixth division, with the fifth in its rear, occupied Miletin ; the seventh and eighth, Horitz ; the third and fourth, with the cavalry corps and the reserve artillery corps, were bivouacked along the road from Gitschin to Horitz. The head-quarters of the Prince were at Kammenitz.

The small chateau and village of Kammenitz lie on the northern slope of an isolated hill, which stands on the left-hand side of the road from Gitschin to Horitz, about half-way between the two towns. The head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles were moved here on the evening of the 1st July from Gitschin.

From the hill south of the village of Kammenitz a wide view could be obtained of the undulating plain which, richly cultivated and studded with villages and fir-woods,

stretches southwards for nearly thirty miles. Near to Kammenitz, the smoke of the bivouac fires and the glitter of the sunlight on the piled arms marked the position of the Prussian troops, but no Austrian outposts could be made out. During the march of that day a sudden thunderstorm came on, and the rain fell heavily for an hour; the road, crowded with thousands of waggons and military carriages, ran into ruts under the excessive transport, and the convoys of Austrian wounded, who had been perforce deserted by their retreating friends, jolted painfully along towards the hospitals which had been established at Gitschin. The maimed soldiers suffered much, for every time the waggons rocked some wound was opened afresh, or some bandage came undone, but they bore it patiently, and their guardians did all they could to alleviate their sufferings. The different coloured facings of the wounded told that many Austrian regiments had been engaged in the late combats, for the uniforms of the different infantry regiments could be distinguished, beside those of hussars and riflemen.

On the night of the 1st the main body of the First Army lay between Kammenitz and Horitz. General von Bittenfeld had occupied Smidar on the right flank, and Jung Bunzlau<sup>1</sup> was also occupied in the same direction. The head of the columns of the Second Army had crossed the Upper Elbe, and the whole Prussian force was free for operations in Bohemia, for the Hanoverians had laid down their arms near Erfurth, and there were now no hostile troops in Northern Germany.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the railway between Münchengrätz and Prague.

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. II.



The inhabitants of the towns had mostly fled on the approach of the Prussian army, but the country villagers, unable to afford to pay for transport, had been obliged to remain in their houses. Nor did they suffer by doing so, for the Prussian soldiers behaved well, and there was no plundering where the inhabitants remained. In the towns where there was no one to sell, the commissariat was obliged to take the necessaries of life, for the marches had been long, the roads had been crowded with troops, and the provision trains had not always been able to keep up with the army. But the soldiers never used force to supply their wants. Forage for the horses was taken from the barns of the large landed proprietors, who had deserted their castles and chateaux ; but the men paid for what they had from the peasantry : unable to speak the Bohemian language, they by signs made their wants understood, and the peasantry, as far as lay in their power, supplied them readily, for none were found so ignorant as not to appreciate Prussian coin. The villagers were invariably kindly treated ; no cottages had been ransacked, their poultry yards had been respected, their cattle had not been taken away from them, and, though the women of this province are beautiful, no Bohemian girl had cause to rue the invasion of her country. Yet the inhabitants of a land where a war is carried on must always suffer ; troops must move through the standing corn, cavalry and artillery must trample down the crops ; hamlets must be occupied, defended, and assaulted, and a shell, intended to fall among fighting men, must often unintentionally set fire to a cottage, which, blazing fiercely, communicates the flames to others, and thus a whole hamlet is often

destroyed. Then the ejected cottagers have little hope of anything but starvation, for a vast army with its many hundred thousand mouths eats up everything in the country, and can spare little after its own necessities are supplied to give away in charity. The proprietors of the burnt houses sometimes wandered about the fields dejected and desponding, sometimes stood staring vacantly at the cinders and charred timbers which marked the place where a few days ago stood their homes ; the little money that was given to them by kind-hearted officers might keep off the pangs of hunger for a short time, but was no compensation for the heavy losses they had sustained, for often their cottage and their cowhouse and a little field was all their wealth, and since these were gone and their crop destroyed, they had nothing. The young men even in the country districts had nearly all fled south, frightened by a report that the Prussians would make them join the ranks ; for this report there was never a foundation, for no recruits had been demanded or received in the countries occupied by the armies.

Brilliant success had attended the skilful plans laid for the prosecution of this campaign by the Prussian leaders. The army of Prince Frederick Charles had fought five severe combats without a reverse, and had secured a favourable position in which to fight a great battle. The Crown Prince fought severe actions on the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and had now secured his junction with Prince Frederick Charles, bringing with him as trophies of his victories 15,000 prisoners, 24 captured guns, six stands of colours, and two standards.

The places where there had been fighting did not long

retain the more ghastly signs of the combat ; the wounded were always removed as quickly as the *krankenträger* could work, and though broken boughs, burnt houses, and down-trodden corn marked for a few days the places where the hostile troops had been engaged, the broken arms and castaway knapsacks were soon removed, and the graves dotted among the fields, each with a wooden cross at the head, alone told the spots where soldiers had fallen. And these, too, will soon disappear, for the sun and the rain rapidly diminished the mounds of newly-turned earth, and it will soon be impossible to distinguish the positions of the graves from the other parts of the fields. But this will matter little to those who sleep below. The wounded merited greater commiseration. The hospital resources of the Prussian army had been tasked to the utmost, for more wounded prisoners had been taken than could have been anticipated. Every available house and the churches in Gitschin had been converted into hospitals, but still there was more room required ; nor would the few remaining inhabitants help to assist the wounded Austrian soldiers ; in vain did the Prussian staff entreat, imprecate, and threaten ; the townspeople who were still at Gitschin would not even carry some of the coffee which they had in abundance to give to the wounded, and these from the scarcity of provisions in the army fared badly. As the news spread abroad in the country that the Prussians did not pillage and murder, the people began to return to their houses, but they all appeared to be totally callous to the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. The Austrian medical men and hospital attendants who were captured at Gitschin worked

hard, and were aided powerfully by the Prussian officers, but they had few materials with which to supply the wants of so many; and though none went totally unprovided for, and none were entirely neglected, a little trouble on the part of the inhabitants would have tended materially to the comfort and cure of many.

The inhabitants pleaded as an excuse that the Austrian soldiery had treated them badly, and had pillaged; but this did not seem true, for the houses bore no signs of having been plundered, and if plundering had been allowed in the Austrian army the prisoners would not have had to complain of want of food. Railway traffic was already opened to Münchengrätz, but the army had now left the line of railway, many miles of road separating it from the nearest station; and in those miles of road lay the difficulty of supplying the troops with provisions. The railway trains easily brought enough to any station, but at this time the roads were required for the marching columns, and everything had to give way for the passage of the troops.

The army carried no tents; sometimes at night the soldiers were billeted in villages, but more often slept in the open air. As soon as a regiment arrived at the place where it was to pass the night, the rifles were piled four together resting against each other, and the knapsacks were taken off and laid on the ground beside them. The men quickly lighted their fires and began cooking their rations; a couple of stones or a few bricks formed their field stoves, and their whole cooking apparatus consisted of the one tin can which they carry with them. This serves for both boiling the water for coffee and for

making their meat into a thick soup, which they seem to prefer to roasted food. As soon as it got dark each man lay down to sleep wrapped in his cloak with his knapsack for a pillow, and the muffled figures lay as regularly in the bivouac as they stood in the ranks on parade. The officers lay separate in groups of two or three, and in rear of the battalion the horses were picketed and champed at their bits uneasily all night long, and seldom seemed to lie down. When a village was occupied a rush was made to secure mattresses, but these were only used by the luxurious. The men, as a rule, appeared to prefer straw, and if they could get plenty of it were quite content to sleep in the open air. General and staff officers usually contrived to get into houses, and then there was a heavy drain on the sleeping accommodation of the establishment. One had a pillow, another a mattress, a third a couple of blankets, and beds were made on the floor on the most advanced shake-down principles, but all slept soundly, for the day's work was long and tiring, and the march generally begun at early morning. The proprietors of most of the large houses had not only left them, but had taken most of their furniture with them, so that the temporary occupants were entirely dependent on what little had been left behind, and had to make it up by borrowing from the nearest cottages.

On the 29th June the King left Berlin, and on the afternoon of the 1st July arrived at Gitschin, where in person he assumed the supreme command of the three Prussian armies in Bohemia. It was decided by him that the troops should halt on the 2d July, to recover from the great fatigues they had lately undergone.

A council of war was ordered to assemble at Gitschin, to which Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince were summoned. It was decided that on the 3d the First Army should send a reconnoissance towards Königgrätz, that the Second should send a strong detachment towards Josephstadt, and if possible cut that fortress off from communication with the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek; while the remainder of the troops halted in their actual positions.

These plans were, however, entirely altered within a few hours.

## CHAPTER II.

### BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

WHEN Prince Frederick Charles left Kammenitz on the morning of Monday, the 2d July, to attend the council of war summoned by the King to meet at Gitschin, he sent out two officers to reconnoitre beyond Horitz; both fell in with Austrian troops, and had to fight and ride hard to bring their information home safely. Major Von Ungar, who went in the direction of Königgrätz, escorted by a few dragoons, came upon a large force of Austrian cavalry and Jägers before he got to the little river Bistritz, over which the road from Horitz to Königgrätz crosses, about half-way between those two towns. A squadron of cavalry made an immediate dash to catch him, and he and his dragoons had to ride for their lives; the Austrians pursued, and those best mounted came up to the Prussians, but not in sufficient numbers to stop them, and after a running skirmish, in which Von Ungar received a lance thrust in the side which carried away most of his coat, but hardly grazed the skin, this reconnoitring party safely gained the outposts of their own army. More on the Prussian right the other reconnoitring officer also found the Austrians in force, and

was obliged to retire rapidly. From the reports of these officers, and from other information which Prince Frederick Charles received at Kammenitz on his return from the council of war held at Gitschin, he inferred that the Austrian commander had the intention of advancing the next day from the Bistritz, with the object of attacking the First Prussian Army with superior force, before its junction with that of the Crown Prince was practically effected.

Prince Frederick Charles, in order to secure a favourable position in which to accept this probable attack, resolved immediately to move his army forward beyond Horitz, and sent orders to General Von Bittenfeld to advance with the Army of the Elbe to Neu Bidsow, and be prepared thence to fall upon the left wing of the Austrian column of advance, while he himself assailed its leading divisions. At the same time he sent Lieutenant Von Normand with a letter to the Crown Prince, asking him to push forward in the morning from Miletin with one corps, and attack the right flank of the Austrians while he himself engaged them in front. There was some fear that the Austrian cavalry patrols and detachments which were prowling about would intercept the aide-de-camp and stop the letter, but Von Normand succeeded in avoiding them, and got safely to the Crown Prince's head-quarters at one o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, and rejoined Prince Frederick Charles at four to report the success of his mission, and to bring to the leader of the First Army an assurance of the co-operation of the Second. Had this aide-de-camp been taken prisoner or killed on his way to Miletin, his loss would have pro-



bably influenced the whole-campaign, for on that letter depended in a great measure the issue of the battle.

The commander of the First Army sent at the same time his chief of the staff, General Von Voigt Rhetz, to acquaint the King at Gitschin with the steps he was prepared to take, and to solicit his approval of them. The King expressed his entire approbation of the plan of Prince Frederick Charles, and sent an officer of his own staff to order the Crown Prince to advance in the morning against the Austrian right, not with one corps alone, but with all his available forces. An officer of the King's staff was also sent to General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, with an endorsement of the order already signed by Prince Frederick Charles.

Long before midnight the troops were all in motion, and at half-past one in the morning the general staff left Kammenitz. The moon occasionally shone out brightly, but was generally hidden behind clouds, and then could be distinctly seen the decaying bivouac fires in the places which had been occupied by the troops along the road. These fires looked like large will-o'-the-wisps as their flames flickered about in the wind, and stretched for many a mile, for there were 100,000 soldiers with the First Army alone, and the bivouacs of so great a force spread over a wide extent of country. Day gradually began to break, but with the first symptoms of dawn a drizzling rain came on, which lasted until late in the afternoon. The wind increased and blew coldly upon the soldiers, for they were short of both sleep and food, while frequent gusts bore down to the ground the water-laden corn in the wide fields alongside the way.

The main road from Horitz to Königgrätz sinks into a deep hollow near the village of Milowitz. On the side of this hollow furthest from Horitz, is placed near the road the village of that name, and on the left of the road, on the same bank, stands a thick fir wood. A little after midnight the army of Prince Frederick Charles was entirely concealed in this hollow, ready to issue from its ambush and attack the Austrians if they should advance.<sup>1</sup> Soon after dawn, a person standing between the village of Milowitz and the further hill of Dub could see no armed men, except a few Prussian vedettes posted along the Dub ridge, whose lances stood in relief above the summit, against the murky sky. A few dismounted officers were standing below a fruit-tree in front of Milowitz, with their horses held by some orderlies behind them. These were Prince Frederick Charles and his staff. All was still, except when the neigh of a horse, or a loud word of command as the last divisions formed, rose mysteriously from the hollow of Milowitz.

Until nearly four o'clock the army remained concealed. No Austrian scouts came pricking over the hill of Dub, no enemy's skirmishers were detected in the corn by the side of the high road. Prince Frederick Charles began to fear that the Austrian commander meant to slip away from the encounter, and to steal behind the Elbe, where his right flank would be covered by Josephstadt, from the assault of the Army of Silesia.

<sup>1</sup> The eighth division and cavalry, with the fifth and sixth divisions in rear, were on the left of the road, while the third and fourth divisions

were behind the villages of Bristau and Stracow respectively, in the same hollow.

To hold the Austrian army in front of the Elbe was absolutely necessary for the success of the Prussian plans, and Prince Frederick Charles resolved, with his own army alone, to engage the whole of Benedek's forces, and clinging to the Austrian commander, to hold him on the Bistritz until the Prussian flank attacks could be developed. A few short words passed from the commander of the First Army to the chief of his staff; a few aides-de-camp, mounting silently, rode quietly away; and, as it were by the utterance of a magician's spell, one hundred thousand Prussian warriors springing into sight as if from the bowels of the armed earth, swept over the southern edge of the Milowitz ravine, towards the hill of Dub.

The head of the eighth division was on the main road to Königgrätz, while the third and fourth divisions spread through the corn lands on its right. The fifth and sixth divisions followed the eighth in reserve. A brigade of cavalry served on the left of the eighth division to connect the main army with the seventh division under Franzecky, which had been sent straight from Miletin to Cerekwitz, in order to cover the left flank of the First Army.

About four o'clock in the morning of the 3d July, the army began to advance, and marched slowly up the gentle hill which leads from Milowitz to the village of Dub, two miles nearer Königgrätz. The corn lay heavy and tangled from the rain, upon the ground; the skirmishers pushed through it nimbly, but the battalions which followed behind in crowded columns toiled heavily through the down-beaten crops, and the artillery horses had to strain hard on their traces to get the wheels of the gun-carriages through the sticky soil. At six the

whole army was close up to Dub, but it was not allowed to go upon the summit of the slope, for the ridge on which Dub stands had hidden all its motions, and the Austrians could see nothing of the troops collected behind the crest. Perhaps they thought that no Prussians were near them, except ordinary advanced posts; for the cavalry vedettes which had been pushed forward thus far over night remained on the top of the ridge, as if nothing were going on behind them.

From the top of the slight elevation on which the village of Dub stands, the ground slopes gently down to the river Bistritz, which the road crosses at the village of Sadowa, a mile and a quarter from Dub. From Sadowa the ground again rises beyond the Bistritz, and to the little village of Chlum, conspicuous by its church tower standing at the top of the gentle hill, a mile and a half beyond Sadowa. A person standing that morning on the top of the ridge saw Sadowa below him, built of wooden cottages, surrounded by orchards, and could distinguish among its houses several water-mills, but these were not at work, for all the inhabitants of the village had been sent away, and a white coat here and there among the cottages was not a peasant's blouse, but was the uniform of an Austrian soldier; three quarters of a mile down the Bistritz a big red-brick house, with a high brick chimney near it, looked like a manufactory, and some large wooden buildings alongside it were unmistakeably warehouses; close to these a few wooden cottages, probably meant for the workmen employed at the manufactory, completed the village of Dohalitz.

A little more than three quarters of a mile still further

down the Bistritz stood the village of Mokrovous,—like most Bohemian country villages, built of pine-wood cottages enclustered in orchard trees. The Church of Dohalicka stands midway between Dohalitz and Mokrovous, on a knoll overhanging the river. Behind Dohalitz, and between that village and the high-road which runs through Sadowa, there lies a large thick wood; many of the trees had been cut down about ten feet above the ground, and the cut down branches had been twisted together between the standing trunks of the trees which were nearest to the river, to make an entrance into the wood from the front extremely difficult. On the open slope between Dohalitz and Dohalicka along the ground there seemed to run a dark dotted line of stumpy bushes, but the telescope showed that these were guns, and that this battery alone contained about sixty pieces. Four miles down the Bistritz, from Sadowa could be seen the house-tops of Nechmitz, above which rose the dark fir-woods that clustered round the Castle of Hradek. Looking to the left, up the course of the Bistritz, the ground was open between the orchards of Sadowa and the trees which grow round Benatek, a little village about two miles above Sadowa, except where, midway between these villages, a broad belt of fir-wood runs for three quarters of a mile. Above and beyond these villages and woods on the course of the river, the spire of Chlum was seen; below it a few houses, gardens, and patches of fir-wood; and a little to the left, rather down the hill, the cottages of the hamlet of Cistowes, and on the side of the main road the orchards, and the house-tops of Lipa.





On the extreme left, at the foot of the hills, lay the larger village of Horenowes, above which stood on the bare plateau what appeared to be a large single tree.<sup>1</sup>

The air was thick and hazy, the rain came down steadily, and the wind blew bitterly cold, while the infantry and artillery were waiting behind the brow of the hill near Dub. At seven o'clock Prince Frederick Charles pushed forward some of his cavalry and horse artillery. They moved down the slope towards the Bistritz at a gentle trot, slipping about on the greasy ground, but keeping most beautiful lines; the lance flags of the Uhlands, wet with the rain, flapping heavily against the staves. At the bottom of the hill the trumpets sounded, and in making their movements to gain the bridge the squadrons began wheeling and hovering about the side of the river, as if they courted the fire of the enemy. Then the Austrian guns opened upon them from a battery placed in a field near the village at which the main road crosses the Bistritz, and the battle of Königgrätz began.

Feldzeugmeister Benedek had drawn up the Austrian army to accept battle in this position seen from the Dub hill. His centre lay in front of Chlum, where the hills attain their greatest height; in his front was the marshy stream of the Bistritz. Batteries had been thrown up in some positions favourable for bringing a heavy artillery fire to bear against his assailants, and the ranges of different distances from these batteries marked by poles and barked trees. Little was spared to bring the artillery, the best arm of the Austrian service, into action with

<sup>1</sup> The supposed solitary tree was in reality two trees, but was taken to be one by both Prussian armies, and from the fortress of Königgrätz.



every advantage.<sup>1</sup> The villages were also barricaded and prepared with abattis for infantry defence, but not sufficiently. The right flank of the Austrian position was covered to a certain extent by the Trotina brook, which flows through a deep marshy ravine into the Elbe, but little had been done by the engineer to aid in opposing the passage of this naturally strong feature. The left wing was supported by the wood and castle of Hradek, while the left centre was strengthened by possession of the villages of Probus and Prim. Feldzeugmeister Benedek had formed his army in the following order of battle:—

The Saxons on the left wing held Probus, with an advanced guard in Nechanitz; in rear of them stood the eighth corps, the first light cavalry division, and the second division of reserve cavalry at Prim.

In the centre, the tenth corps was posted round Langenhof, the third corps round Cistowes, and the fourth corps at Maslowed, with a detachment in Benatek.

On the right wing, the second corps and the second division of light cavalry were at Sendrasetz, while on the extreme right flank the *Schwarz-geld* brigade held the Trotina.

As reserves, the first corps was posted on the left of the main road near Rosnitz, the sixth corps on the right of the road on the south of Rosberitz; in rear of these were the first and third divisions of reserve cavalry.

The first shot was fired about half-past seven. The

<sup>1</sup> The great loss of Austrian guns was due to the horses and limbers being sent under cover of the hill out of fire. When the Prussians advanced only the

lightest guns could be saved, and nearly one-third of the Austrian pieces engaged fell into the hands of the victors.

Prussian horse artillery, close down to the river, replied to the Austrian guns, but neither side fired heavily, and for half an hour the cannonade consisted of but little more than single shots. At a quarter before eight the King of Prussia arrived on the field, and very soon after the horse artillery were reinforced by other field batteries, and the Prussian gunners began firing their shells quickly into the Austrian position. As soon as the Prussian fire actively commenced Austrian guns seemed to appear, as if by magic, in every point of the position ; from every road, from every village, from the orchard of Mokrovous, on the Prussian right, to the orchard of Benatek, on their left, came flashes of fire and whizzing rifle shells, which, bursting with a sharp crack, sent their splinters rattling among the guns, gunners, carriages, and horses, often killing a man or horse, sometimes dismounting a gun, but always ploughing up the earth, and scattering the mud in the men's faces. But the Austrians did not confine themselves to firing on the artillery alone, for they threw their shells up the slope opposite to them towards Dub, and one shell came slap into a squadron of Uhlans, who were close beside the King ; burying itself with a heavy thud in the ground, it blew up columns of mud some twenty feet in the air, and, bursting a moment after, reduced the squadron by four files.

As soon as the cannonade in front became serious, the guns of the seventh division began to bombard the village of Benatek, on the Austrian right. The Austrians returned shot for shot, and neither side either gained or lost ground. In the centre, too, the battle was very even ; the Prussians pushed battery after battery into the action,

and kept up a tremendous fire on the Austrian guns, but these returned it, and sometimes with interest, for the Austrian artillery officers knew their ground, and every shell fell true; many officers and men fell, and many horses were killed or wounded. More Krankenträger were sent down to the batteries, and always returned carrying on stretchers men whose wounds had been hastily bound up under fire, but who seemed to be too much stunned to suffer much from pain.

Gradually the Prussian cannonade appeared to get stronger, and the Austrian batteries between Dohalitz and Dohalicka retired higher up the hill, but the guns at Mokrovous still stood fast, and the Prussians had not yet crossed the Bistritz; many guns were now turned on Mokrovous, and at ten o'clock the battery there was also obliged to retire a little.

While this cannonade had been going on, some of the infantry had been moved down towards the river, where they took shelter from the fire under a convenient undulation of ground. The eighth division came down on the left-hand side of the causeway, and, under the cover of the rising in the ground, formed its columns for the attack of the village of Sadowa; while the third and fourth divisions, on the right-hand side of the road, prepared to storm Dohalitz and Mokrovous. A little before their preparations were complete the village of Benatek, on the Austrians' right, caught fire, and the seventh division made a dash to secure it, but the Austrians were not driven out by the flames, and here for the first time in the battle was there hand-to-hand fighting. The 27th regiment led the attack, and rushed into

the orchards of the village ; the burning houses separated the combatants ; they poured volley after volley at each other through the flames ; but the Prussians found means to get round the burning houses, and, taking the defenders in reverse, forced them to retire with the loss of many prisoners.

It was ten o'clock when Prince Frederick Charles sent General Stülpnagel to order the attack on Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Mokrovous. The columns advanced covered by skirmishers, and reached the river bank without much loss, but from there they had to fight every inch of their way. The Austrian infantry held the bridges and villages in force, and fired fast upon them as they approached. The Prussians could advance but slowly along the narrow ways and against the defences of the houses, and the volleys sweeping through the ranks seemed to tear the soldiers down. The Prussians fired much more quickly than their opponents, but they could not see to take their aim ; the houses, trees, and smoke from the Austrian discharges shrouded the villages. Sheltered by these, the Austrian Jägers fired blindly where they could tell by hearing that the attacking columns were, and the shots told tremendously on the Prussians in their close formations ; but the latter improved their positions, although slowly, and by dint of sheer courage and perseverance, for they lost men at every yard of their advance, and in some places almost paved the way with wounded. Then, to help the infantry, the Prussian artillery turned its fire, regardless of the enemy's batteries, on the villages, and made tremendous havoc among the houses. Mokrovous and Dohalitz both caught fire, and the shells

fell quickly and with fearful effect among the defenders of the flaming hamlets; the Austrian guns also played upon the attacking infantry, but at this time these were sheltered from their fire by the houses and trees between.

In and around the villages the fighting continued for nearly an hour; then the Austrian infantry, who had been there, driven out by a rush of the Prussians, retired, but only a little way up the slope into a line with their batteries. The wood above Sadowa was strongly held, and that between Sadowa and Benatek, teeming with riflemen, stood to bar the way of the seventh division. But General Franzecky, who commanded this division, was not to be easily stopped, and he sent his infantry at the wood, and turned his artillery on the Austrian batteries. The seventh division began firing into the trees, but found they could not make any impression, for the defenders were concealed, and musketry fire was useless against them. Franzecky let them go, and they dashed in with the bayonet. The Austrians would not retire, but waited for the struggle, and in the wood above Benatek was fought out one of the fiercest combats which the war has seen. But the wood was carried. The Austrian line of advanced posts was now driven in on the Bistritz, but its commander had formed his main line of battle a little higher up the hill, round Lipa, still holding the wood which lies above Sadowa.

Then the Prussian artillery was sent across the Bistritz, and began to fire upon the new Austrian position. At the same time the smoke of General Herwarth's advance was gradually seen moving towards the Austrian left. He had at Nechanitz found the brigade of Saxon troops

which formed the advanced front of the corps at Probus, with some Austrian cavalry, and was driving them towards Probus and Prim, himself following in such a direction that it appeared he would turn the Austrian left flank. But the Austrian commander seemed determined to hold his position, and heavy masses of infantry and cavalry could be seen on the upper part of the slope.

By eleven o'clock the eighth division of the Prussian infantry had taken the village of Sadowa, the fourth that of Dohalitz, and the third that of Dohalicka. The eighth division was now sept against the wood, which, above these places, runs along the side of the Sadowa and Lipa road, while the third and fourth divisions attempted to bear the battle up the hill towards Lipa, and to attack the left flank of the wood. The Prussians advanced against the nearest trees, but did not at first make much impression, for the Austrians being here again concealed, the fire of the needle-gun did not tell, and a whole battery placed at the far end of the wood fired through the trees, and told on their ranks with awful effect. But the assailants fought on, at last broke down the obstacles at the entrance, and then dashed in. The fighting continued from tree to tree, and the Austrians made many a rush to recover the lost position of the wood, but in this close fighting their boyish troops went down easily before the strong men of the eighth division; but when the defenders drew back a little, and their artillery played into the trees, the Prussians suffered fearfully, and about half-way up in the wood the fight became stationary.

For two hours more it continued so; in vain Horne, who commanded the eighth division, strove to push along

the road or through the trees to storm the battery beyond. The fire was too terrible, and his men became gradually exhausted.

A few minutes after the Prussians had occupied the villages along the Bistritz, Feldzeugmeister Benedek was informed that the sixth Prussian corps belonging to the army of the Crown Prince was threatening his right flank. He sent orders that this attack should be checked or detained, and appears to have calculated that the Crown Prince could be held in check until he had time to inflict a severe blow upon the army of Prince Frederick Charles. With this aim he made his preparations for a counter-attack between Probus and Lipa, which was to be made as soon as his artillery had shaken the Prussian line sufficiently. Sixty-four guns were stationed between Lipa and Streselitz to fire on the third and fourth Prussian division, and some of the reserves of cavalry and infantry were moved up to positions favourable for making the counter-attack.

At this time the Austrian artillery were making splendid practice, and about one o'clock the whole battle line of the Prussians could gain no more ground, and was obliged to fight hard to retain the position it had won. At one time it seemed as if it would be lost, for guns had been dismounted by the Austrian fire, and in the wooded ground the needle-gun had no fair field, and the infantry fight was very equal.

Then Prince Frederick Charles sent the fifth and sixth divisions forward. They laid down their helmets and knapsacks on the ground, and advanced to the river.

The King was now near to the Bistritz, and the troops cheered him loudly as they marched into the battle. They went over the Sadowa bridge, disappeared into the wood, and soon the increased noise of the musketry told they had begun to fight ; but the Austrian gunners sent salvo after salvo among them, and they did not push the battle forwards more than a few hundred yards, for they fell back themselves, and they could not reach the enemy. Not only did the fragments of the shells fly about among them, scattering death and awful gashes among their ranks, but the portions of the trees, torn by the artillery fire, flew thickly about, huge ragged splinters that caused even more frightful wounds.

Herwarth, too, was checked upon the right. The smoke of his musketry and artillery, which had hitherto been pushing forward steadily, stood still.

He had marched with his three divisions from Smidar to Nechanitz, and had made himself master of this village at the same time as the divisions of Prince Frederick Charles had occupied the hamlets further up the Bistritz. The Saxon artillery withdrew to the heights by Probus and Prim, and to an intrenchment beside the Hradek wood. Then here also the battle came to a standstill. It required a long time to bring the artillery over the Bistritz, for the Saxons had broken the bridge at Nechanitz, no ford could be found, and the banks of the river were too marshy to allow of the guns been dragged through the stream.

About one o'clock Herwarth's pioneers had repaired the bridge, and his artillery had been brought across the river. He then directed the fourteenth division, commanded by



General Münster, against Probus through Lubno as his left wing. In his centre he sent the fifteenth division, under General Canstein, against Prim, while the sixteenth division, under General Etzel, made a wide sweep to the right, in order to turn the left of the Austrian position at the Castle of Hradek. Probus and Prim were strengthened with barricades and abattis. The Saxons and the eighth Austrian corps fought nobly. A hot battle ensued here, which lasted till past three o'clock.

Affairs did not apparently go more favourably for the Prussians in the centre. The whole of the First Army was severely engaged, with the exception of eight batteries of artillery and the cavalry which was still held in reserve. The reserve artillery of Prince Frederick Charles was sent a little distance up the Bistritz, in order to bring a fire against the flank of the Sadowa wood, to search out the defenders, and if possible to dismount the guns in the batteries in front of Lipa. But, notwithstanding, the Austrians clung obstinately to the trees.

Franzecky's men, cut to pieces, could not be sent forward to attack the Sadowa wood, for they would have exposed themselves to be taken in rear by the artillery on the right of the Austrian line formed in front of Lipa. The First Army was certainly checked in its advance. The Prussian commanders began to look anxiously to the left for the coming of the Crown Prince. Some Austrian guns near Lipa were seen to be firing towards the Prussian left, and it was hoped they might be directed against the advanced guard of the Second Army, but at three o'clock there were no signs of Prussian columns advancing against Lipa. The generals became manifestly

uneasy, and they drew Horne's division out of the Sadowa wood. Cavalry was also formed up, so that it would be available either for the pursuit of the Austrians, or for retarding their pursuit.

When Prince Frederick Charles sent the night before the battle to request the co-operation of the Crown Prince, the latter sent back an answer that he would be on the field at two o'clock. More than faithful to his promise, he was there with two corps at half-past twelve, and his artillery was engaged with the batteries on the Austrian right at that hour. But the fire from the Austrian batteries was so terrible that he could not attack with his infantry till something had been done towards silencing the enemy's guns. The generals directing the first attack could see nothing of the Crown Prince's infantry, as they were hidden in the undulations of the ground. The aide-de-camp despatched from the Second Army to tell the King that the Crown Prince was engaged had to make a long *détour*, and did not reach the generals directing the front attack till late in the afternoon. Hence arose great uneasiness in the front, for from the direction of the Austrian guns they might have been firing against the seventh division, which formed the left of the front attack, and as nothing could be seen of the Crown Prince's troops it began to be feared that he had been stopped by some accident. As time went on anxiety increased, for it was felt that the Austrian position was too strong to be taken by a front attack alone. Glasses were anxiously directed to the left, but the day being wet there was no dust to show where columns marched, and nothing could be seen to indicate the advance of the Second Army

against the Austrian right. The King himself gazed stedfastly through his glass, looking in vain through the misty air. No glimpse could be caught of Prussian riflemen on the slope to the left of Lipa, and no battalions could be seen; the guns also were out of sight, for they were on the reverse side of the Lipa ridge, or were hidden from the position of the staff by the wood that runs from Benatek up the slope towards Lipa.

The anxiety of the Prussian generals at Sadowa was, however, groundless. While they were still unaware that the Crown Prince was upon the field of battle, some of his soldiers were already in the very heart of the Austrians' position, and holding their ground against repeated attempts by superior numbers to dislodge them.

ADVANCE OF THE CROWN PRINCE.—On receiving the request from Prince Frederick Charles to move against the Austrians' right, and the subsequent order from the King to the same effect, the Crown Prince issued orders to the troops to march early on the 3d July. His orders were not sent out till nearly five in the morning, but before seven the heads of his columns had begun to move. On his left wing the sixth corps crossed the Elbe above Jaromir, and marched in two columns towards the Trotinka. The twelfth division, under General Proudinsky, which moved down the Elbe close to the river, was fired upon by the fortress of Josephstadt, and had to leave one brigade to observe the garrison of that place. On the right wing the first corps, followed by the cavalry division, was ordered to march in two columns by Zabres and Grosz-Trotin to Grosz-Bürglitz. In the centre, the corps of the Guards was to move from Königinhof on

Jericek and Lhota. The fifth corps was to follow the sixth corps as a reserve, and to march two hours later from the Elbe to Choteborek. All baggage and train were to be left behind.

The Crown Prince knew nothing of the Austrian position. Where he should find the Austrian flank, in what force, and how defended, were questions which he and his chief of the staff could only answer on the actual field of battle, and on the spur of the moment. The rain had already fallen heavily for some time when the Second Army commenced its march. The Crown Prince witnessed the passage of the Elbe at Königinhof by a portion of the Guards, and then hastened forward with his staff to place himself at the head of the column. The steep roads leading up the high bank of the valley of the Elbe to the plateau of Daubrowitz, slippery and heavy with the rain, tried severely the strength of both men and horses.

Directly after passing Daubrowitz the Commander-in-chief of the Second Army saw from smoke arising from a cannonade, and from burning houses in the direction of Sadowa, that the First Army was already engaged. The wind was blowing towards the battle, so that he could not hear the cannonade, and could not tell in which direction it was moving. He directed the head of his column upon Choteborek. The view extended with every step forward, and it soon became apparent that a great battle was being waged. At a quarter-past eleven the Crown Prince had reached the chain of hills to the west of Choteborek with the first division of the corps of the Guards close behind him. In front of Choteborek the ground formed a low trough about two miles wide, in

which there were many soft and marshy places. Beyond this trough lay the hill of Horenowes, conspicuous with its single tree, and at its foot the village of that name. Beyond this hill the view was shut out, but on its western side the eye could range clearly down the valley of the Bistritz, where it was easy to distinguish the situations of the antagonistic lines of battle by the smoke of a great number of batteries in action, and by the flames of several burning villages. It could be seen that the seventh division, which formed the left wing of the First Army, was fighting an unequal battle in front of Benatek, and was already in need of support.

Towards Grosz-Bürglitz and Welchow, where the two wings of the Second Army were to debouch, heavy woods shut out the view. It was certain, however, that if these two corps, in execution of the orders which had been given them, had reached those places, the further march of the Second Army would conduct it against the right flank and partly into the rear of the enemy's position. Already the army of the Crown Prince occupied a similar position with regard to the First Army, as that of Blücher to the British line on the day of Waterloo.

The Crown Prince despatched officers to ascertain the real positions of the first and sixth corps. Hardly had they left his side when a report came in from General Von Mutius with the intelligence that the sixth corps had already reached Welchow, and in consequence of the heavy cannonade he had ordered it to push on in the direction of the firing. It was this advance which, reported to Benedek, was his first intimation of the advent of the Crown Prince, and which he ordered to be

held in check by his second corps. Fortune had ordained that the sixth corps should have been casually prepared to advance, because, in consequence of the order which it had received to make a reconnoissance against Josephstadt, it had already crossed the Elbe when the second order for an advance beyond Josephstadt reached it.

In a short time the fifth corps was also reported by General Steinmetz to be approaching Choteborek. No news had come in from the first corps, but it was known that on account of its longer march its arrival could hardly yet be expected.

The Crown Prince determined, with the first division of the Guards, which he held available, to seize the hill of Horenowes. In order to do so, he was obliged to advance across the marshy hollow, where his troops would be exposed, without any cover, to the fire of the Austrian guns, which would have plenty of time to collect on the hill in large quantities while the Prussians were traversing the low ground. To save his men as much as possible, the regiments were ordered to spread out and to march singly on the Horenowes hill, where their chief pointed out the conspicuous trees as their goal.

It was a remarkable circumstance that the columns of the Guards could descry no Austrian patrols or outposts to oppose its path. One battery of artillery alone could be seen upon the Horenowes hill. It was clear that the advance of the Guards would turn the line of Austrian guns, which, posted between Horenowes and Maslowed, were playing on Franzecky, and would take some pressure off his struggling division. As the Guards advanced, these guns were seen to change their position, and at half-past

eleven forty Austrian pieces were ranged beside the single tree, to fire against the advancing columns of the Second Army. At ten minutes to twelve the first shell was discharged from these batteries against the Prussian Guards.

The advanced guard of the first division of the Prussian Guards, under General Alvensleben, had bivouacked the previous night at Daubrowitz. It had pushed on in the morning by Burglitz and Zizelowes, and had debouched from the latter place in the direction of Horenowes, at a quarter-past eleven. A quarter of an hour later, five 4-pounder batteries of the Guard opened fire against an Austrian battery, and compelled it to quit its position between Horenowes and Benatek. A 6-pounder Prussian battery at the same time opened upon the Austrian artillery, which was beginning to form on the east of Horenowes, while the infantry advanced by Wrchwitz, for the attack of that village. The other troops of the division followed up this attack by way of Jericek.

The second division of the Guard had lain the previous night at Rettendorf, considerably in rear of the first division. Its march had been consequently delayed, and the reserve artillery of the Guard corps, as well as the heavy cavalry of the Guard, arrived at the scene of action before this division. Its direction was by Choteborek to Lhota.

At eleven o'clock the reserve artillery of the Guard was marching on the left rear of the first division. The ground heavy with rain, and the high corn which wound itself round the wheels of the guns, tired the horses excessively. In front of Jericek, six batteries opened fire, to signal by their noise to the First Army that the Crown

Prince was near at hand. But this salvo was not distinguished by the staff of Prince Frederick Charles amidst the general din of battle, and, as the range was very great, little harm was done to the Austrians by it.

By the time that General Alvensleben advanced against Horenowes, the sixth corps had, on the left, commenced an assault against Racicz. Of this corps, one brigade of the twelfth division, consisting of six battalions, four squadrons, and two batteries, under General Proudzyński, led the way by Roznow and Nesnasow. When the eleventh division, consisting of twelve battalions, eight squadrons, and four batteries, under General Zastrow, reached Welchow, the former had only encountered a few detachments of Austrian cavalry. General Mutius then ordered it to keep the enemy in sight, and in its further advance to communicate with the eleventh division, which he directed against the heights of Horenowes. A report was now brought to that general that it was urgently desirable that he should send some artillery as quickly as possible to support Franzecky's division. Four batteries immediately pushed forward at a trot, covered by the 4th regiment of hussars, crossed the Trotinka at Luzan, and at half-past eleven opened upon the Austrian artillery stationed on the east of Horenowes. The two brigades of the eleventh division in the meantime advanced in *echelon*, left in front, and supported by the 8th Dragoons crossed the Trotinka with great difficulty to the south-east of Luzan, and advanced under a heavy artillery fire to the attack of Racicz.

The twelfth division directed its march against



Smiritz by Roznow, while a squadron of its cavalry regiment, which had been pushed forward in the direction of Smiritz, reported that there were Austrian regiments of cavalry in its front.

On the approach of the first division of the Guard to Horenowes, and of the eleventh division to Raciez, and when both wings of the position of their artillery began to be threatened, the Austrians commenced evacuating their position, and had entirely withdrawn from it by one o'clock. By the same hour the villages of Horenowes and Raciez fell into the hands of their assailants, after short contests. The greater portion of the troops which had garrisoned these places retired in the direction of Sendrasitz, while the first division of the Guard pressed forward to the trees on the east of Horenowes, and the eleventh division pressed upon the retreating Austrians on the south of Raciez.

The small resistance which the army of the Crown Prince here met with appears to be due to the fact that when General Franzecky carried the village of Benatek, the Austrian fourth corps moved forward to oppose him, drove the battle back, and remained engaged with his division in the Maslowed wood. The Austrian second corps was thus alone exposed to the onset of the whole of the Crown Prince's army, and was pushed back by its attack to Sendrasitz. These two Austrian movements caused a gap in Benedek's line of battle, through which the Prussian Guards penetrating, seized Chlum, the key of his position, and turned the fortune of the day.

On the advance of the Prussian Guards to Horenowes some Austrian battalions took up a position on the hill

east of Maslowed. The Guards immediately marched against this hill, and carried it without meeting with any serious resistance. The village of Maslowed, which lay to their right, was evacuated, and half a company of Prussian riflemen occupied it without drawing a trigger. The sixth corps in the meantime engaged the main body of the second Austrian corps, which had furnished the garrisons for Horenowes and Racicz, at Trotina, Sendrasitz, and Nedelitz, and finally forced it to withdraw across the Elbe at Lochenitz. By this contest, which was of quite an independent nature, the left wing of the Prussian Guard was covered while it took the direction of the village of Chlum, guided by the church tower, which forms the highest landmark in the field. In this way the Prussian Guard marched a distance of about two thousand paces along the rear of the position of the fourth Austrian corps, which was now being pushed back by Franzecky in the Maslowed wood. An Austrian brigade showed itself between Maslowed and Lipa, the Prussian advanced guard formed up to its own right and attacked it; while the main body, under Colonel Von Obernitz, pushed on to Chlum, and the fusilier regiment, under Colonel Von Kessel, threw itself into Rosberitz.

The first Prussians who arrived in Chlum saw on the reserve side of the hill, between themselves and the fortress of Königgrätz, the whole of the Austrian reserves, mustering about 40,000 men. Between them and their comrades of the First Army were the Austrian corps engaged near Lipa, and in the Sadowa wood. Twelve battalions of the Prussian Guards was the whole force at hand to hold the key of the battle against the whole reserve of the enemy.

A fierce battle soon began round Rosberitz and Chlum, which were seized by the Prussian Guard at a quarter before three o'clock. At five minutes before three an aide-de-camp reported to Feldzeugmeister Benedek, who was between Chlum and Lipa, that the Prussians had occupied the former village. The Austrian commander could not credit this unexpected intelligence, and hastened himself in person to ascertain its truth. On approaching Chlum he was received by a withering volley, which told with severe effect upon his staff, and convinced him of the veracity of the report. He immediately hastened to send up some reserves to retake the place.

About three o'clock the Army of the Elbe carried Probus, and Feldzeugmeister Benedek was obliged to send two brigades of the nearest Austrian corps, the first, to reinforce his front while he directed one brigade against Chlum, and one against Probus. At the same time the Saxon artillery of the reserve, which was on the further side of the highway from Rosberitz, opened with terrible effect on the Prussians in that village, and prepared the way for an attack by the sixth Austrian corps.

The position of the Prussian Guard became every moment more critical. The few battalions in Rosberitz could not hold their ground, and were driven out of the village, having lost among other officers Prince Anton of Hohenzollern. The reserve artillery of the Prussian Guard under the Prince of Hohenlohe laboured up to the aid of the battalions in Chlum, and, coming into action, smote heavily upon the thick masses of the Austrian reserves which were preparing to attack the houses. When they were attacked twice they almost reached the

orchard and churchyard, but were received at a few paces distance by such a volley from the needle-guns that nearly the whole of the attacking force was either killed or wounded. By the time of the third attack the advanced guard of the reserve division of the Prussian Guard had come up to the support of the battalions who were already in occupation. The third attack was repulsed, and at the same moment the battle was won. The first Prussian corps and the fifth corps, with the cavalry of the Second Army, was pressing up towards Chlum and Rosberitz, bringing a reserve of 50,000 fresh soldiers into the heart of Benedek's position ; while the main body of the second division of the Guards dashed against the wood of Lipa, and the batteries of Chlum.

As yet the Prussian generals at Sadowa were in ignorance of the progress of the Crown Prince, for his other divisions were on the reverse side of the hill of Chlum, and the attack of the second division of the Guard could alone be seen from the front. First a swarm of black dots stealing across the fields showed the advance of the skirmishers, and the Austrian sharpshooters, who had been lying among the corn, could be seen running before them to gain the shelter of their own lines ; close behind the skirmishers followed the heavy columns of infantry, looking like small black squares gliding along the sides of the hill. The Austrian guns played sharply on them, but they pushed forward without wavering till within a short distance of the batteries ; then a few rapid volleys of musketry sent up a cloud of smoke, which, hanging heavily in the misty air, shut out the view ; but the sudden silence of the Austrian guns told that the Prus-

sians had closed, and that the batteries had been stormed. The ground leading up to them was steep, and the gunners sent round after round into the storming columns, till the leading ranks were close to the muzzles of the guns ; the riflemen who were ensconced in intrenchments beside the batteries, to defend them, sent biting volleys into their assailants ; but, caring nought for the fire of the infantry or the steepness of the ground, the Prussians dashed straight at the guns, and both gunners and sharpshooters had to turn and fly. Then the deadly needle-gun opened its fire on the fugitives, and with such precision that the ground was covered with dead or wounded Austrians lying thick together. In one place forty corpses lay on less than an acre of ground, and the wounded appeared to be to the dead as three to one.

The Austrian defeat was now inevitable. As soon as the Crown Prince sent his infantry against the Lipa wood, the First Army sprang forward, and, with loud cheers and drums beating, went dashing up the hill. The Sadowa road was cleared as if by magic, and the battalions went straight against the Austrian batteries. No heed was given to take the guns in flank ; the soldiers felt certain of victory, and sought it by the shortest road. Though disordered by the broken ground, and out of breath with the rapid ascent, so quickly did they advance that the Austrian gunners had no time to limber up, but were forced to desert their pieces and seek safety for themselves and their horses in flight. Most of the guns which had been placed in batteries were taken, but those which acted as field artillery, admirably handled, were quickly

withdrawn, and were already fast forming on a further ridge by Rosnitz to cover the retreat of the infantry.

The Prussians paused but a few moments among the taken guns and then rushed on in pursuit. The summit of the ridge was quickly gained, and there before them they saw the whole hollow ground between them and Rosnitz filled with running white uniforms. The victorious battalions commenced a rapid fire upon them, and men dropped quickly from the flying ranks, rolling over and over as they fell on the sloping ground. The sixth corps, which the Crown Prince had directed more against the Austrian rear, caught the fugitives in flank, and raked the running ranks with their fire. The Prussian artillery was also quickly up, unlimbered, and came into action on the summit of the ridge, and sent its shells bursting with an horrible precision among the heads of the flying soldiers. And yet the Austrians kept their formation, and never let their retreat become a rout. Such a retreat under such circumstances is as creditable to the valour of the Austrian soldiers as a battle won.

The Prussian cavalry, unable to leave the road till it got to nearly the top of the hill, on account of the woods by the side of the way, was not up till the Austrian infantry had got half-way across the hollow which separates Chlum from the further ridge of Rosnitz, and there the Austrian batteries had taken up their position and began to play upon the pursuing troops. Then, for a few minutes, Prince Frederick Charles, who was leading the hussars and dragoons, had to leave them to make his general dispositions for attacking the new position taken up by the Austrian artillery, and the cavalry immediately got

out of hand. By single squadrons, by single troops, and even only in knots of a few horsemen, they rushed with wild impetuosity at different points of the retreating infantry; but the Austrian guns sent shells rapidly among them, and the infantry, though running, still kept its formation, and turned, when they came too close, to stand and deliver volleys which emptied many a saddle. Nor were the Austrian cavalry off the field, though they could not face the tremendous fire of the Prussians to charge and cover the retreat of their infantry; but when attacked by the enemy's cavalry, and when thus the guns could not fire upon them, they fought hard, and sacrificed themselves to cover the retreat. Then, as the squadrons of the 3d regiment of Prussian dragoons were rushing forward to charge some battalions firing near the village of Wsester, an Austrian cuirass brigade, led by an Englishman in the Austrian service of the name of Beales, charged them in flank. They drove the Prussians back, and, smiting them heavily with their ponderous swords, nearly destroyed the dragoons; but Hohenlohe's Prussian Uhlans, seeing their comrades worsted, charged with their lances couched against the Austrians' flank, and compelled them to retire. Pressed hard by the lancers they fell back, fighting hard, but then Ziethen's hussars charged them in the rear. A fierce combat ensued; the Austrian horsemen struck strongly about them, fighting for their lives; but the lancers drove their lances into their horses, while the hussars, light and active, closed in upon them, and only ten Austrians are reported to have escaped unwounded from the *mêlée*. Beales himself was borne wounded to the ground. But the Austrian artillery was

not long able to hold its new position ; the fire of the Prussian guns and the dispositions which were being made to attack it compelled it to retire. It then drew off slowly, but on every successive ridge came into action, and fired against the pursuers to check them, and gain for its own infantry time for retreat. Some Prussian horse artillery and cavalry followed it, and till after nightfall the pursuit went thundering towards the Elbe, and drew the fire of the heavy guns of the fortress. The Austrian cavalry retired to Pardubitz, and the remainder of the army by seven or eight bridges, thrown across the river between that place and Königgrätz, got beyond the stream by night without severe loss.

The Prussian cavalry slowly followed in pursuit along both roads. The wounded who were lying on the ground shrieked with fear when they saw the cavalry galloping down towards them, but Prince Frederick Charles took care that they should be avoided, and at one time checked the pursuit in order to move his squadrons around, and not go through, a patch of standing corn, where many wounded Austrians had taken refuge. These, when they saw the lancers coming, thought they were going to be massacred, and cried piteously, waving white handkerchiefs as a sign of truce ; but they had no cause to fear. Large numbers of prisoners were taken, for the pursuit was continued to the Elbe, and it was not till nine o'clock that all firing had ceased, though the main body of the army halted about seven. As the Princes returned, the battalions cheered them for their victory ; but they left the pursuit of their enemies and the cheers of their own



victorious troops to look after the hospital accommodation provided for the wounded. These lay in immense numbers in the field ; the dead too laid thick, but all they required was done on the morrow. Every cottage in the neighbourhood that had not been burnt was full of wounded. Austrians and Prussians lay side by side, but the Krankenträger were still out, and all were not collected till late the next morning. Conspicuous in the hospitals, working diligently in their voluntary labour, were the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This Order of Knighthood, renewed lately for the succour of the weak and suffering, had sent here a large hospital establishment, under the direction of Count Theodore Stolberg. From the voluntary contributions of the knights, hospitals were maintained in the nearest towns and in the field, all necessary hospital stores were carried by the Order, and means of transport accompanied the army, hospital nurses were provided, and by their aid many wounded were carefully attended to who could not have been looked after by the ordinary arrangements.

The battle of Königgrätz was a great victory for the Prussians, though its full advantages were not known by them until the following day. One hundred and seventy-four guns, twenty thousand prisoners, and eleven standards, fell into the hands of the conquerors ; the total loss of the Austrian army by the disaster of the 3d July amounted to almost forty thousand men, while that of the Prussians was not ten thousand. The *morale* of the Austrian army was destroyed, and their infantry found that in open column they could not stand against the better-armed Prussians. The Austrians had hoped to be

able to close with the bayonet, and so amend the effects of the fire of the needle-gun ; but the idea of the superiority in the use of the bayonet in which the Austrian army prided itself, is one of those vanities which are common to every nation, and this war proved that at close quarters the stronger men of Prussia invariably overcame the lighter and smaller Austrians. The Austrian and Saxon troops engaged amounted to about two hundred thousand men, with six hundred guns.<sup>1</sup> The Prussian army in the field mustered in round numbers two hundred and sixty thousand combatants, with eight hundred and sixteen guns, but of them the fifth corps, one brigade of the sixth corps, and all but the advanced guard of the first corps, in all about sixty thousand men, never fired a shot. Thus the number of casualties were about one thirteenth of the number of men actually engaged.<sup>2</sup>

The highest proportionate loss of the Prussian army fell upon Franzecky's division, which lost two thousand out of a little over fourteen thousand men. The greatest loss on the Austrian side was incurred by the troops who attempted to retake Chlum, and by those who had to retire out of the Lipa and Sadowa woods after the Crown Prince had developed his attack. The artillery on both sides appeared to fail in causing such numerous casualties as might have been anticipated from so large a number of rifled guns. Nor did the infantry fire tell except at close quarters. Whether this was due to the in-

<sup>1</sup> This estimate of the Austrian force is based on an able letter written from Olmütz after the battle by the special correspondent of the *Times*, in which that writer states that Benedek had then collected one hundred and sixty

thousand of the defeated army at Olmütz. This with the Austrian loss would give the above figure.

<sup>2</sup> The following list of the proportion of casualties to combatants, in some of the most famous battles of the last two

ferior shooting power of the needle-gun or to the practical disadvantage of aiming under fire seems to be uncertain.

two centuries, is extracted from a careful essay written for the professional papers of the Royal Engineers by Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, R.E. :—

Name of Battle.	Year.	Numbers.		Killed and Wounded.	
		On each side.	Total.	Number.	Proportion to total Forces.
Malplaquet . .	1709	. . . . .	180,000	18,250 Allies.	. .
Hohen Friedberg.	1745	{ 70,000 P. 70,000 A. }	140,000	{ 5,000 9,000 }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Prague . . .	1757	{ 64,000 P. 74,000 A. }	138,000	{ 16,000 8,000 }	$\frac{1}{8}$
Rosbach . . .	1757	{ 22,000 P. 55,000 A. }	77,000	{ 500 2,800 }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Breslau . . .	1757	{ 25,000 P. 60,000 A. }	85,000	{ 5,000 6,286 }	$\frac{1}{8}$
Lissa . . . .	1757	{ 36,000 P. 80,000 A. }	116,000*	{ 5,000 6,574 }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Zernsdorf . .	1758	{ 32,000 P. 50,000 R. }	82,000	{ 11,385 21,531 }	$\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$
Hoch Kirch . .	1758	{ 50,000 A. 30,000 P. }	80,000	{ 5,000 7,000 }	$\frac{1}{4}$
Marengo . . .	1800	{ 28,127 F. 30,850 A. }	58,977†	{ 7,000 6,800 }	$\frac{1}{4}$
Austerlitz . .	1805	{ 90,000 F. 80,000 R. & A. }	170,000‡	{ 12,000 11,000 }	$\frac{1}{4}$
Jena . . . .	1806	{ 100,000 F. 100,000 P. }	200,000§	{ 14,000 20,000 }	$\frac{1}{8}$
Preussic Eylau .	1807	{ 85,000 F. 75,000 R. }	160,000	{ 30,050 25,000 }	$\frac{1}{3}$
Friedland . .	1807	{ 80,000 F. 50,000 R. }	130,000	{ 10,000 17,000 }	$\frac{1}{8}$
Talavera . . .	1809	{ 52,000 E. & S. 50,000 F. }	102,000	{ 5,928 7,200 }	$\frac{1}{8}$
Wagram . . .	1809	{ 150,000 F. 130,000 A. }	280,000	{ 24,000 8,000 F. }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Salamanca . .	1812	. . . . .	90,000	{ 22,800 F.    }	$\frac{1}{4}$
Borodino . . .	1812	{ 125,000 F. 125,000 R. }	250,000	{ 80,000 50,000 ¶ }	$\frac{1}{3}$
Leipsic . . . .	1813	{ 150,000 F. 280,000 Allies }	430,000	{ not known. }	. .
Vittoria . . .	1813	{ 70,000 E. & C. 27,000 F. }	97,000	{ 10,000 14,000 }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Waterloo . . .	1815	{ 67,600 E. & C. 68,900 F. }	136,500	{ not known. }	. .
Magenta . . .	1859	{ 48,000 F. & S. 61,640 A. }	109,730	{ 4,000 5,700 }	$\frac{1}{10}$
Solferino . . .	1859	{ 135,234 F. & S. 163,124 A. }	298,358*	{ 14,415 13,020 }	$\frac{1}{10}$

\* 21,000 Austrian prisoners missing.

† 19,000 Austrian prisoners.

‡ Includes some prisoners.

§ 1,000 French and 3,000 Austrian prisoners.

|| 20,000 Prussian prisoners. ¶ Includes missing.

\*\* 2,770 Allies and 9,290 Austrians missing.

The number of cartridges fired by the Prussian army in the battle barely exceeded one per man on the ground. Hardly any soldier fired so many as ninety, and few more than sixty.<sup>1</sup> The average number of rounds fired by the artillery of Prince Frederick Charles's army, was forty-two per gun, and no gun of that army fired more than eighty rounds. In the artillery of the Guard, the thirteen batteries engaged fired one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven rounds, being an average of twenty-three per gun ; one battery fired eighty-one rounds per gun.

On the evening of the battle, an officer of the Ziethen hussars, who were forward in the pursuit, rode as far as the gates of Königgrätz, and, finding there were no sentries outside, rode in ; the guard, immediately on seeing him in his Prussian uniform, turned out and seized him, when, with a ready presence, he declared he had come to demand the capitulation of the fortress. He was conducted to the commandant, and made the same demand to him, adding that the town would be bombarded if not surrendered within an hour ; the commandant, unconscious that he was not dealing with a legitimate messenger, courteously refused to capitulate ; but the hussar was conducted out of the town, passed through the guard at the entrance, and got off safely without being made a prisoner.

That night the Prussian army bivouacked on the field, where the main body remained the next day in order to allow the troops time to rest after their great fatigues.

The appearance of the field of battle the next morning showed the severity of the fight. The wounded had all

<sup>1</sup> At the battle of Borodino, one of the most sanguinary contests on record (see preceding page), the French are

said to have fired 1,400,000 cartridges, which would be at the rate of about 10 per man.

been removed, but few of the dead had been buried, for the number of wounded was so great that every man who could be spared from duty was required to look after them. All night long the Krankenträger had been at work, and had been assisted by a large number of soldiers. Every village near the field of battle had all its standing houses converted into hospitals, and all the surgeons in the army had been busy all night long. In the woods and in the broken ground the bodies of Austrians and Prussians were tolerably equal in number, generally lying in groups of four or five of either nation together, marking the spot where a shell had burst; but in the open ground and down the reverse side of the Chlum hill the Austrians lay terribly thick, and hardly a Prussian uniform was to be seen. Wherever the Austrians fought unprotected by cover, and wherever the Prussian riflemen, armed with needle-guns, could see their enemies, the disproportion of the dead became immediately apparent. The corn was trodden down all over the field as flat as if it was straw laid on a stable floor, and the ground was ploughed up and dug into holes with shells.

On the top of the hill of Chlum, and near the village, stood a large number of the captured guns, with all their waggons and carriages beside them, and on the slope away from Sadowa the rest were placed under the charge of the corps of the Guard. Everywhere about the field, fatigue parties were digging large trenches in which the Austrian and Prussian killed were laid side by side, clothed in their uniforms. No other tombstone was put to mark each grave than a plain wooden cross, on which was written the number of each regiment that lay below.

The officers were placed in single graves near the men. But here and there a few were seen silently carrying some comrade to a more retired spot. On one part of the field a Prussian general with his staff was burying his son, who had fallen in the attack on the Austrian right. Close by, the wife of a private soldier who had found her husband's body on the field had had it buried by some soldiers, had hung some oak branches on the little wooden cross at the head, and was sitting on the freshly-turned earth, sobbing her heart out, with his shattered helmet in her lap. She had followed his regiment, in order to be near him, from the beginning of the campaign, through all the long marches the army had made.

The less severely wounded were moved to Horitz, from which, on the approach of the Prussians, the inhabitants had nearly all fled. The vacated houses were converted into hospitals, and at nearly every window and every door men were hanging about listlessly, with heads or arms bound up, with a half stupefied look, as if they had not yet recovered from the stunning effects of the blow which had disabled them. Many were Austrians, and prisoners of war ; but the greatest liberty seemed to be accorded to them, for they were allowed to wander about the streets, and to mix freely with the Prussian soldiers.

Long columns of unwounded prisoners were being marched continually through the town on their way to the rear. The Austrians looked dejected and unhappy, yet marched stolidly and silently along ; but the prisoners from the Italian regiments laughed and talked cheerily, and on them their imprisonment sat lightly.

Here and there an Austrian officer, prisoner on parole, strolled moodily about, stopping every now and then to return the courteous salutations of the Prussian officers who passed by. To ease the anxiety of their friends at home, they wrote letters to announce that they were not killed, but taken, and these were sent with a flag of truce to the Austrian lines. The greatest courtesy and kindness were shown by the Prussian officers to their unfortunate prisoners, and every attempt was made to make them feel their position as little as possible. Several Austrian officers wounded mortally on the field requested Prussian officers to send their last message to their families, requests which it is needless to say were readily complied with.

Field-Marshal Gablenz came to Horitz the day after the battle from the Austrian head-quarters, to ask for an armistice as a preliminary to peace. It was impossible that Prussia could grant an armistice at this moment, when the Austrian army was still in the field, and any pause in the operations of the campaign would be used to collect troops from the Italian frontier and from the distant provinces of the empire in order to oppose the Prussian armies. Nor could peace be concluded by Prussia without the concurrence of Italy, for a treaty existed between the Cabinets of Berlin and Florence, by which neither could make peace without the sanction of the other.

The Field-Marshal accordingly did not obtain an interview with the King of Prussia, and returned to his own lines without obtaining any result from his mission.

The actual junction of the two armies of the Crown Prince and of Prince Frederick Charles was effected on

the battle-field of Königgrätz, and the Austrians had now lost the chance they had of falling upon each army separately.

As the consequence of the defeat of Königgrätz, Austria on the 4th July ceded Venetia to the Emperor of the French, who was nominally to hold the province, although it was virtually then, and practically in the following October, given to the kingdom of Italy.

#### OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

The details of a great battle are, as a general rule, less perfectly known the more closely the time at which they are criticised approaches to the date of the action. While the men are still living on whom disclosures would draw an inconvenient censure, the government of a country which has suffered a great reverse in war is naturally unwilling to gratify the curiosity of the world by the publication of information which can only be certainly found in its own official archives. Without such information it is impossible to make any observations on the causes or conduct of incidents in war with an assured certainty. It is necessary to attempt to lift the veil which shrouds such events during the lifetimes of the principal actors with only a hesitating and a faltering touch, and to acknowledge that any conclusions based upon a crude knowledge of facts are enunciated with diffidence. If correct they are fortuitous, if incorrect their fallacies will be exposed by future information.

The position taken up by Feldzeugmeister Benedek in front of Königgrätz has been severely criticised. It does



not, however, appear that the river in his rear was any disadvantage to him, although his army was defeated, and had its flank turned by a strong force. The Austrian commander took the precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special as well as general conditions also came into play. The pursuing Prussians could not approach with impunity the heads of the Austrian bridges. The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the banks of the river both up and down stream, and, with superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the passage of the Austrians. The position was otherwise acknowledged on all sides to be a good one, carefully chosen; and though the villages were not completely barricaded and loopholed, this omission was probably due to the extreme rapidity of the movements of Prince Frederick Charles. A great disadvantage was the fact that the presence of two opponent armies acting from divergent bases against the Austrian position caused, as all such conditions always must cause, Feldzeugmeister Benedek to fight with his army drawn along two sides of an angle. One side was from Prim to Maslowed, the other from Maslowed to Lochenitz. By such a formation a defeat or even a repulse of either wing must necessarily allow the successful enemy to penetrate into the rear of the other. Or a success and advance of one or both wings must leave a gap at the salient angle.

Two questions have attracted more notice with reference to the battle than others. These are, first — Why did

Benedek allow the Crown Prince to come down so heavily upon his right flank? and secondly, ~~How~~ did the first division of the Prussian Guard manage to get into Chlum unobserved? The answer to the first question appears to be that the Austrian general was deceived as to the position of the Crown Prince.<sup>1</sup> On the 30th June he knew that the Crown Prince was on the Elbe, because from the heights above Königinhof the Prussians were that day cannonaded by an Austrian battery. Between the 30th and the 2d, the Crown Prince pushed troops across the river at Arnau and Königinhof, and directed the heads of their columns towards Miletin. On the afternoon of the 2d, two of Prince Frederick Charles's divisions occupied Miletin. Late on the night of the 2d, one of these divisions of Prince Frederick Charles's army was ordered to move to Milowitz, while the other moved to Cerekwitz. It seems probable that these movements were reported to Benedek by his spies, but erroneously. It would appear that he was told that the main body of the Crown Prince's army had joined Frederick Charles at Miletin, and that the mass of the united armies on the night of the 2d was moving towards its own right to make a concentrated attack against Benedek's left near Nechanitz, with the object of driving in his left, and of cutting him off from Pardubitz and the railway to Vienna. The spies would not fail to notice that some of the Crown Prince's troops were still at Königinhof, and near Gradlitz. Their presence there would be accounted for by the supposition that they were left to watch Josephstadt, to hold the line of the

<sup>1</sup> This theory is entirely based on hypothesis, and must be accepted only for what it is worth.

Elbe, and prevent a raid against the Crown Prince's line of communication with Silesia until he had changed that line for the one by which Frederick Charles communicated with Saxony. This ideal cause of the Austrian conduct on the 3d July appears to be borne out by the following general order which, as it is said, Benedek issued late on the night of the 2d: so late that it only reached his second corps on the Trottna at four o'clock on the morning of the day of the battle. This order would seem to have been dictated when the Feldzeugmeister heard that the Prussians were moving to their own right from Miletin. It was as follows:—

“The Saxon corps will occupy the heights of Popowitz and Tresowitz, the left wing slightly refused and covered by its own cavalry. To the left of this corps and somewhat to the rear, the first light cavalry division will take post, on the extreme left flank of Probus and Prim. On the right of the Saxons the tenth corps will take its position; on the right of the tenth the third will occupy the heights of Chlum and Lipa. The eighth corps will serve as immediate support to the Saxons. The troops not named above are only to hold themselves in readiness while the attack is confined to the left wing. Should the hostile attack assume greater dimensions, the whole army will be formed in order of battle.

“The fourth corps will then move up on the right of the third to the heights between Chlum and Nedelitz; and on the extreme right flank next to the fourth the second will take post.

“The second light cavalry division will take post in rear of Nedelitz, and there remain in readiness. The

sixth corps will take post on the heights near Wästar ; the first near Rosnitz. Both these corps will be in concentrated formation. The first and third cavalry divisions will take post at Sweti. In the event of a general attack the first and sixth corps, the five cavalry divisions, and the reserve artillery of the army, which will be posted in rear of the first and sixth corps, are to serve as the reserve of the army.

"The retreat, if necessary, will be made by the high road to Hohenmauth, without disturbing the fortress of Königgrätz.

"The second and fourth corps must at once cause pontoon bridges to be thrown across the Elbe. The second corps will throw two between Lochenitz and Predmeritz. The first corps will also throw a bridge."

As a digression it may be noticed in passing that these bridges mentioned in this order were ready by mid-day. The organization of the Austrian army cannot have been so very bad as some are now fain to suppose.

By the general tenor of this order, it appears that the Feldzeugmeister fully expected to be attacked on his left, for much the same reason as Wellington at Waterloo fully expected to be assailed on his right. The part of the order which relates to the fourth and second corps shows that he contemplated the possibility of an attack on his right ; but not from a very large force. Probably the reports of the spies induced him to believe that the first corps and the Guards at least of the army of the Crown Prince had joined Prince Frederick Charles, and that only two corps, or sixty thousand men, were at the most on the Elbe. He knew that the two main bodies

of these latter two corps must defile over the river, and march fifteen miles over very bad roads and an extremely difficult country, before they could feel his right. In the meantime he might have disposed of the adversaries in his front. The conduct of the Austrian general during the action seems also to confirm this. Had he known that at ten o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent only four divisions across the Bistritz, he would hardly have failed to bear down upon them with greatly superior numbers, and crush them at once, before the arrival of their assistants. From the time of the attack on Benatek until the arrival of the Crown Prince, Franzecky was exposed across the Bistritz, separated by a wide interval from Horne's division in the Sadowa wood. The country favourable for the action of cavalry. Franzecky had with him only one regiment of hussars. The Prussian reserve cavalry could not have crossed the stream, on account of its marshy banks, to his assistance. Twenty thousand Austrian horsemen were at Benedek's command. He held them inactive. Yet the hero of San Martino was not the man to miss to strike a blow if he thought he could do so with safety. He must have imagined Franzecky much stronger than he really was. Probably the Austrian staff imagined that the Crown Prince's corps, which here joined Frederick Charles, were the assailants of Benatek. If there is any ground for the above supposition, how much must the conclusion reflect upon the Austrian system of reconnaissances and patrols. From the high bank above Königinhof, a staff-officer lying hidden in the fir-wood could, almost with the naked eye, have counted every Prussian gun, every

Prussian soldier that the Crown Prince moved towards Miletin. The eyes of the Austrian army on more than one occasion during the campaign failed. Their patrol system was very much inferior to that of the Prussians. Its inferiority seems to have been due to the want of military education among the officers to whom patrols were entrusted. In the Prussian army special officers of high intelligence were always chosen to reconnoitre. Properly so, for the task is no easy one. An eye unskilled, or a mind untutored, can see little, where a tried observer detects important movements. A line of country, or a few led horses, will tell the officer who is accustomed to such duty more than heavy columns or trains of artillery will disclose to the unthinking novice. The Prussian system never failed, never allowed a surprise. The Austrians were repeatedly surprised, and taken unprepared. Yet the outpost system of the latter during the Italian war of 1859 merited the praise of the Emperor of the French, and was by him pointed out to his own army as a model of superiority.<sup>1</sup> The military development of Prussia has not yet been fully appreciated.

Another fact which may aid to corroborate the theory advanced above is the telegram in which Feldzeugmeister Benedek first announced to Vienna the loss of the battle. In this he said that some of the enemy's troops, under cover of the mist, established themselves on his flank, and so caused the defeat. Probably at that time he thought that the troops that got into Chlum were a detachment from those engaged at Benatek.

How the Prussian Guards were allowed to get into

<sup>1</sup> General Order of the Emperor after the Battle of Solferino.

Chlum appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum Church tower the whole country can be clearly seen as far as the top of the high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally supposed, could have easily seen any movements of troops as far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite distinctly Herwath's attack at Hradek, and, except during occasional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surrounding country except where the configuration of the ground or the heavy smoke overcame the sight. From the top of Chlum Church there was a clear view over all the neighbouring hills, and the top of the spire generally stood out clear over the heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill from Benatek to Nechanitz. So little apprehensive, however, was Benedek of an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower; and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any view towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and houses of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of the advance of the Guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes, and passed through Maslowed. From that village, without opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line, apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlum and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps to whom the defence of the ground between Maslowed and Nedelitz was entrusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Franzecky in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing forwards towards Benatek quitted their proper ground. A short time afterwards the second

Austrian corps was defeated by the Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards its bridge at Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retreat of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, through which the Prussian Guards marched unmolested, and without a shot seized the key of the position. Once installed they could not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the Austrians.

The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed. The men were fatigued, and night was coming on. The Austrian cavalry was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Prussian cavalry of the First Army had suffered severely. The Elbe lay between the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The victory, although fortuitously decisive, was not improved to such advantage as it ought to have been.



## CHAPTER III.

### DEFENCE OF SILESIA.

BEFORE proceeding to review the events which have in the meantime been taking place in the western theatre of war, it is requisite to cast a glance upon the operations of the two Prussian corps which had been left to guard the province of Silesia. On the concentration of the Austrian army in Bohemia, a corps of 6,000 men, under General Trentinaglia, had been left at Cracow. Two Prussian independent corps had, as was already noticed, been stationed at Ratibor and Nicolai, to shield south-eastern Silesia against a probable attack from this corps. The former was commanded by General Knobelsdorf, and consisted of the 62d regiment of infantry, the 2d regiment of Uhlans, a few battalions of Landwehr, and one battery. The latter, under General Count Stolberg, was formed of Landwehr alone, and mustered six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jägers, and one battery.

The corps of Knobelsdorf was to defend the Moravian frontier, that of Stolberg the Gallician ; and both, in case of attack by overwhelming numbers, were to fall back under the protection of the fortress of Kosel.

On the 21st June, Stolberg's corps obtained its first important although bloodless success. That day it marched rapidly, many of the men being conveyed in waggons to Pruchna, blew up the railway viaduct there, and so destroyed the communication between General Trentinaglia and the main Austrian army.

On the 24th and 26th June, as well as on the intermediate days, several Austrian parties made demonstrations of crossing the frontier near Oswiecin. Large bodies of troops appeared to be in the act of concentration at that place, and General Stolberg determined to assure himself of the actual strength of the Austrians there by a reconnoissance in force.

To aid this, General Knobelsdorf sent a part of his troops to Myslowitz, to cover the rear of Stolberg's corps while it marched on Oswiecin.

At the latter place, General Stolberg found a considerably superior force of the enemy. He seized the buildings of the railway station, placed them hastily in a state of defence, and determined by making a long halt here to force the Austrians to develop their full force.

After he had achieved this object, General Stolberg retired to his position near Nicolai. The detachment at Myslowitz had at the same time to sustain an action there, and fulfilled completely its purpose of holding the enemy back from Oswiecin.

On the 30th June, Stolberg's detachment was so weakened by the withdrawal of his Landwehr battalions, which were called up in order to aid in the formation of a fourth battalion to every regiment, that it could no longer hold its own against the superior Austrian

force near Myslowitz. It retired accordingly nearer to Ratibor, in the direction of Plesz, and undertook from here, in connexion with General Knobelsdorf, expeditions into Moravia against Teschen, Biala, and Skotchau, annoyed the Austrians considerably, and made the inhabitants of Moravia regard the war with aversion.

## APPENDIX I.

*Peace concluded at VIENNA on the 30th October, 1864  
between AUSTRIA (EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH I.) and  
PRUSSIA (KING WILLIAM I.) on the one side, and  
DENMARK (KING CHRISTIAN IX.) on the other.*

INTRODUCTION.—In the name of the Most Holy and Inseparable Trinity, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Denmark, are decided to convert the Preliminaries signed on the 1st August into a definitive Treaty of Peace.

To this end are named as Plenipotentiaries, Baron Charles von Werther, authorized Minister at the Austrian Court, &c., and Mr. Louis von Balen, present Privy Councillor, by His Majesty the King of Prussia; Bernhard, Count von Rechberg, Knight of the Golden Fleece (until 27th October, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Baron Adolph von Brenner Felsech, Ambassador Extraordinary to the Danish Court, by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria; Mr. Quaade, Minister without Portfolio, &c., and Mr. Theodor von Kaufmann, Colonel in the General Staff, &c., by His Majesty the King of Denmark. These met together at the Vienna Conference, and having exchanged their powers of action, and proved them in due order, are agreed on the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.—May peace and friendship exist from this time forth between their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark, and between their heirs and successors, their states and subjects.

**ARTICLE 2.**—All stipulations and agreements which existed between the contracting Powers before the war shall again come into force, in so far as they have not become annulled or modified by the sense of the present treaty.

**ARTICLE 3.**—His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up all rights in the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, in favour of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and binds himself to acknowledge any arrangements relative to these duchies which their aforementioned Majesties may make.

**ARTICLE 4.**—The abdication of the duchy of Schleswig includes all those islands belonging to it, as well as the territory situate on the continent. To facilitate the determination of boundary, and to avoid the inconveniences which arise from the position of the Jutland territories, which are circumscribed with those of Schleswig, His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up to their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria those Jutland possessions lying south of the southern boundary of the Ribe district, as well as the Jutland territory of Mogel-Tondern, the Island of Amrum, the Jutland share of the Tohr, Sylb, and Roms Isles. In exchange, their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria concede an equivalent portion of Schleswig, which includes territories serving to secure the connexion of the above-mentioned district of Ribe, with the remainder of Jutland, and mark the boundary between Jutland and Schleswig, on the Koldnig side, which portion shall be separated from the duchy of Schleswig, and incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark.

**ARTICLE 5.**—The new boundary between the kingdom of Denmark and the duchy of Schleswig will proceed from the centre of the mouth of the Bay of Heilsmünde, on the Little Belt, and after passing this bay, will follow the present southern limits of the Heyl, Weystrup, and Taps parishes, as far as the course of the river, which is on the south of Geylbjerg and Brönore. It will then follow the course of this river from its mouth in the Fövs Aa, the extent of the southern limits of the parishes of Peddfis and Vandrup, and the west boundary of the latter, as far as

Konge Aa, to the north of Holte. From this point the valley of Konge Aa will represent the limits as far as the eastern boundary of the parish of Hjort-Lund. From this point the boundary line will follow this east limit and its prolongation, as far as the jutting angle to the north of the valley of Abbekjar, and lastly the eastern boundary of the village, on to Gyels Aa. From there the east boundary of Seem parish, and the south borders of the Seem, Ribe, and Wester-Wedstedt parishes, will represent the new limits, which will run in the North Sea, at equal distance between the islands of Mäno and Römo. In consequence of this new determination of boundary, the common title to rights and possessions, as well those which relate to the secular as the ecclesiastical, and which till now have existed on the islands and in the various parishes of the district, will be declared null. Therefore the new sovereign powers will have full right in every relation to the territories separated by the new boundaries.

ARTICLE 6.—An international commission, composed of the representatives of these high contracting Powers, will, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, be authorized to undertake the drawing of the new boundaries, according to the stipulations of the above article. This commission will also have to divide the restoration expenses for the new high road from Ribe to Tondern, even to the extension of the mutual territories through which it runs. Lastly, the same commission will lead the Presidentship in the division of the institutions and capitals which till this time belonged in common to the districts or parishes now severed by the new boundaries.

ARTICLE 7.—The arrangements of the 20th, 21st, and 22d Articles of the Treaty of the 3d May, 1815, between Austria and Russia, which represents an essential part of the arrangements relating to mixed possessors, to the rights which these may exert, and neighbourly relations, with regard to the possessions separated by the boundary line, will find their application to the possessors, as well as to the possessions, which are to be found in Schleswig as in Jutland, in the cases given in the above-mentioned arrangements.

**ARTICLE 8.**—To arrive at a just division of the Danish monarchy's public debt, according to the proportion of the population in the kingdom and duchies concerned, and at the same time to ameliorate the insuperable difficulties which a detailed liquidation of the mutual claims and pretensions would call forth, the high contracting Powers have fixed the debt of the Danish monarchy with which the duchies will be burdened at the round sum of 20,000,000 thalers (Danish currency).

**ARTICLE 9.**—The share of the public debt to the Danish monarchy, which according to the above Article is to fall on the duchies, shall, under the guarantee of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, reckon as to the debt of the above-mentioned duchies, to the kingdom of Denmark, after the expiration of a year, or earlier if it be possible, from the time of the definitive organization of the duchies. For the payment of this debt the duchies can avail themselves, wholly or in part, of one or other of the following means :—1. Payment in silver currency, 75 thalers (Prussian) equal to 100 thalers (Danish) ; 2. Payment to the Danish Treasury, by indissoluble bonds at 4 per cent. on the internal debt of the Danish monarchy ; 3. Payment to the Danish Treasury, in new Treasury bonds, given out by the duchies, and the value of which shall be determined in Prussian thalers (30 to the pound), or in Hamburg marks. These will be liquidated by a half-yearly annuity of 5 per cent. upon the original amount of the debt, of which 2 per cent. represents the interest adjudged to the debt for each term, while the rest will serve to pay it off. The above-mentioned payment of the half-yearly annuity will be made through the public coffers of the duchies, or through the bankers of Berlin and Hamburg. The bonds named under 2 and 3 will be accepted by the Danish Treasury at their nominal value.

**ARTICLE 10.**—Up to the time when the duchies definitively receive the sum, which according to the 8th Article of the present Treaty is that which the Danish monarchy has to pay as its share of the mutual debt, they will pay 2 per cent. on the settled sum, that is 580,000 thalers, Danish currency. This payment will be so effected that the interest and the account settlement

of the Danish debt, which to the present has been assigned to the public offices of the duchies, shall, as before, be paid by them. These payments will be made every half year, and in case they do not reach the above-mentioned sums, the duchies will pay off the remainder in cash to the Danish Finance Administration; if the reverse, the overplus is to be likewise repaid to them in cash. The liquidation will take place between Denmark and the highest managing authorities of the duchies, commissioned for the purpose, according to the stipulated manner of the present list, or even quarterly, if it be considered necessary on both sides. The first settlement shall be for the especial purpose of arranging the interest and account payment of the Danish monarchy, which were made after the 2d December, 1863.

ARTICLE 11.—The sums which represent the so-called Holstein-Plousche equivalent, the remainder of the compensation for the former possessions of the Duke of Augustenburg, including the debt of precedence with which it is burdened, and the Government bonds of Schleswig and Holstein, shall fall exclusively to the duchies.

ARTICLE 12.—The Governments of Prussia and Austria will repay themselves the expenses of the war through the duchies.

ARTICLE 13.—His Majesty the King of Denmark binds himself, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to give up, with their freights, all the merchant ships of Prussia, Austria, and Germany, which have been taken during the war, also the cargoes belonging to Prussian, Austrian, or German subjects, which have been taken from neutral vessels; lastly, all vessels which Denmark had taken with a warlike design from the abdicated duchies. These objects shall be given back in the same condition in which they really are up to the time of restoration. In case the objects to be returned no longer exist, the worth shall be given in restitution; and should the value have considerably diminished since their seizure, the owner shall receive a proportionate remuneration. It is also acknowledged as binding to make amends to the owners and crews of the ships, and to the owners of the cargoes, for all outlay and direct



loss which are proved to have fallen on them through the seizure of the vessels; also for the port duties, quarantine duties, law expenses, costs of maintenance, and expenses of sending back the ships and crews. Concerning the vessels which cannot be restored, the value of these at the time of seizure will be accepted as remuneration. Concerning the average freights, or those objects which exist no more, the indemnification will be fixed according to the value which they would have borne at the place of their destination, at the time when the vessel would have reached it, according to probable calculation. Their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria will also give up the merchant ships which have been taken by their troops and men-of-war, with their freights, as far as these are the properties of private individuals. If the restoration cannot be made *in natura*, the indemnification will be settled according to the above-mentioned principles. At the same time their Majesties bind themselves to bring to a settlement the sum total of the war contributions which were received in advance by their troops in Jutland. This sum will be deducted from the indemnification which was to be paid by Denmark, according to the principles of the present act. Their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark, will name a special commission to fix the sum total of the indemnifications. This commission will assemble at Copenhagen, at latest six weeks after the ratification of the present Treaty, and will endeavour to complete their task in three months. If at the end of this term they have arrived at no understanding about the claims brought before them, those which are not yet arranged shall be submitted to a court of separation (*Schneide*). To this end, their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark, will agree on the choice of a judge (of separation?). The indemnifications will be paid, at latest, one month after their definitive appointment.

ARTICLE 14.—The Danish Government remains burdened with all sums which are paid through the subjects of the duchies, communities, public institutions, and corporations, to the Danish pay offices, as cautions, deposits, and consignments. Moreover

shall be restored to the duchies—1. The deposit fixed for the payment of the Holstein Bank certificates; 2. The funds appointed for the prison building; 3. The fire insurance funds; 4. The Savings' Bank; 5. The capital proceeding from legacies belonging to the parishes or public institutions of the duchies; 6. Bank reserves from the special receipts of the duchies, which were *bonâ fide* in the public coffers, at the commencement of the Germanic execution and occupation of these lands. An international commission shall be authorized to liquidate the amount of the above-mentioned sums, deducting the expenses which the special administration required. The collection of antiquities at Flensburg, relating to the history of Schleswig, and which during the late occurrences have been for the most part dispersed, shall, by the assistance of the Danish Government, be again gathered together. Likewise shall those Danish subjects, communities, public institutions, and corporations which have paid sums of money into the public coffers of the duchies, as cautions, deposits, or consignments, be most promptly satisfied by the new Government.

ARTICLE 15.—The pensions which depend on the special budgets, be it of the kingdom of Denmark or of the duchies, shall in future be paid by the country concerned, and the holders of them shall be free to choose their domicile, either in the kingdom or in the duchies. All other pensions, civil as well as military (including the pensions of the functionaries of the civil list of His late Majesty King Frederick VII. of His late Royal Highness Prince Ferdinand, of Her late Royal Highness the Margravine Charlotte of Hesse, *née* Princess of Denmark), and the pensions which till now have been paid through the Privy Purse, will be divided between the kingdom and duchies, according to the proportion of their population. To this end, a list of all these pensions will soon after be drawn up, the value of the life rents converted into capital, and all the pensioners invited to declare whether in future they desire to receive their pensions in the kingdom or the duchies. Should it happen that, in consequence of this declaration, the proportion between the two parts, that is, between that which falls to the duchies

and that which remains as a charge on the kingdom, should not be according to the proportionate population, the difference shall be equalized by the parties concerned. The pensions which are assigned to the General Widows' Pay-office, and the Pension-fund of the subordinate military, will for the future, as formerly, be paid as far as the funds reach. As regards the additional sums which the State will have to advance to these funds, the duchies will be charged with a share, according to the proportion of their population. The share of the Income and Life Insurance Institution, founded at Copenhagen in 1848, which the individual rights belonging to the duchies have attained, they shall expressly retain. An international commission, composed of representatives of both sides, shall assemble at Copenhagen, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, and regulate singly the stipulations of this article.

ARTICLE 16.—The Royal Government of Denmark undertakes the payment of the following royal annuities: Her Majesty the Dowager Queen Caroline Amelia; Her Royal Highness the Hereditary Princess Caroline; Her Royal Highness the Duchess Wilhelmina von Glücksburg; Her Serene Highness the Princess Caroline Charlotte Marianne of Mecklenburg-Strelitz; Her Serene Highness the Dowager Duchess Louise Caroline von Glücksburg; His Highness the Prince of Hesse; and their Serene Highnesses the Princesses Charlotte Victoria, and Amelia of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. The share of these payments which according to the proportion of the population falls to the duchies will be repaid to the Danish Government by the administration of the duchies. The selected commissioners mentioned in the preceding article will also be charged to fix the arrangements for the performance of the present article.

ARTICLE 17.—The new Government of the duchies undertakes the rights and obligations of all contracts and objects of public interest (especially those which concern the abdicated country) which have been concluded, conformable to the law of the administration of His Majesty the King of Denmark. It

is, of course, understood that all obligations resulting from contracts which the Danish Government had concluded, in reference to the war and the Germanic execution, are not included in the preceding determinations. The new Government of the duchies will respect every right or title of individuals or civilians, legally acquired in the duchies. In case of dispute, the Law Courts will find their matters under this category.

ARTICLE 18.—The native subjects of the relinquished countries serving in the Danish army or navy have the right to be immediately exempted from military service, and to return to their homes. It is understood that those among them who remain in the service of His Majesty the King of Denmark need not therefore be in fear, either in reference to their persons or their estates. The same rights and guarantees will be mutually assured to the civil functionaries born in Denmark or the duchies, and who have the intention either to give up or retain the offices they hold, either in Denmark or the duchies.

ARTICLE 19.—The subjects domiciled in the countries relinquished under the present Treaty have, during an interval of six years (reckoned from the day of the exchange of the ratifications), by means of a preliminary declaration before the authorized jurisdiction, full and entire freedom to carry out their moveable possessions free from all tax, and to retire with their families into the states of His Danish Majesty, in which case they will retain the quality of Danish subjects. At the same time they are permitted to keep their estates in the abdicated countries. The same freedom is also mutually allowed to Danish subjects and individuals born in the duchies, who are established in the states of His Majesty the King of Denmark. The subjects who make use of these arrangements need suffer no inquietude, either for their persons or with reference to the properties situate in both states, on account of their choice of either one side or the other. The above-mentioned respite of six years is also available to those belonging either to the kingdom of Denmark or to the ceded country, who are staying out of the territories of the King of Denmark, or of the duchies at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

The nearest Danish Embassy, or any high provincial jurisdiction of the kingdom or the duchies, will receive their declaration. The naturalization in the kingdom of Denmark, as in the duchies, belongs to any individual who has possessed it up to the time of the ratification of this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 20.**—The titles of possession, the acts of administration and civil justice, which relate to the ceded countries, and which are in the archives of the kingdom of Denmark, shall be surrendered to the Commissioners of the new Government of the duchies as soon as possible. All those divisions of the archives at Copenhagen, which belonged to the ceded country, and which were taken from their archives, shall be given up. The Danish Government and the new Government of the duchies mutually bind themselves to divide all documents and manuscripts which bear reference to the common concerns of Denmark and the duchies, on the demand of the high administrative jurisdiction. The trade and navigation of Denmark and the ceded duchies shall enjoy the rights and privileges of the most favoured nations, and indeed, until a special Treaty settles the conditions, the exemptions and facilities relating to the transit duty, which, according to Article 2 of the Treaty of the 14th May, 1857, is allowed to the goods which are conveyed on the highways and canals which unite, or will unite, the North Sea and the East Sea, will find their application to all goods which the kingdom or the duchies convey, whatever mode of communication it be.

**ARTICLE 21.**—The evacuation of Jutland by the allied troops will be accomplished in as short a time as possible, at latest in the course of three weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The extra arrangements concerning the evacuation are fixed in a Protocol appended to the present Treaty.

**ARTICLE 22.**—And to contribute all in their power to the tranquillity of every mind, the high contracting Powers declare and promise that no person who is compromised on the occasion of the late events, because of his position and political opinions, shall be at all persecuted, molested, or alarmed, either in his

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Hertwegh.

25th Field Jäger Battalion.

41st Infantry Regiment (Kellner).

56th " " (Gorizutti).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Rosenweig.

17th Field Jäger Battalion.

4th Infantry Regiment (Deutschmeister).

55th " " (Bianchi).

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Jonak.

14th Field Jäger Battalion.

20th Infantry Regiment (Prussia).

60th " " (Wasa).

To each Brigade one squadron of the 10th Uhlans and one 4-pounder Field Battery were attached.

Besides were attached to the Corps one Sanitary Company, two Field Ambulances, one battalion of Engineers, one battalion of Pioneers, two 4-pounder and two 8-pounder Field Batteries, two 8-pounder batteries of Horse Artillery, and a Rocket Battery.

#### EIGHTH CORPS D'ARMÉE.

General Commanding . . . Archduke Leopold.

Assistant . . . Major-General Weber.

Chief of the Staff . . . Lieut.-Col. Von Majnone.

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Fragner.

5th Field Jäger Battalion.

15th Infantry Regiment (Nassau).

77th " " (Archduke of Tuscany).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Von Docteur.

31st Field Jäger Battalion.

8th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Louis).

74th " " (Nobili).

Commandant of Brigade.—General Count Rothkirk.

25th Infantry Regiment (Mamula).

71st " " (Leopold of Tuscany).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Brandenstein.

24th Field Jäger Battalion.

21st Infantry Regiment (Reischach).

23d       "       "       (Este).

To each Brigade one squadron of the Archduke Charles's Uhlans (No. 3) and one 4-pounder Battery were attached.

Besides were attached to the Corps the same as to the First Corps.

#### TENTH CORPS D'ARMÉE.

General Commanding . . . Lieutenant Field-Marshal Von Gablenz.

Assistant . . . . . Baron Koller.

Chief of the Staff . . . . Colonel Bourignon.

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Mondel.

12th Field Jäger Battalion.

10th Infantry Regiment (Mazuchelli).

24th       "       "       (Parma).

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Grivicics.

16th Field Jäger Battalion.

2d Infantry Regiment (Alexander).

23d       "       "       (Airoldi).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Von Knebel.

28th Field Jäger Battalion.

1st Infantry Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph).

3d       "       "       (Archduke Charles).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Wimpffen.

13th Infantry Regiment (Bamberg).

58th       "       "       (Archduke Stephen).

To each Brigade were attached one squadron of the 1st Uhlans and one 4-pounder Field Battery.

The same were attached to the Corps as to the First Corps, except that this Corps had only one 4-pounder Field Battery.

*First Light Cavalry Division.*—Major-General Baron Edelsheim.

Chief of Staff.—Major Wäldstatten.

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Appel.

2d Dragoons (Windischgrätz).

9th Hussars (Liechtenstein).

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Wallis.

1st Dragoons (Savoy).

10th Hussars (King of Prussia).

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Fratricievics.

5th Hussars (Radetzky).

8th „ (Hesse-Cassel).

*Second Light Cavalry Division.*—Major-General Prince Thurn  
and Taxis.

Chief of the Staff.—Colonel Rodakovszky.

Commandant of Brigade.—Colonel Bellegarde.

4th Hussars (Eseh).

12th „ (Haller).\*

Commandant of Brigade.\*Colonel Westphalen.

6th Hussars (Württemberg).

11th „ (Palfy).

*First Reserve Division of Cavalry.*—Lieutenant Field-Marshal  
Prince Schleswig-Holstein.

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Prince Solms.

4th Cuirass Regiment (Ferdinand).

6th „ „ (Hesse).

8th Uhlans (Emperor Max.).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Schindlöcker.

9th Cuirass Regiment (Stadion).

11th Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph).

4th Uhlans ( „ „ )



*Second Reserve Division of Cavalry.*—Major-General Von Zajtsek.

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Borberg.

3d Cuirass Regiment (Saxony).

7th " " (Brunswick).

2d Uhlans (Schwarzenberg).

Commandant of Brigade.—General Count Soltyk.

1st Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph).

5th Cuirass Regiment (Nicolas).

5th Uhlans (Walmoden).

*Third Reserve Division of Cavalry.*—Major-General Count Coudenrove.

Commandant of Brigade.—Prince Windischgrätz.

2d Cuirass Regiment (Wrangel).

8th " " (Prince of Prussia).

7th Uhlans (Archduke Charles Louis).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Mengen.

10th Cuirass Regiment (Bavaria).

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 29th Infantry Regiment (Thun).  
 43rd     "     "     (Alemann).

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 10th Field Jäger Battalion.  
 19th Infantry Regiment (Crown Prince Rudolph).  
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5th Infantry Regiment (Wetzlar).

7th       "       "       (Maroicic).

Commandant of Brigade.—Major-General Gaal.

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39th       "       "       (Don Miguel).

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